This article aims to make progress towards an account of social cohesion and participation in terms of which we can better understand how groups of people come to constitute stable social orders. It argues for a conceptual distinction between "inclusion" and "integration" and sheds new light on their theoretical relationship. While "integration" refers to group members' willingness to act in accordance with the given norms of a social structure, "inclusion" is linked to their participation opportunities. Although inclusion also plays an (...) essential role in integrating a normative order, levels of inclusiveness necessary for social cohesion may vary across different contexts. (shrink)

This chapter surveys essentialist and anti-essentialist theories of sex and gender. It does so by engaging three approaches to sex and gender: externalism, internalism, and contextualism. The chapter also draws attention to two key debates about sex and gender in the feminist literature: the debate about the sex/gender distinction (the distinction debate) and the debate about whether sex and gender have essences (the essentialism/anti-essentialism debate). In addition, it describes three problems that theories of sex and gender tend to face: the (...) Inclusion Problem, the Definition Problem, and the Exclusion Problem. Lastly, the chapter highlights why the division between essentialist and anti-essentialist accounts of sex and gender is not clear. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 209-229, June 2022.

Simion and Kelp defend a non-anthropocentric account of trustworthy AI, based on the idea that the obligations of AI systems should be sourced in purely functional norms. In this commentary, I highlight some pressing counterexamples to their account, involving AI systems that reliably fulfil their functions but are untrustworthy because those functions are antagonistic to the interests of the trustor. Instead, I outline an alternative account, based on the idea that AI systems should not be considered primarily as tools but (...) as technological participants in social practices. Specifically, I propose to source the obligations of an AI system in the norms that should govern the role it plays within the social practices it participates in, taking into account any changes to the social practices that its participation may bring about. This proposal is anthropocentric insofar as it ascribes obligations to AI systems that are similar to those of human participants in social practices, but only modestly so, as it does not require trustworthy AI to have contentious anthropomorphic capacities (e.g. for consciousness or moral responsibility). (shrink)