Berkeley and the justification of beliefs

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (2):235-256 (1987)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper analyzes berkeley's philosophy in the light of modern epistemology and philosophy of mind. It is shown that our knowledge of spatio-Temporal bodies cannot be certain. Certainty is restricted to the realm of sensory ideas themselves. But there is hardly any reason to be interested in ideas as such. Berkeley is a common sense thinker who wants to know the world and its scientific laws. Bodies are constructed on the basis of both real and imaginary ideas. This topic is analyzed starting from pappas's and pitcher's views. It is shown that bodies are complete complexes of ideas and that imagination plays an essential role here. The continuity of bodies is discussed. The methods of making a distinction between real and imaginary ideas are analyzed. Concerning berkeley's philosophy of mind--It is shown that one can reach absolute certainty in this field but one cannot find much information concerning the various parts and functions of the mind. The difference between the active and the passive mind is discussed. The relations between ideas and the mind is explored briefly

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Coherentism.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Scientific Realism, Perceptual Beliefs, and Justification.Richard Otte - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:393 - 404.
Probability and Coherence Justification.Michael Huemer - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):463-472.
Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.
Rock bottom: Coherentism's soft spot.Bruce Russell - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):94-111.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
148 (#117,673)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Berkeley: How to make a mistake.Michael P. Levine - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):29-39.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references