Intertemporal bargaining predicts moral behavior, even in anonymous, one-shot economic games

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):78 - 79 (2013)
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Abstract

To the extent that acting fairly is in an individual's long-term interest, short-term impulses to cheat present a self-control problem. The only effective solution is to interpret the problem as a variant of repeated prisoner's dilemma, with each choice as a test case predicting future choices. Moral choice appears to be the product of a contract because it comes from self-enforcing intertemporal cooperation.

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