Block proposes that phenomenal experience overflows conscious access. In contrast, we propose that conscious access overflows overt report. We argue that a theory of phenomenal experience cannot discard subjective report and that Block's examples of phenomenal relate to two different types of perception. We propose that conscious access is more than simply readout of a pre-existing phenomenal experience.

A recent fMRI study by Webb et al. (Cortical networks involved in visual awareness independent of visual attention, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2016;113:13923–28) proposes a new method for finding the neural correlates of awareness by matching atten- tion across awareness conditions. The experimental design, however, seems at odds with known features of attention. We highlight logical and methodological points that are critical when trying to disentangle attention and awareness.

L’article évoque l’origine du mot dragon, expose la géographie des mythes à dragons, et passe en revue différentes fonctions du dragon — fournir la pluie chez les uns, fournir à des héros de quoi accomplir un exploit initiatique chez les autres. Il revient sur les meurtres de dragons et les rituels correspondant au solstice d’hiver, et il en augmente le dossier. En cours de route, les problèmes d’influences et de circulation des idées sont envisagés. This paper discusses the origin of (...) the word dragon, outlines the geography of dragon myths, and reviews different functions of the dragon—some provide rain, others provide heroes with the means to performe an initiatory feat. We revisit the dragon murders and winter solstice rituals, and we expand the record. Along the way, the problems of influences and the circulation of ideas are considered. (shrink)

Amidst the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which are specifically associated with conscious perception, and which merely reflect non-conscious processing? Several recent neuroimaging studies have contrasted conscious and non-conscious visual processing, but their results appear inconsistent. Some support a correlation of conscious perception with early occipital events, others with late parieto-frontal activity. Here we attempt to make sense of those dissenting results. On the basis of a minimal neuro-computational model, the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, we propose a (...) taxonomy which distinguishes between vigilance and access to conscious report, as well as between subliminal, preconscious and conscious processing. We suggest that these distinctions map onto different neural mechanisms, and that conscious perception is systematically associated with a sudden surge of parieto-frontal activity causing top-down amplification. (shrink)

The scientific study of consciousness emerged as an organized field of research only a few decades ago. As empirical results have begun to enhance our understanding of consciousness, it is important to find out whether other factors, such as funding for consciousness research and status of consciousness scientists, provide a suitable environment for the field to grow and develop sustainably. We conducted an online survey on people’s views regarding various aspects of the scientific study of consciousness as a field of (...) research. 249 participants completed the survey, among which 80% were in academia, and around 40% were experts in consciousness research. Topics covered include the progress made by the field, funding for consciousness research, job opportunities for consciousness researchers, and the scientific rigor of the work done by researchers in the field. The majority of respondents (78%) indicated that scientific research on consciousness has been making progress. However, most participants perceived obtaining funding and getting a job in the field of consciousness research as more difficult than in other subfields of neuroscience. Overall, work done in consciousness research was perceived to be less rigorous than other neuroscience subfields, but this perceived lack of rigor was not related to the perceived difficulty in finding jobs and obtaining funding. Lastly, we found that, overall, the global workspace theory was perceived to be the most promising (around 28%), while most non-expert researchers (around 22% of non-experts) found the integrated information theory (IIT) most promising. We believe the survey results provide an interesting picture of current opinions from scientists and researchers about the progresses made and the challenges faced by consciousness research as an independent field. They will inspire collective reflection on the future directions regarding funding and job opportunities for the field. (shrink)

Les éditions Payot & Rivages ont eu l'excellente initiative de réunir dans ce gros volume et sous un titre commun deux ouvrages complémentaires de B. Sergent publiés respectivement en 1984 et en 1986, L'homosexualité dans la mythologie grecque et L'homosexualité initiatique dans l'Europe ancienne. Fulgurants, ces travaux ont suscité en leur temps un très grand nombre de comptes rendus et ont valu à leur auteur force louanges (surtout en France où la pratique de la mythologie comparée n...

Les éditions Payot & Rivages ont eu l'excellente initiative de réunir dans ce gros volume et sous un titre commun deux ouvrages complémentaires de B. Sergent publiés respectivement en 1984 et en 1986, L'homosexualité dans la mythologie grecque et L'homosexualité initiatique dans l'Europe ancienne. Fulgurants, ces travaux ont suscité en leur temps un très grand nombre de comptes rendus et ont valu à leur auteur force louanges (surtout en France où la pratique de la mythologie comparée n...

In a recent article, [Sergent, C. & Dehaene, S. . Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15, 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. . Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness, (...) Psyche, 7, 18]. In the experimental study described in this article, we find support for this opposite notion that we should have a parsimonious account of conscious perception. Our reported finding relates to the hypothesis that there is more than one perceptual threshold [Merikle, P.M., Smilek, D. & Eastwood, J.D. . Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology, Cognition, 79, 115–134], but goes further to argue that there are different “levels” of conscious perception. (shrink)