We expose the main ideas, concepts and results about Jaśkowski's discussive logic, and apply that logic to the concept of pragmatic truth and to the Dalla Chiara-di Francia view of the foundations of physics.

We expose the main ideas, concepts and results about Jakowski's discussive logic, and apply that logic to the concept of pragmatic truth and to the Dalla Chiara-di Francia view of the foundations of physics.

We expose the main ideas, concepts and results about Jaśkowski's discussive logic, and apply that logic to the concept of pragmatic truth and to the Dalla Chiara-di Francia view of the foundations of physics.

We present some recent technical results of us on the incompleteness of classical analysis and then discuss our work on the Arnol'd decision problems for the stability of fixed points of dynamical systems.

We present some recent technical results of us on the incompleteness of classical analysis and then discuss our work on the Arnol'd decision problems for the stability of fixed points of dynamical systems.

We present some recent technical results of us on the incompleteness of classical analysis and then discuss our work on the Arnol'd decision problems for the stability of fixed points of dynamical systems.

We first state a few previously obtained results that lead to general undecidability and incompleteness theorems in axiomatized theories that range from the theory of finite sets to classical elementary analysis. Out of those results we prove several incompleteness theorems for axiomatic versions of the theory of noncooperative games with Nash equilibria; in particular, we show the existence of finite games whose equilibria cannot be proven to be computable.

We first state a few previously obtained results that lead to general undecidability and incompleteness theorems in axiomatized theories that range from the theory of finite sets to classical elementary analysis. Out of those results we prove several incompleteness theorems for axiomatic versions of the theory of noncooperative games with Nash equilibria; in particular, we show the existence of finite games whose equilibria cannot be proven to be computable.