The article analyses the impact of the neoliberal policy framework and managerialism on critical legal education in the context of Waikato Law Faculty, University of Waikato, Aotearoa New Zealand. The delivery of critical legal education challenges the ideology and implementation of current tertiary education policy and training because it is designed to deliver critical knowledge and not just vocational information. Waikato Law School was established in 1990 the year the neoliberal tertiary policy was enacted in the Education Amendment Act 1990. (...) It represented an attempt to introduce a more critical and inclusive approach to legal education. The article provides an account of the struggle to maintain a critical approach under a statutory framework that requires conformity to government policy designed to cut the cost of tertiary education and integrate universities into a neoliberal policy framework. The case study is intended to illustrate the insidious influence of the policy on undermining a legal education that prepares students to think critically. It is also intended to illustrate that it is possible to resist this interference in the fundamental role of the academic to be the critic and conscience of society. (shrink)

Kubovy and Epstein's main quarrel is with the concept of “internalization.” I argue that they underestimate the aptness of this metaphor. In particular, an emulator which predicts unfolding events can be described as an internalization of external structures. Further, an emulator may use motoric as well as perceptual resources, which lends support to Hecht's proposal. [Hecht; Kubovy & Epstein].

First, I note three questions that need further exploration: how fast the emulator operates, compared to the real-time events it models; what exactly perceptual emulation, with no motor component, consists of; and whether images are equivalent to raw sensations. Next, I propose that Grush's framework can explain the role of motor activation in processing “imitable” stimuli.

A perception-action system may underlie the mechanisms by which human speech exchange in social interaction is managed, as well as the evolutionary precursors of these mechanisms in closely related species. Some phenomena of interaction well-studied by sociologists are suggested as a point of departure for further research.

The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body's interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: (1) cognition is situated; (2) cognition is time-pressured; (3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; (4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; (5) cognition is for action; (6) off-line cognition is body (...) based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims. (shrink)