The paper is an analysis of Dworkin's attempt to develop, within liberal theory, a conception of community and associative obligations, where community is taken as a particular intrinsic value. Certainly, this attempt encounters various difficulties, like the insufficiently robust distinction between political community and other types of communities, as well as Dworkin's too narrow delimitation of the scope of activities and competences of political community. It is argued nevertheless that this endeavor is highly significant, complementing substantially the theoretical concerns of (...) standard liberal theories. U ovom radu autor analizira Dworkinov pokusaj da u okviru liberalisticke teorije razvije koncepciju zajednice i duznosti iz udruzivanja, pri cemu zajednistvo shvata kao posebnu intrinsicnu vrednost. Mada u ovom pokusaju iskrsavaju problemi, kao sto je nedovoljno jasno distingviranje politicke od drugih zajednica, kao i Dworkinovo preusko odredjenje domena aktivnosti i kompetencija politicke zajednice, autor smatra da je rec o izuzetno znacajnom poduhvatu, koji bitno upotpunjuje teorijska interesovanja standardnih liberalistickih teorija. (shrink)

According to Ronald Dworkin, political obligation is to be justified as an associative obligation through membership in certain political communities. In this regard, I first argue that the concept of an associative obligation cannot help us to account for precise moral obligations. Second, I analyze certain disanalogies between paradigmatic cases of associative obligation and political obligation in order to show the inability of the former to justify the enforcement of a comprehensive obligation such as the latter. Finally, I argue that (...) Dworkin could not have provided a better argument: His theory of law makes him incapable of justifying political obligation. (shrink)

In March 2020, the Government produced a document entitled “Responding to COVID-19: The Ethical Framework for Adult Social Care”. In this article, we summarise the key features of the proposed ethical framework and subject it to critical analysis. We highlight three primary issues. First, the emphasis placed on autonomy as the primary ethical principle. We argue if ever there was a context in which autonomy should dominate the ethical analysis, this is not it. Second, we examine the interface between ethics (...) and law which is largely overlooked in the document. Finally, we explore the surprising lack of attention paid to the concept of responsibility and communal obligations within the framework. (shrink)