Berkeley’s Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):47-61 (1990)
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Abstract

Part of Berkeley's strategy in his attack on materialism in the Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous is to argue that the epistemological distinction between ideas of so-called primary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities, especially as this distinction is found in Locke, is untenable. Both kinds of ideas-those presenting to the mind the quantifiable properties of bodies and those which are just sensations -are equally perceptions in the mind, and there is no reason to believe that one kind represents true properties of independently existing external objects while the other kind does not.

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Steven Nadler
University of Wisconsin, Madison

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Berkeley’s Use of the Relativity Argument.Richard T. Lambert - 1980 - Idealistic Studies 10 (2):107-121.
Berkeley: God's pain.Donald Gotterbarn - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 28 (4):245 - 254.
Berkeley.C. J. Warnock - 1983 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (1):121-122.

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