Abstract
This book is a collection of five studies, four of which have not been previously published. The first is a reprint of Professor Bernard Williams’ inaugural lecture at Bedford College in May, 1965. In "Morality and the Emotions," Williams points to the neglect of emotions in recent British moral philosophy due to the preoccupation with fact-value distinction and an immersion in "a deeply Kantian view of morality". A reassessment of the contribution of emotivism is made. The suggestion is that in some cases, "the relevant unity in a man’s behaviour, the pattern into which his judgments and actions together fit, must be understood in terms of an emotional structure underlying them, and that understanding of this kind may be essential". There follows a criticism of Kant on emotions. The second essay, "Attitudes, Beliefs, and Reasons," by R. Scruton addresses to the question of "What is the nature of a moral belief?" by considering the naturalistic and emotive answers and offering arguments in favor of the latter. This is a monographic essay that deals with a range of issues in recent moral philosophy. The suggested analysis of "attitude" in terms of two necessary conditions gives plausibility of a new defense of emotive theory. Regarding objectivity of moral judgments, Scruton suggests that this notion be regarded as "indefinite suspended subjectivity" which in some way parallels C. Wellman’s Challenge and Response.