A dilemma for asymmetric dependence

Noûs 37 (2):232-257 (2003)
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Abstract

Accounts of mental content rooted in asymmetric dependence hold, crudely speaking, that the content of a mental representation is the cause of that representation on which all its other causes depend.1 To speak somewhat less crudely, such accounts, hereafter

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Joseph Mendola
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Citations of this work

Fodor on Causes of Mentalese Symbols.Tevfik Aytekin–Erdinç Sayan - 2012 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 19 (1):3-15.

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