Fodor's Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections

Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,846

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Asymmetric dependencies, ideal conditions, and meaning.Martha Gibson - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (2):235-59.
Fodor on Causes of Mentalese Symbols.Erdinç Sayan & Tevfik Aytekin - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):3-15.
Speaking up for Darwin.Ruth G. Millikan - 1991 - In Barry M. Loewer (ed.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 151-164.
Locking on to the language of thought.Christopher David Viger - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.
Fodor's causal theory of representation.H.-R. Cram - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):56-70.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-16

Downloads
34 (#469,582)

6 months
9 (#307,343)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references