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How many selves make me?

Philosophy 66:235-43 (1991)

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  1. Anosognosia and the unity of consciousness.Drakon Derek Nikolinakos - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (3):315-342.
    There are researchers in cognitive science who use clinical and experimental evidence to draw some rather skeptical conclusions about a central feature of our conscious experience, its unity. They maintain that the examination of clinical phenomena reveals that human consciousness has a much more fragmentary character than the one we normally attribute to it. In the article, these claims are questioned by examining some of the clinical studies on the deficit of anosognosia. I try to show that these studies support (...)
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  • Fuzzy fault lines: Selves in multiple personality disorder.George Graham - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):159-174.
    This paper outlines a multidimensional conception of Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of the content of its commitment to the reality of the self. Unlike the orthodox conception it recognizes that selves are fuzzy entities. By appreciating the possibility that selves are fuzzy entities, it is possible to rebut a form of fictionalism about the self which appeals to clinical data from MPD. Realism about self can be preserved in the face of multiple (...)
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  • Metaphor between Embodiment and Imaginative Processes.Tiziana Giudice - 2008 - Anthropology and Philosophy 9 (1-2):42-57.
    In this paper I will analyse the relationship between metaphor and imagination. This issue has been recently studied by cognitive linguists who appreciate its importance, while other semantic perspectives neglect it. I will analyse the thesis which affirms that metaphors are based on cognitive components which are not logical-propositional but imaginative: the “image schemata” are recurrent models of corporeal experiences, centres of knowledge organization which structure – in a non-propositional form – an amount of salient information. This information emerges from (...)
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