You can't give permission to be a bastard: Empathy and self-signaling as uncontrollable independent variables in bargaining games

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):815-816 (2005)
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Abstract

Canonical utility theory may have adopted its selfishness postulate because it lacked theoretical rationales for two major kinds of incentive: empathic utility and self-signaling. Empathy – using vicarious experiences to occasion your emotions – gives these experiences market value as a means of avoiding the staleness of self-generated emotion. Self-signaling is inevitable in anyone trying to overcome a perceived character flaw. Hyperbolic discounting of future reward supplies incentive mechanisms for both empathic utility and self-signaling. Neither can be effectively suppressed for an experimental game

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