The South African government announced the much-discussed stay-at-home order between March 27 and April 30, 2020, during what was known as lockdown level 5, which meant that citizens were not allowed to leave their homes. The objective of this study is to assess the stay-at-home order against the global principles of the UDBHR. It is deducible that, in reference to the UDBHR, the government possessed the right to curtail individual liberty, thereby not infringing on Article 5 of the UDBHR and (...) therefore, in this context, passes the test of the UDBHR. However, it remains uncertain at present whether the limitation of freedom imposed by the South African stay-at-home order was successful in controlling the spread of COVID-19 and protecting individuals from harm. Initial investigations also indicate that individuals who are particularly vulnerable may not have received equitable treatment in accordance with the principle outlined in Article 10, therefore, it can be cautiously and modestly argued that the stay-at-home order does not withstand scrutiny when assessed against the UDBHR. Given the continued discussion about the efficacy of limiting freedom to control the spread of COVID-19, and the growing conviction that the advancement of justice is being called into question, the notion of least restriction ought to be considered seriously. Ten Have (2022) is correct in asserting that global bioethics should also seriously consider other principles beyond an almost exclusive focus on limiting individual freedom. The preliminary conclusion is that the potential implementation of the stay-at-home order in the future must be seriously reconsidered. (shrink)

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be (...) more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies. (shrink)

La filosofía de la tecnología es una rama reciente de la filosofía en general. Puede aportar herramientas para problemas derivados de aplicaciones tecnológicas recientes, como la telemedicina. Un problema señalado reiteradamente por la bioética lo constituye la privacidad en general, y las modificaciones que pueden introducirse por el cada vez mayor uso de las tecnologías. Comentando propuestas desde la Asociación Médica Mundial y datos contemporáneo derivados de la pandemia de COVID-19, puede reconocerse que la privacidad es una exigencia ética que (...) requiere regularse a través de su implementación política para su adecuada protección legal. (shrink)