Standard approaches to the morality of abortion typically founder on the question of the “personhood” of the fetus. This paper attempts to avoid this problem by developing an alternative approach in which philosophical positions are derived not from a presumed right to life but from the special moral obligations of parents to nurture their immature children. After a discussion of the notion of parental responsibility, three leading accounts of the acquisition of parental responsibilities are examined: one based on biological relationship, (...) one based on consent, and one based on causal responsibility. The consequences of each of these positions for the morality of abortion are examined and each is considered in relation to cases involving nonstandard methods of procreation, e.g. surrogate mothering, artificial insemination by donor, and embryo transfer. On the basis of these cases, I argue that the model based on causal responsibility provides the most adequate criterion for the ascription of parental responsibility. While some discussion is devoted to the question of implementing this model as social policy, the main thrust of the paper is not so much to defend a particular policy on the morality of abortion as it is to argue for the approach to the problem based on the notion of parental responsibility over the more familiar approach relying on the right to life. (shrink)

The trend of much of recent moral philosophy has been to question the adequacy of traditional deontological and utilitarian views which place universal moral rights and duties at the center of ethical theory. Robert Goodin's book continues this trend and attempts to break new ground in ethical theory by proposing a general theory of special moral responsibilities. He argues that such responsibilities, though diverse in many ways, all derive from a common underlying moral principle, the vulnerability principle, according to which (...) moral agents acquire special responsibilities to the extent to which others are dependent upon them or are specially vulnerable in some way or ways to their choices and actions. (shrink)