Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections

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Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (4):433-437 (1997)
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Abstract

In “A Theory of Content, 11: The Theory,” Jerry Fodor presents two reasons why his asymmetric causal dependency theory does not lead to the conclusion that syntactic items “X” mean proximal sensory stimulations, rather than distal environmental objects. Here we challenge Fodor’s reasoning.

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2010

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00384283

DOI

10.1111/j.2041-6962.1997.tb00845.x

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Author Profiles

Fred Adams
University of Delaware
Ken Aizawa
Rutgers University - Newark

Citations of this work

Mentalese semantics and the naturalized mind.Charles E. M. Dunlop - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94.

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