Abstract

In this thesis I argue that emotion can not be adequately defined in terms of sensation, normative belief , nor a combination of the two. Emotion does entail "feeling" however, and explaining the sense of feeling which is relevant to defining emotion is the central aim of this thesis. In brief, I will show that the "emotionally relevant" sense of feeling is intentional in itself--but it is not to be identified with bodily sensation as feelings "traditionally" have been treated, nor is it to be reduced to normative belief, which is how "cognitive theorists" have explained the intentionality of emotion. The feeling essential to emotion is irreducibly intentional and affective in nature: It is distinctively affective and can not be analysed in terms of "component parts." ;A proper analysis of the concept of emotion requires somewhat more than an explanation of "emotionally relevant feeling" though. For as the cognitive theorists have correctly maintained, one can "have an emotion" for quite some time without having to continuously feel or experience it. So while I mainly define emotion in terms of ERF, I add to this the concept of "dispositional emotion" which accounts for emotions that are not always felt. Finally, I discuss the connection between the concept of emotion and ERF, as well as the connection between emotions and moods, and emotions and behavior