In this paper, I defend an updated account of functional kinds, initially presented by Daniel Weiskopf, from the criticism that functional kinds will not qualify as scientific kinds. An important part of Weiskopf’s account is that functional kinds are multiply realisable. The criticisms I consider avoid discussion of multiple realisability. Instead, it is argued that functional kinds carry inferior counterfactual profiles when compared to other accounts of kinds. I respond to this charge by arguing that this criticism fails to take (...) into consideration the role that multiple realisability can play in providing important explanatory counterfactuals. I do so by highlighting some points made by Lauren Ross that highlight where multiple realisability is explanatorily pertinent. I then argue that the criticisms of Weiskopf’s account fail to establish the explanatory inferiority of functional kinds. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the possibility of robustness analysis as confirmatory. Given that models are highly idealized, multiple models with different sets of idealizations are constructed to show that some result is not dependent on those idealizations. This method of robustness analysis has been criticized since, no matter how many false models agree, all of them are false and lack confirmatory power. I argue that this line of criticism makes an assumption that a model is confirmatory only if it (...) ontically represents its target. I draw on work about explanations to motivate a challenge to this assumption, and argue that this assumption needs bolstering. (shrink)