How many selves make me?

Philosophy 66:235-43 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The answer to the title question which I want to defend in this paper is ‘none’. That is: I doubt strongly that the notion of ‘a self’ has any use whatsoever as part of an explanans for the explanandum ‘person’.Put another way: I shall argue that the question itself is misguided, pointing the inquirer in quite the wrong direction by suggesting that the term ‘self’ points to something which can sustain a philosophically interesting or important degree of reification.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
59 (#244,539)

6 months
1 (#1,040,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Fuzzy fault lines: Selves in multiple personality disorder.George Graham - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):159-174.
Anosognosia and the unity of consciousness.Drakon Derek Nikolinakos - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (3):315-342.
Metaphor between Embodiment and Imaginative Processes.Tiziana Giudice - 2008 - Anthropology and Philosophy 9 (1-2):42-57.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Yishi, duh, um and consciousness.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
Psychology as science.Sigmund Koch - 1974 - In Stuart C. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology. London: : Macmillan.

Add more references