The main aim of this paper is to analyse Hegel’s theory of cognitive reference to the world and, in particular, Hegel’s theory of sensation, in order to verify whether it implies metaphysical commitments. I will pursue my goal by investigating the problem of sensation in Hegel’s philosophy starting from McDowell’s conception of the relation between mind and world and from his theory of perception. In my view, this strategy offers a threefold advantage that will enable us to do the following: (...) i) persuasively interpret the Hegelian theory of sensation; ii) better understand the authenticity and the limits of McDowell’s ‘Hegelianism’; iii) place the Hegelian theory of sensation within the complex contemporary debate on the status of sensible experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall investigate whether Hegel can be considered as a sort of ancestor of McDowell’s disjunctivism. If this hypothesis turns out to be plausible, then the paper offers two gains. On the one hand, it offers an innovative interpretation of the way in which Hegel conceives of our sensible epistemic access to the world. On the other hand, McDowell's own claim that his own theoretical proposal has a Hegelian sound is supported by a previously unexplored argument. I (...) organize my analysis into three parts: I sketch McDowell’s version of disjunctivism (Section 2); I analyze some passages from Hegel that I believe are important for showing some similarities between his and McDowell’s argumentative strategy (Section 3); in the conclusion (Section 4), I highlight a number of core features that Hegel seems to share with McDowell’s disjunctivism and I submit that they are sufficient to label Hegel the “grandfather” of McDowell's disjunctivism. (shrink)

RESUMEN Largamente desatendida o malinterpretada, la noción de caos en la filosofía de Nietzsche es una pieza constitutiva de la particular concepción del ser que este autor habría dejado apenas esbozada. El artículo se propone elaborar este concepto en la obra nietzscheana, siguiendo algunas de las metáforas que lo iluminan. Desde allí se busca plantear los rasgos centrales de una ontologia del caos, de sesgo no metafísico, que, al afirmar el carácter acontecimental de la realidad, puede verse como precursora de (...) la ontología hermenéutica contemporánea. ABSTRACT The notion of chaos, which has long been neglected or misinterpreted, is a constitutive element of a peculiar conception of being that the philosopher only had time to outline. The objective of this article is to elaborate on this concept in Nietzschean philosophy, guided by some of the metaphors that shed light on it. This serves as the basis to set forth the main characteristics of a non-metaphysical ontology of chaos that asserts the eventful nature of reality and can thus be seen as a precursor of contemporary hermeneutic ontology. (shrink)

This article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities. These often unremarked upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between human and (...) animal minds—two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation (Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory. (shrink)

Hegel definiert „Vernunft” als die Einheit der Objektivität und der Subjektivität. Diese Definition bedeutet nicht, dass für Hegel nur das Subjekt existiert, welches sich das Objekt dementsprechend nur in seinem Inneren vorstellt; eine solche Definition bedeutet nämlich nicht, dass es für Hegel keine Außenwelt gibt, sondern eigentlich, dass es für ihn nichts gibt, was als solches unvernünftig ist. Als Einheit des Subjekts, das erkennt, und des Objekts, das erkannt wird, umfasst die Vernunft für Hegel alles, was es gibt und geben (...) kann. Jene Definition bedeutet eben: Es gibt nichts außerhalb dessen, was das Subjekt erkennt und erkennen kann. Mit dieser These verneint Hegel selbstverständlich nicht, dass es Sachen gibt, die das Subjekt noch nicht kennt bzw. von deren Existenz es noch nicht weiß, und auch nicht, dass es keine Sachen gibt, die das Subjekt noch nicht verstanden und begriffen hat, sondern eigentlich nur, dass es keine Sachen gibt, die prinzipiell nicht erkannt und begriffen werden können. Dass etwas existiert, impliziert für Hegel, dass es eventuell erkannt und fernerhin begriffen werden kann. Sein, Erkennbarsein und Begreifbarsein sind für Hegel ein und dasselbe. (shrink)

No processo do conhecimento a imaginação desempenha para Hegel o estágio no qual a mente humana dissocia o objeto em dois diferentes conteúdos, o conteúdo-coisa do mundo externo e o conteúdo interno da própria mente, de tal modo que ambas as versões do mesmo devem corroborar-se mutuamemente ao modo de uma síntese simples de elementos heterogéneos que apenas em seu cotejamento reconhecem sua identidade. Na atividade de compreensão, ao contrário, este dualismo é suprassumido e, com ele, o empirismo e a (...) teoria correspondista da verdade que, aos olhos de Hegel, está em sua base. (shrink)