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  1. Nudging, informed consent and bullshit.William Simkulet - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):536-542.
    Some philosophers have argued that during the process of obtaining informed consent, physicians should try to nudge their patients towards consenting to the option the physician believes best, where a nudge is any influence that is expected to predictably alter a person’s behaviour without restricting her options. Some proponents of nudging even argue that it is a necessary and unavoidable part of securing informed consent. Here I argue that nudging is incompatible with obtaining informed consent. I assume informed consent requires (...)
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  • Opt-Out to the Rescue: Organ Donation and Samaritan Duties.Sören Flinch Midtgaard & Andreas Albertsen - 2021 - Public Health Ethics 14 (2):191-201.
    Deceased organ donation is widely considered as a case of easy rescue―that is, a case in which A may bestow considerable benefits on B while incurring negligent costs herself. Yet, the policy implications of this observation remain unclear. Drawing on Christopher H. Wellman’s samaritan account of political obligations, the paper develops a case for a so-called opt-out system, i.e., a scheme in which people are defaulted into being donors. The proposal’s key idea is that we may arrange people’s options in (...)
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  • Nudging to donate organs: do what you like or like what we do?Sergio Beraldo & Jurgis Karpus - 2021 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy (3):329-340.
    An effective method to increase the number of potential cadaveric organ donors is to make people donors by default with the option to opt out. This non-coercive public policy tool to influence people’s choices is often justified on the basis of the as-judged-by-themselves principle: people are nudged into choosing what they themselves truly want. We review three often hypothesized reasons for why defaults work and argue that the as-judged-by-themselves principle may hold only in two of these cases. We specify further (...)
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