A Defence of Functional Kinds: Multiple Realisability and Explanatory Counterfactuals

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):119-133 (2022)
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Abstract

In this paper, I defend an updated account of functional kinds, initially presented by Daniel Weiskopf, from the criticism that functional kinds will not qualify as scientific kinds. An important part of Weiskopf’s account is that functional kinds are multiply realisable. The criticisms I consider avoid discussion of multiple realisability. Instead, it is argued that functional kinds carry inferior counterfactual profiles when compared to other accounts of kinds. I respond to this charge by arguing that this criticism fails to take into consideration the role that multiple realisability can play in providing important explanatory counterfactuals. I do so by highlighting some points made by Lauren Ross that highlight where multiple realisability is explanatorily pertinent. I then argue that the criticisms of Weiskopf’s account fail to establish the explanatory inferiority of functional kinds.

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