The Tattvabindu of Vacaspatimisra with the commentary called Tattvavibhavand of Paramesvara II of Payyur Bhattamana. This edition of Vacaspatimisra's Tattvabindu and of its commentary Tattvavibhavana by Paramesvara II is based on (1) a transcript of a manuscript Tattvavibhavana preserved in the Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, and (2) the Benares Edition of the Tattvabindu. Since the commentator has made it a rule to quote the full text by parts before commenting on it. Vacaspatimisra's Tattvabindu is a short and highly difficult (...) text. In his characteristically rhythmic and stately diction, Vacaspatimisra reviews in the Tattvabindu, the vaiyakarana doctrine of Sphota, mainly as expounded by Bhartrhari and Mandanamisra, and amplifies and reaffirms Kumarila's criticism of Sphota doctrine. The elaborate and scholarly introduction, giving a historical sketch of the Mimamsa literature, and the thoroughgoing analysis of the Tattvabindu, in English, which the learned editor has prefixed to his edition of the work. (shrink)

Supercommentary on Śaṅkarācārya's Śārīrakamīmāṃāṃsābhāṣya, Advaita commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's Brahmasūtra, basic Vedanta work.

Commentary on Īsvarakr̥sṇa's Sāṅkhyakārikā, classical work on the Sankhya school of Hindu philosophy.

The rivalry among the philosophical schools in India was not purely intellectual, but had far-reaching social implications. The rivalry between vedic and non-vedic schools had a socio-political dimension. This paper claims that commentaries of the source texts of schools on both sides played an important role in development of inter-darśana politics. This paper deals with some of the interpretative moves made by Vācaspatimiśra in his two famous commentaries: Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī, the commentary on Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā, the commentary on (...) Nyāyavārtika of Udyotakara. The paper argues that some of Vācaspatimiśra’s interpretative moves in these commentaries can be called “political moves.” The paper shows how these interpretative moves deviate from the natural or unforced meanings of the texts. It argues that these deviations aim at strengthening the orthodox front of Indian philosophy. (shrink)

This work is a translation of selected sutras of the Nyāya-sūtra, together with relevant extracts from three commentaries: Nyāya-sūtra-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana; Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakara; and Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā of Vācaspatimiśra. The translators' introduction gives a general overview of the Nyāya school, its overall aims, and its place within classical Indian philosophy. Each of the nine chapters covers a particular topic in the Nyāya scheme: knowledge sources, philosophical method, the Nyāya defense of metaphysical realism, the self, substance and causation, God, theory of (...) meaning, value theory, and debate. For a given topic there will be sūtras... (shrink)

Ātman (soul) and Nairātmya (no soul) are, for the Brahmanical schools and the Buddhists respectively, equally fundamental tenets which neither side can concede to the other. Among the 16 formulations presented by Uddyotakara, the fifteenth, which is a proof of Ātman and is originally an indirect proof ( avīta/āvīta ), is presented in a prasaṅga -style, and contains double negation ( na nairātmyam ) in the thesis. However, it is perhaps Dharmakīrti who first transformed it into a normal style ( (...) sātmakam ). He is well aware of the law of excluded middle, and insisits that the negation is paryudāsa . On the Nyāya side, Uddyotakara at least seems to be unaware of the law of the logical equivalence of contraposition concerning pervasion ( vyāpti ). After Uddyotakara, however, Vyoman (Vyomaśiva), Bhāsarvajña and Vācaspatimiśra, all seem to be well aware of it. Dharmakīrti, in his conter-argument against the proof of ātman , discusses the negative expressions ‘‘ nairātmya ” and ‘‘ a-nairātmya ” Dharmakīrti here uses two logical arguments skillfully and tactically. As a critic of both the authenticity of the Veda and the existence of ātman , he insists on the theory of dichotomy and the equivalence of anvaya and vyatireka , whereas as an apologist he denies the application of these theories to the relation between the existence of ātman and the concept of nairātmya , because for him as a Buddhist the latter is not a negative but essentially positive state of affairs. (shrink)

What was the fate of personalistic vitalism in later Indian thought? That question is too large to be considered here, but it is certain that the doctrine did reemerge, and has remained influential. Nonetheless, there is some reason to believe that Śātarak $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ita critique of personalistic vitalism did have an immediate impact on philosophers within the Nyāya tradition: Vācaspatimiśra, Uddyotakara's sub-commentator, whom we know to have been familiar with Śātarak $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ ita Tattvasa $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{m}$$ graha simply passes over Uddyotakara's (...) already equivocal argument without making any effort to defend it. Certainly, he had concluded that Uddyotakara's weak assertion of personalistic vitalism was either not important, or else a lost cause. Is it too much to suppose that he might have let himself be convinced, in this case, by a Buddhist?The ancient debate between ātmavādin and anātmavādin was at the heart of a conflict between opposing systems of salvation. To construe this, however, in accordance with our contemporary categorical schemes involves a fundamental error, for “systems of salvation” in ancient India were concerned with human nature and the human world, in a rich and full sense. What I have tried to indicate here is that one strand of the debate in question can be isolated and shown to involve progressive developments in the conceptual analysis of a basic biological doctrine. Other strands that might similarly be analyzed bear upon the theories of agency and causation, and rational and empirical psychology. To study these and many other topics in classical Indian thought from the perspective here advocated does not require our losing sight of the essential religious interests which motivated and informed the Indian discussions with which we are concerned; what it does require is an involvement in the history of ideas quite broadly conceived. In this context we should recall that it is now possible to treat much of classical Indian thought from a truly historical, and not merely doxographical, vantage-point. By focusing less upon belief and doctrine within single systems, and more upon the dynamic tension that arose where competing systems came into conflict, we discover that there was indeed historical progress, and that it is characterized in part by the application of methodological refinements in the areas of logic and epistemology to problems that had been defined in antiquity. This sounds very much like the history of philosophy in other settings; what must be done is to fill in the details with respect to the splendid array of questions which Indian thinkers posed and the answers about which they argued. (shrink)