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In Praise of Poise

In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block's Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA, USA: (2019)

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  1. Does perceiving require perceptual experience?David John Bennett - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-28.
    In Section I, I clarify turning point issues in the Phillips and Block debate about whether there is unconscious perception. These include questions about whether uptake of certain visual information is an individual or person level accomplishment, as required for genuine unconscious perceiving. Section II takes up a recent reorientation proposed in Block towards the question of whether there is unconscious perceiving, where we are to look for the pervasive role of unconscious perceiving in, perhaps especially, the online control of (...)
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  • Vicarious Attention, Degrees of Enhancement, and the Contents of Consciousness.Azenet Lopez - 2022 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 3.
    How are attention and consciousness related? Can we learn what the contents of someone’s consciousness are if we know the targets of their attention? What can we learn about the contents of consciousness if we know the targets of attention? Although introspection might suggest that attention and consciousness are intimately connected, a good body of recent findings in cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience brings compelling reasons to believe that they are two separate and independent processes. This paper attempts to bring (...)
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  • Evans on Transparency: A Rationalist Account.Daniel Stoljar - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2067-2085.
    Gareth Evans famously observed that he can answer the question ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’ by attending to “precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’”. I argue that this observation follows from two independently plausible ideas in philosophy of mind. The first is about rationality and consciousness: it is that to be rational is in part to be (...)
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  • The Collapse Argument.Joseph Gottlieb - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):1-20.
    We can divide philosophical theories of consciousness into two main camps: First-Order theories and Higher-Order theories. Like all Higher-Order theories, many First-Order theories are mentalistic theories of consciousness: they attempt to reduce a mental state’s being consciousness using mental (but non-phenomenal) terms, such as being available to certain cognitive centers. I argue that mentalistic First-Order theories, once fully cashed out, collapse into some form of Higher-Order theory. I contend that not only is there general considerations in favor of this conclusion, (...)
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  • Attention explains the transition to unlimited associative learning better than consciousness.Carlos Montemayor - 2021 - Biology and Philosophy 36 (2):1-5.
    This commentary focuses on the importance of attention skills in the development of universal associative learning, and it explains why the centrality of attention in UAL presents a considerable difficulty for the UAL approach. Attentional abilities are not just developmentally related to UAL but are in fact explanatory of UAL. The main problem is that all the types of attention involved in UAL can be dissociated from consciousness. This means that while attention skills for UAL might be necessary for consciousness, (...)
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  • The Complexity of Neural Responses to Visual Stimuli: On Carruthers’ Challenge to Block’s Overflow Argument.Damiano La Manna - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):233-253.
    Ned Block’s Overflow Argument purports to establish that the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness is independent of the neural basis of access consciousness. In a recent paper, Block’s argument has been challenged by Peter Carruthers. Carruthers concedes the truth of one of the argument’s key steps, namely, that phenomenal consciousness overflows what is in working memory. At the same time, he rejects the conclusion of the argument by developing an account of this overflow that is alternative to Block’s. In this (...)
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