The Naive Argument against Moral Vegetarianism

Environmental Values 9 (1):81-89 (2000)
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Abstract

The naïve argument against moral vegetarianism claims that if it is wrong for us to eat meant then it is wrong for lions and tigers to do so as well. I argue that the fact that such carnivores lack higher order mental states and need meat to survive do suffice to undermine the naive argument.

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Peter Alward
University of Saskatchewan

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