By exploring the significance of Wittgenstein’s later texts relating to the philosophy of language, _Wittgenstein’s Later Theory of Meaning_ offers insights that will transform our understanding of the influential 20th-century philosopher. Explores the significance of Wittgenstein’s later texts relating to the philosophy of language, and offers new insights that transform our understanding of the influential 20th-century philosopher Provides original interpretations of the _systematic_ points about language in Wittgenstein’s later writings that reveal his theory of meaning Engages in close readings of (...) a variety of Wittgenstein’s later texts to explore what the philosopher really had to say about ‘kinds of words’ and ‘parts of speech’ Frees Wittgenstein from his reputation as an unsystematic thinker with nothing to offer but ‘therapy’ for individual cases of philosophical confusion. (shrink)

By exploring the significance of Wittgenstein’s later texts relating to the philosophy of language, _Wittgenstein’s Later Theory of Meaning_ offers insights that will transform our understanding of the influential 20th-century philosopher. Explores the significance of Wittgenstein’s later texts relating to the philosophy of language, and offers new insights that transform our understanding of the influential 20th-century philosopher Provides original interpretations of the _systematic_ points about language in Wittgenstein’s later writings that reveal his theory of meaning Engages in close readings of (...) a variety of Wittgenstein’s later texts to explore what the philosopher really had to say about ‘kinds of words’ and ‘parts of speech’ Frees Wittgenstein from his reputation as an unsystematic thinker with nothing to offer but ‘therapy’ for individual cases of philosophical confusion. (shrink)

Review text: "S.s schönes Buch hilft uns, entscheidende Schritte auf dem Weg hinter das, was nach der Physik kommt, zurückzulegen."Hartmut von Sass in: Theologische Literaturzeitung 7-8/2009 "All jenen, bei denen die Religion(en) also noch auf ein Mindestmaß an Interesse stoßen und noch Irritation und philosophische Beunruhigung auslösen, sei die Hinführung Schneiders herzlich empfohlen."René Kaufmann in: Rundbrief 2008/2009.

This chapter looks for a new understanding of the picture of a “projection”; and indeed the example of river names suggests a new way of speaking of projections. The considerations Wittgenstein discusses here indicate that the imagination (projection) is intertwined with calculation and that this should be considered a characteristic feature of natural languages: agreement about the success of the ongoing shared activities demands at every step the ability to project, to transfer – it demands creative imagination. Theoretically, an insight (...) into the workings of our language is all too often denied us because it is blocked by traditional pictures and prejudices. That is why philosophy plays such a decisive, critical role in its apparently quite conservative “mere description”: because it must point out how to distinguish those cases in which language “works properly” from those in which it leads us astray by “going on holiday”. (shrink)

Wittgenstein′s early philosophy of language is shown to be inspired by the idea of a notation in Nelson Goodman′s sense. Seeing this allows us to reject the thesis that for the sole reason that they do not represent 'states of affairs′, ethical statements must be nonsense. Positively, by exploring his Lecture on Ethics as well as the linguistic means provided in his later Philosophy, it is shown that what he had called 'the Ethical′ can be an object of communication. The (...) ethical position reached is a kind of cognitivism without metaphysics. (shrink)

The paper develops a perspective on religion that is inspired by William James’ concept of religious experience and by the philosophy of language of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein. It proceeds by naming basic steps leading to the proposed conception and by showing that none of them must be a hindrance for a substantial understanding of religion. Among the steps discussed are the acceptance of non-theistic religions, an existential version of functionalism, and the acceptance of the possibility of non-literal truths about (...) the human condition. Furthermore, it proposes a way to interpret the expression ‘the sacred’ in the given framework. Finally it points out two contradictory necessities that make interreligious dialogue difficult: In the beginning one has to use an abstract vocabulary in order not to exclude any positions, but on the other hand one has to avoid robbing the participants of the means for articulating their specific religious views. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of those of Frege's basic contributions to a theory of meaning that are most important for an understanding of Wittgenstein's later thought. It shows that Frege was aware of the problem of how, when constructing complex expressions out of their components, to avoid coming up with a list of names rather than a sentence. This led him to his strategy of not building a sentence out of its component parts, but of getting at the parts (...) by breaking up a whole. Wittgenstein, despite his own “synthetic” approach, did not encounter this problem, because he followed Frege's late insight to its logical conclusion, namely that the sense of an expression consists in its use as a sign. (shrink)

Wittgenstein is apparently contending that it is simply linguistic habit that gives us the impression that the question “who or what…?” fits the subject expression of the sentence. The logical conclusions in this chapter show that the strong reading of the proposed thesis developed here of a purely sound‐oriented character of the grammar of a single language (in this case, English) cannot be entirely right, and might not even be what Wittgenstein intended, because he only spoke of the sound as (...) one characteristic of the concept of a sentence. The author seeks a twofold understanding of the grammatical: on the one hand it should grasp sentences as whole units (not aggregates of the “singing from the score” type); on the other hand it should help us better understand the motivation for Wittgenstein's thesis that the grammatical concept of a sentence is oriented by (among other things) sound. (shrink)

Wittgenstein distinguishes two areas of what he calls the “use” of a word. First, there is the application of a word in the construction of a sentence, which he calls the “surface grammar.” Second, there is a usage that goes beyond the merely verbal part of language games, the rules governing which he terms “depth grammar.” These latter rules constitute what the preliminary work for the Investigations still referred to as “logical form.” To spell out Wittgenstein's analogy a little, he (...) must mean that, just as we are accustomed to saying the alphabet aloud in a certain way, so too are we familiar with the forms of expression of our language, for example with the subject predicate form. One became familiar with the forms in the course of originally learning how to use them ‐ that is, in learning certain ways of forming linguistic complexes at the level of content. (shrink)

Taking up some of W.’s paradoxical remarks about the existence of ‘mental things’ the paper investigates, what exactly he is criticizing. After a discussion of the mistaken idea of a private baptizing of one’s own ‘mental events’ W.’s general criticism of the ‘object-and-name model’ is treated with a view on the consequences it has for our understanding of the mental. This treatment includes a discussion of figurative kinds of language use as well as a discussion of the difference between ‘things’ (...) and ‘objects of reference’: With respect to figurative uses of language it often makes no sense to treat constituent expressions as names of objects, and not all objects of reference are things in an unproblematic ordinary-life sense. So what at first sight appears to be a limitation of our understanding of the nature of an object and consequently seems to ask for more empirical research often turns out to be a limitation of our understanding of how we use our language. The paper concludes that one important aspect of what the later W. opposes is dualism: The mental cannot be conceived of as an additional ‘something’ a description of which could be just added to a description of a person as a physical being. Thus W.’s anti-dualism can also be read as turning against a dualism in his Tractatus: The mental realm as well as other provinces of ‘the higher’ are no longer seen as areas of entities about which we have to be silent. (shrink)

According to Dummett's interpretation, one finds Wittgenstein denying the existence of a general linguistic action of “communicating something” at many places in the Investigations. In Wittgenstein's view, however, the author errs when (in philosophical contexts) he ignores the projective step and concludes from the meaningful applicability of the expression that he is speaking here of an “inner object of feeling” that should arouse the epistemological interest. The author proposes the middle passage of § 363, which is so important for Dummett's (...) interpretation: Wittgenstein certainly does not want to deny that linguistic actions do include speech acts of communicating something or informing. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz reagiert auf Peter Bieris Kritik der analytischen Philosophie und plädiert dafür, die systematischen sprachphilosophischen Einsichten des späten Wittgenstein als dauerhaft und weiterführend anzusehen, was insbesondere für unser Verständnis des Mentalen weitere Fortschritte verspricht. Er wendet sich gegen rein ,therapeutische Lesarten' von Wittgenstein und gegen die Streichung des erkenntnistheoretischen Impulses aus der Sprachphilosophie.

On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (...) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the linguistic structure to the extent that it can be understood in relation to linguistic activity. In order to arrive at an adequate, non‐formal concept of structure, the author and his colleagues oriented themselves on Frege's thought as the most plausible starting point. Wittgenstein's considerations is then taken into account, without endangering the systematic and comprehensive character of the picture as painted by Frege. The chapter highlights two central statements with which Wittgenstein contradicts Frege. First is (...) his thesis that there is no justification in the philosophy of language for isolating just one “fundamental relation” for the representation of all truth‐relevant contents. Second is the thesis that it is typical of natural languages that one and the same kind of composition of expressions can have various meanings. (shrink)

This chapter deals with the following questions: What does Michael Dummett demand of a “systematic” theory of meaning, and what understanding of Frege's “level of sense” leads him to conclude that, if Wittgenstein is correct in denying that there is such a level, then no systematic theory of meaning is possible? For Dummett, an understanding of the meaning side of language is not “systematic” if it must hold that a sentence is understood only because it has been previously learned as (...) a whole. To reconstruct how Dummett arrives at Frege's level of “sense” as crucial for a systematic understanding of complexity, we can begin with a hypothetical concrete situation and proceed step by step to rule out what is not meant by “meaning” when we speak of it as being systematically developed. (shrink)

This chapter highlights that what is today perhaps most commonly called a “theory of meaning” (i.e., one where there is a robust sense of “theory” not exemplified in Wittgenstein's work) will in most cases be “pure” in Rorty's sense (i.e., it will have no direct epistemological concerns) and can (in Dummett's sense) only be a modest one, since it does not explain what “being in command of a concept” consists in. It typically treats a logical system of the kind developed (...) by Frege as a point of comparison to shed light on some aspects of natural languages. Aspects of language that might be brought into focus by such a comparison are the “calculus” side of language (the side to which our “algebraic understanding” applies). (shrink)

In this chapter the author discusses some of Wittgenstein's statements, which directly concern the problem of linguistic complexity. The chapter provides a discussion on invented language games of the kind envisaged by Wittgenstein. The chapter explains two negative insights concerning the complexity of content in language. Summarized as claims they are: (1) there is no special realm of sense between “reality” and language, which would be the domain of grammar (or logical grammar); and (2) employing a complex sentence is a (...) complex action in a different sense of complexity than is the action of “singing from the score.” The author discusses the first thesis in talking about Wittgenstein's critical use of the picture of “meaning‐bodies” in conjunction with the discussion of the function of an expression in a sentence. (shrink)

The paper was written for and planned to be published within the present collection of papers on Mood. Due to an editorial error, it has been published in Philosophia 45:2 773-787 rather than here.

The paper was written for and planned to be published within the present collection of papers on Mood. Due to an editorial error, it has been published in Philosophia 45:2 773-787 rather than here.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 62 Heft: 2 Seiten: 336-341.