Abstract

In this study, I have compared Avicenna's position concerning the nature of creative action and the beginning of the universe to that of Aquinas. As a preliminary, I discussed whether their theories can be examined on the same criteria; and affirmed that they can be because they have similar positions concerning the source of our knowledge of God and its expression. Subsequently, I have discussed whether they have a similar conception of God, to which the differences between their positions regarding the nature of creative action and the beginning of the universe can be related. I have argued that Avicenna and Aquinas have similar conceptions of divine formal features, i.e., simplicity, necessity, immutability and eternity, and divine knowledge. Comparing their positions concerning the nature of divine creative action, I have argued that their conceptions of divine creative action are not fundamentally different. Regarding the question of the beginning of the universe, I presented Avicenna's arguments for that the universe cannot have a temporal beginning, and compared them to Aquinas' counter arguments intending to show that they do not have demonstrative force. I have argued that Avicenna's position, in this regard, is more consistent than that of Aquinas, not with their common conception of God, but with their common Aristotelian and Neoplatonic background