The right to health care is a right to care that is not too costly to the provider, considering the benefits it conveys, and is effective in bringing about the level of health needed for a good human life, not necessarily the best health possible. These considerations suggest that, where possible, society has an obligation to provide preventive health care, which is both low cost and effective, and that health care regulations should promote citizens’ engagement in reasonable preventive health care (...) practices. (shrink)

I am grateful to the Journal of Medical Ethics for asking these critics to discuss my book, and am grateful to each of the critics themselves for raising interesting and often difficult issues for me to think about.Alan Wertheimer makes a number of good points. One of the most significant, to me, is how paternalism might function at what I will call an institutional level. In my book, I endorse paternalistic actions by the state, when the cost benefit analysis justifies (...) that. I have not supported paternalistic interventions by private individuals, though. For one thing, private individuals will make decisions without public input, and without their justification being examined by experts in the field, and for these reasons they are too likely to make mistakes as to when intervention is appropriate. For another, the interventions by random individuals haranguing us about our failure to eat our broccoli is likely to drive us crazy—unexpected interference from people with no particular authority will give us just that sense of harassment I say paternalists need to avoid.However, between the public, authorised actions of a democratic state and the private actions of individuals with no authority lies the significant area of non-state institutions. Such institutions develop regulations and standards their members are expected to act in accordance with, and these in turn can have a significant impact on private persons. Of course, there have also been legal actions, notably court decisions, that have played a role here, but much of the specific interpretation of things like consent has been determined by the medical community developing what it believes to be an appropriate ethic for itself. And we know, here, that in recent years there has been a movement away from the paternalism that was once common, and a reorientation towards respect for …. (shrink)

This is a really good book. Brettschneider’s When the State Speaks is both provocative and persuasive, resolving a stubborn conflict within democratic theory in a way many will initially reject, but which he argues for so effectively that, by the end, the controversial appears the commonsensical.The problem Brettschneider addresses is one with which we are all familiar. In democracies we believe in the right to free speech. We believe that this right is implied by the underlying principles of democracy, and (...) believe that the exercise of this right is essential for democracy to function. We are presented with a conflict when some people use their right to free speech to advocate values that are contradictory to democracy: to argue that not everyone should be allowed to speak, to argue that not all citizens are equal, to argue that some people should be discriminated against for reasons of race, religion, sex, or other distinctions that, in a democracy, we hold to be irrelevant. The probl. (shrink)

Critics have argued that utilitarians, by the very nature of the system they endorse, cannot maintain their integrity; and that they cannot, in the end, be individuals of the sort human beings want to be. In my dissertation I explore this criticism and argue that utilitarianism need not endanger integrity, that it need not undercut autonomy, and that it need not deny individuality of any sort. ;Bernard Williams is the major proponent of this criticism. Williams argues that a utilitarian cannot (...) maintain the commitment to projects and principles which is necessary for a person to be an individual. He cannot have what Williams calls "ground projects," projects which are so central to him that they are what give point to his life. The reasons Williams gives for this are varied, and the connections between his various criticisms are not always clear. In the thesis I first analyze the arguments Williams uses against utilitarianism. I show that Williams' arguments that a utilitarian cannot have ground projects depends on a false assumption about the emotional attachment required for a person to be committed to his projects in a way that individuates. I argue that Williams demands an emotional attachment that blinds one to rational consideration, in a way that we will find unacceptable. ;Williams offers an account of individuality which claims that utilitarianism does not allow the proper sort of emotional attachment to projects because it is too necessarily rational a system. W. D. Falk, on the contrary, offers a theory which if correct will show utilitarianism to be an insufficiently rational system. Falk argues that any moral system which declares that there are universal moral rules by which all people's behavior should be regulated undercuts the autonomy of the agents to whom it dictates. If one is to be autonomous, one must do only what one has reason to do. An agent has reason to do something only if he would be motivated to do it upon reflection. If utilitarianism does not motivate some particular agent, that agent, in order to preserve rationality and autonomy, ought not to follow utilitarianism. ;In response to these criticisms I suggest a more plausible notion of individuality which requires neither irrational emotional attachment nor Falk's subjective standard of rational choice. I then advocate a modified form of utilitarianism which does not pose the dangers to individuality which traditional forms of utilitarianism may. In this version, we broaden the notion of utility so that our evaluative beliefs are of special importance in our determination of what things have utility. When utility-maximization is construed in this way it does not pose special dangers for individuality. (shrink)

A con-reason is a reason which plays a role in motivating and explaining an agent's behaviour, but which the agent takes to count against the course of action taken. Most accounts of motivating reasons in the philosophy of action do not allow such things to exist. In this essay, I pursue two aims. First, I argue that, whatever metaphysical story we tell about the relation between motivating reasons and action, con- reasons need to be acknowledged, as they (...) play an explanatory role not played by pro- reasons. Second, I respond to an argument recently developed by David-Hillel Ruben to the effect that a causal theory of action – still known as ‘the standard story’ – cannot account for con- reasons. His argument attempts to show that a fundamental principle of the causal theory cannot be reconciled with the role con- reasons play in a certain kind of imagined case. I first argue that a causal theorist is not, in fact, committed to the problematic. (shrink)

Book synopsis: This collection of previously unpublished essays presents the newest developments in the thought of international scholars working on the explanation of action. The contributions focus on a wide range of interlocking issues relating to agency, deliberation, motivation, mental causation, teleology, interprative explanation and the ontology of actions and their reasons. Challenging numerous current orthodoxies, and offering positive suggestions from a variety of different perspectives, this book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the explanation of action.

This article provides a critical discussion of the problems raised by Kant’s characterization of reason as having ‘needs’ and ‘interests’. The first part presents two examples of arguments in which this conative characterization of reason plays a crucial role. The rest of the article consists of a discussion of four different interpretations of Kant's talk of reason as having needs and interests. Having identified a number of problems with literal interpretations of the conative characterization of reason, I examine whether a (...) metaphorical reading, suggested by several commentators, can solve these problems. I argue that it is impossible to regard the conative terms in which Kant describes reason as merely decorative metaphors, and that they are better understood as cases of ‛symbolic exhibition' in Kant's own sense. (shrink)

A characterization of transcendental arguments is proffered, whereby they yield conclusions about how things are via intermediate conclusions about how we must think that they are. A variant kind of argument is then introduced. Arguments of this variant kind are dubbed ‘conative’ transcendental arguments: these yield conclusions about how it is desirable for things to be via intermediate conclusions about how we must desire that they are. The prospects for conative transcendental arguments are considered. It is argued that, although they (...) can never be of practical use, they may nevertheless be of use in dissolving certain applications of the debate—initiated by Bernard Williams—about whether anyone can have an ‘external’ reason to do anything, that is to say a reason that is not grounded in some desire of the person’s, in a suitably broad sense of ‘desire’. The relevance of conative transcendental arguments to this debate is that they highlight desires that we cannot help having and with respect to which the debate lacks any suitable focus. In the final section of the essay five conative transcendental arguments deriving from the work of five moral philosophers are briefly considered. (shrink)

Wigmore thought that there was a science of proof underlying legal reasoning that could be displayed in any given case as a graphic sequence of argumentation from the evidence in the case leading to the ultimate probandum. Argumentation technology has now vindicated this approach by providing useful qualitative methods that can be applied to identifying, analyzing, and evaluating the pro and con arguments put forward by both sides in a trial. In this chapter, it is shown how to apply argumentation (...) schemes, such as argument from witness testimony, using argument diagrams applied to typical sequences of evidence-based legal reasoning in which there is a successive refinement of arguments displayed as the evidence comes into a case. It is shown how argument from applying rules to cases, teleological, argument from expert witness testimony, and abductive reasoning are centrally important for this purpose. (shrink)

Recent philosophical attention to climate models has highlighted their weaknesses and uncertainties. Here I address the ways that models gain support through observational data. I review examples of model fit, variety of evidence, and independent support for aspects of the models, contrasting my analysis with that of other philosophers. I also investigate model robustness, which often emerges when comparing climate models simulating the same time period or set of conditions. Starting from Michael Weisberg’s analysis of robustness, I conclude that his (...) approach involves a version of reasoning from variety of evidence, enabling this robustness to be a confirmatory virtue.. (shrink)

RESUMEN: Este trabajo considera la conceptualización y aplicación de la figura de los ajustes razonables en Qatar tras nueve años desde la ratificación de la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad (CDPD). En él se trata de analizar la situación de igualdad y no discriminación de las personas con discapacidad utilizando como medida de impacto la figura de ajustes razonables. El artículo destaca las principales fallas y virtudes del Estado de Qatar respecto a esta figura y traza (...) un camino a fin de poder avanzar en la inclusión de las personas con discapacidad a la luz de la CDPD. ABSTRACT: This paper considers the conceptualization and application of reasonable acommodation in Qatar after nine years since the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). It analyzes the situation of equality and non-discrimination of people with disabilities using the figure of reasonable adjustments as an impact measure. The article highlights the main failures and virtues of the State of Qatar regarding reasonable accommodation and draws a path to move forward in the inclusion of people with disabilities in the light of the CRPD. PALABRAS CLAVE: ajustes razonables, igualdad, CDPD, Qatar. KEYWORDS: reasonable accommodation, equality, CRPD, Qatar. (shrink)

Scientifi c theories and hypotheses make claims that go well beyond what we can immediately observe. How can we come to know whether such claims are true? The obvious approach is to see what a hypothesis says about the observationally accessible parts of the world. If it gets that wrong, then it must be false; if it gets that right, then it may have some claim to being true. Any sensible a empt to construct a logic that captures how we (...) may come to reasonably believe the falsehood or truth of scientifi c hypotheses must be built on this idea. Philosophers refer to such logics as logics of confi rmation or as confi rmation theories. (shrink)

There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire (...) at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude. (shrink)

Several authors, including Thomas Nagel and David Gauthier, have defended the view that reasons of self-interest (prudential reasons) are rationally binding. That is, there is always a reason, bearing on the rational advisability, based on one's self-interest and, as a result, a person may act irrationally by knowingly acting against such reasons regardless of the person's desires or values. Both Nagel and Gauthier argue from the rationally mandatory nature of prudential reasons to the conclusion that moral (...) reasons can be rationally mandatory, challenging the neo-Humean position that practical reasons that bear on an agent's rationality are essentially grounded on the agent's subjective, contingent, conative states. I argue, pace Nagel and Gauthier, that prudential reasons are not rationally mandatory--that the rational requirement to act in one's own interest, when it exists, is, as the neo-Humean insists, grounded on one's subjective, contingent, conative states. Prudential reasons are not reasons for every (conceivable) agent--not in the sense that bears on the rational advisability of action. (shrink)

Wellman identified three types of conductive arguments, the third of which contains both pro and counter-considerations in the same piece of reasoning. This paper provides a pragma-dialectical analysis of this type of argumentation, with special focus on argumentation reconstruction. It argues that the account of pro/con argumentation in the framework of argument-as-product has problems solvable by a pragma-dialectical approach. The paper asserts that pro/con argumentation should be analyzed as a dialectical strategy of a protagonist, where acknowledgement of counter-considerations shows that (...) the antagonist’s reasons have been taken into consideration, although the pro-considerations override them. Thus, the pro-considerations of pro/con argumentation should be interpreted as the protagonist’s overriding defeaters of the antagonist’s counter-arguments, the protagonist incorporating the latter as counter-considerations. The paper further argues that the pragma-dialectical framework needs an additional conceptual tool to properly reconstruct complex forms of pro/con argumentation. Finally, the pragma-dialectical approach to reconstruct pro/con argumentation has several advantages, especially to a more logical-structural approach to complex pro/con argumentation. (shrink)

In this primer on apologetics, Henri Blocher helps readers navigate the relationship and tensions between faith and reason. "Doing apologetics" means presenting arguments to lead people to faith or to con rm them in their faith. After discussing the relationship between faith and reason, the author addresses several of the thorniest questions that trouble our efforts to unify a heart for Jesus with a mind at work: - How do we combine science and faith? - Does the Bible contain errors? (...) - Can we make the Bible say whatever we want? In discussing all of these issues in Faith and Reason, the author reminds us of the motivations that should prompt us to seek the most persuasive reasons for believing: to make our decision to have faith a responsible one, to increase our love for the people around us, and to bring glory to God. (shrink)

The central problem of the ‘normativity of law’ concerns how legal rules or directives give us reasons for actions. The core of this question is how something that is external to the agent, such as legal rules or directives, can be ‘part of the agent’, and how they can guide the agent in performing complex actions (such as legal rule-following) that persist over time. David Enoch has denied that the normativity of law poses any interesting challenge to theories of (...) law. He argues that law provides reasons for actions in terms of what he calls triggering-reasons and he advances the view that because there are many circumstances in which reasons are triggered, law does not pose a special challenge. According to Enoch, once we understand the way that triggering reasons operate, we can understand how legal rules and directives provide us with reasons for actions. In §II of this paper, I set the stage for the debate and establish a set of principles that emerge from the common sense of view of reasons for actions and argue that any theory of reasons for action should provide a coherent explanation of these key principles. I focus on the idea that a satisfactory account of reasons for action should also explain reasons in actions. In §III I explain briefly the different theories of reasons for action and locate Enoch’s conception of reasons for action as triggering-reasons within this theoretical framework. In §IV I show that Enoch’s conception of reasons for actions does not explain some of the key features or principles that emerge from our common sense view of reasons for action and nor does it explain reasons in actions.Resumen:El problema central de la ‘normatividad del derecho’ versa sobre cómo las reglas o directrices jurídicas nos dan razones para la acción. El núcleo de esta cuestión reside en cómo algo que es externo al agente, tal como las reglas o directrices jurídicas, pueden ser ‘parte del agente’, y cómo pueden guiar a ese agente al llevar a cabo acciones complejas (tal como la obediencia de las reglas) que persisten en el tiempo. David Enoch ha negado que la normatividad del derecho presente algún reto interesante a las teorías del derecho. Arguye que el derecho provee razones para la acción en términos de lo que él llama razones detonantes (triggering-reasons) y propone la perspectiva de que, dado que hay muchas circunstancias bajo las cuales se detonan las razones, el derecho no plantea ningún reto especial. De acuerdo con Enoch, una vez que entendemos la manera en que operan las razones detonantes, podemos comprender cómo las reglas y directrices jurídicas nos proveen razones para la acción. En la sección II de este artículo, fijo el escenario para el debate y establezco una serie de principios que emergen de la visión de sentido común sobre las razones para las acciones, y sostengo que cual- quier teoría de las razones para la acción debería proporcionar una explicación coherente de estos principios clave. Me centro en la idea de que una concepción satisfactoria de las razones para la acción también debe- ría explicar las razones en las acciones. En la sección III, explico brevemente las diferentes teorías de las razones para la acción y ubico la concepción de Enoch de razones para la acción como razones detonantes (triggering-reasons) dentro de este marco teórico. En la sección IV muestro que la concepción de Enoch de razones para las acciones no explica algunas de las principales características o principios que emergen de nuestra visión de las razones para la acción basada en el sentido común, ni tampoco explica las razones en las acciones. (shrink)

Let us say that a normative conflict is a situation in which an agent ought to perform an action A, and also ought to perform an action B, but in which it is impossible for the agent to perform both A and B. Not all normative conflicts are moral conflicts, of course. It may be that the agent ought to perform the action A for reasons of personal generosity, but ought to perform the action B for reasons of (...) prudence: perhaps A involves buying a lavish gift for a friend, while B involves depositing a certain amount of money in the bank. In general, our practical deliberation is shaped by a concern with a variety of morally neutral goods—not just generosity and prudence, but any number of others, such as etiquette, aesthetics, fun—many of which are capable of providing conflicting reasons for action. I mention these ancillary values in the present setting, however, only to put them aside. We will be concerned here, not with normative conflicts more generally, but precisely with moral conflicts—situations in which, even when our attention is restricted entirely to moral reasons for action, it is nevertheless true that an agent ought to do A and ought to do B, where it is impossible to do both. (shrink)

Modernity has made identity impossible because of its exigency of a per-fection that is not compatible with human finitude. This is the reason why since Romanticism it has been generalized the attempt of establishing scopes in which man is freed from this duty. There arises also many phenomena that can be understood as aesthetic instances that defend the in-dividual particularity and promote the cultural variety.

Living with the Robots. A Conversation about social Robotics This interview aims at focusing some aspects of an intriguing discipline known as social Robotics. In particular, we try to get familiar with concepts and philosophical frameworks which deal with this new human enterprise. Paul Dumouchel and Luisa Damiano will help us to get in contact with a scenario in which emotions, reason and ethics will be partially revised by a somehow different perspective about human-robot interaction and sociality.

People tend to contribute more—and think they have stronger obligations to contribute more—to rescuing an identified victim rather than a statistical one. Indeed, they are often disposed to contribute more to rescuing a single identified victim than a greater number of statistical ones. By an “identified victim,” I mean Terry Q., lying injured in the passenger seat of the wrecked automobile on the corner of Main Street and Broadway, or Jessica McClure, the child who fell into the Texas well in (...) 1987 and whose family was sent $700,000 in donations for her. We need not know their names, however, and we can accept a very minimal form of identification. By a “statistical victim,” I mean the person who, extrapolating from traffic records, will be in a similar, serious car accident tomorrow (and may then be identified), or the children who will fall into wells next year if we do not cap them better than we did the well that trapped Jessica. Does this disposition (or perceived obligation) have any normative force? I initially thought there could be no such normative force, but consequentialist and nonconsequentialist arguments, pro and con, have convinced me that reasonable people can disagree with each other. This disagreement poses a problem for political philosophy: how should policy choices take such disagreement into account? (shrink)

According to a typical skeptical hypothesis, the evidence of your senses has been massively deceptive. Venerable skeptical hypotheses include the hypotheses that you have been deceived by a powerful evil demon, that you are now having an incredibly detailed dream, and that you are a brain in a vat. It is obviously reasonable for you now to be confident that neither of the above hypotheses is true. Epistemologists have proposed many stories to explain why that is reasonable. One theory is (...) that those hypotheses are inherently much less plausible than the hypothesis that your senses are basically reliable. Another theory is that you currently don’t believe any of those hypotheses, and that you need no justification to continue in that disbelief, given that your current beliefs cohere properly. A third theory is that —given that your senses are working properly—your sensory experiences themselves justify you in believing propositions such as the proposition that you have hands. Neo is given very good evidence that some skeptical hypothesis is true. He rightly becomes doubtful that his senses are or have been trustworthy. In fact, he becomes confident of a particular hypothesis: that AI’s created the Matrix, etc. But this is just one of many types of hypotheses that might account for his experiences. These types include. (shrink)

El concepto de razón que emerge con Vico, y que será análogo al propuesto por Ortega, no es ya el de la razón física y pura, natural y abstracta, sino el de una razón vital e histórica, la cual viene a ejercitarse y expresarse como razón narrativa : aquélla única capaz de comprender "la lingua con cui parla la storia".The concept of reason that emerges with Vico, and that is analogous to the one proposed by Ortega, is not only the (...) one of physical and pure, natural and abstract reason, but rather the one of vital and historic reason, which comes to exercise itself and express itself as narrative reason: that only capacity of comprehension "la lingua con cui parla la storia". (shrink)

In a simple model of conflict, two agents fight over a fixed prize, and how hard they fight depends on what they believe about their abilities. To this model I add “preagents,” representing parents, leaders, or natural selection, who choose each agent’s confidence in his ability. Depending on the reason for such confidence, I find five different patterns in how confidence varies with ability. Agents who estimate their ability with error have under-confidence when ability is high and over-confidence when ability (...) is low, while strategic commitment incentives induce the opposite pattern. Agents who misjudge their value for the prize, relative to their cost of effort, induce an overor under-confidence that is independent of ability, while cooperating pre-agents choose extreme under-confidence. Agents who use confidence to signal ability have a relatively uniform over-confidence. (shrink)

In the academic world, peer review is one of the major processes in evaluating a scholars contribution. In this study, we are interested in quantifying the merits of different policies in a peer review process, such as single-blind review, double-blind review, and obtaining authors feedback. Currently, insufficient work has been undertaken to evaluate the benefits of different peer review policies. One of the major reasons for this situation is the inability to conduct any empirical study because data are presently (...) unavailable. In this case, a computer simulation is one of the best ways to conduct a study. We perform a series of simulations to study the effects of different policies on a peer review process. In this study, we focus on the peer review process of a typical computer science conference. Our results point to the crucial role of program chairs in determining the quality and diversity of the articles to be accepted for publication. We demonstrate the importance of discussion among reviewers, suggest circumstances in which the double-blind review policy should be adopted, and question the credibility of the authors feedback mechanism. Finally, we stress that randomness plays an important role in the peer review process, and this role cannot be eliminated. Although our model may not capture every component of a peer review process, it covers some of the most essential elements. Thus, even the simulation results clearly cannot be taken as literal descriptions of an actual peer review process. However, we can at least still use them to identify alternative directions for future study. (shrink)

The creation of guidelines has long been a popular means of conveying normative requirements in scientific and medical research. The recent case of He Jiankui, whose research flouted both widely accepted ethical standards and a set of field-specific guidelines he co-authored, raises the question of whether guidelines are an effective means of preventing misconduct. This paper advances the theory that guidelines can facilitate moral rationalization, a form of motivated reasoning. Moral rationalization in research occurs when individuals justify their actions with (...) plausible reasons that cohere with their moral standards. This allows them to act as they want while believing in their own goodness. If guidelines facilitate moral rationalization, this has implications for research ethics training and for the work of applied ethicists. Research ethics training ought to incorporate reflection on conative features of reasoning, including incentives to commit misconduct, and applied ethicists ought to be circumspect about their use of ethics guidelines. Otherwise, they are feeding the fire of rationalization with the cognitive material practitioners need to accomplish their desired ends. (shrink)

Combining ethics and economics has become one of the greatest challenges of our times. Today’s economic globalisation processes increasingly demand more respect for the universal-isable rights, values and principles defended by societies with a post-conventional level of moral development. The credibility and legitimacy of the activity, and therefore its correct development, depend on this respect. However, the prevailing economic theory continues to perceive moral reflection as an external question, and regards its orientations as impositions which, if followed, minimise the satisfaction (...) of maximum profits. For this reason the aim of the present paper is twofold: first, to show ethics as a constitutive activity, necessary for the economy to develop in the right way through Peter Ulrich’s integrative proposal and especially through Jesús Conill’s critical hermeneutic approach; and second, to propose guidelines for designing a system for monitoring and managing the moral climate in firms and economic organisations that can be applied and implemented in practice. (shrink)

This book has an ambitious aim—to make convincing the rejection of the hard and fast cognitive–conative divide currently so prevalent in philosophy of mind and moral psychology. Only such a rejection, Helm believes, can solve—or dissolve—the two major problems of practical reason. The ‘motivational problem’ is ‘a puzzle about the connection between our choosing something as the outcome of deliberation and our being motivated to pursue it’ (p. 1); the ‘deliberative problem’ concerns ‘how deliberation about value is possible’ (p. 11) (...) given that ‘our concept of value is pulled in seemingly opposed directions of objectivity and subjectivity’ (p. 200). Helm ‘suggests’ in chapter one, and argues with respect to particular attempts to solve these problems in later chapters, that acceptance of the cognitive-conative divide makes them quite intractable. (shrink)

It is suggested that taking into account considerations that traditionally fall within the scope of computer science in general, and artificial intelligence in particular, sheds new light on the subject of causation. It is argued that adopting causal notions con be viewed as filling a computational need: They allow reasoning with incomplete information, facilitate economical representations, and afford relatively efficient methods for reasoning about those representations. Specifically, it is proposed that causal reasoning is intimately bound to nonmonotonic reasoning. An account (...) of causation is offered that relies upon this connection, and compares this proposal to previous accounts within philosophy and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Two questionnaires directed to Swedish physicians and a sample of the Swedish population investigated attitudes towards physician-assisted suicide (PAS). The aim of the present work was to analyse qualitative data from these questionnaires in order to explore how respondents reason about PAS. Data were analysed in two steps. First, we categorized different kinds of responses and identified pro and con arguments. Second, we identified general conclusions from the responses. The data reflect the differences in attitudes towards PAS among the public (...) and physicians, with the former mainly in favour of PAS and the latter mainly against. There was, however, considerable agreement about what requirements must be met before PAS could be considered ethical. Many arguments against PAS concerned the professional role of physicians, which indicates that it may not be assisted suicide as such that many PAS opponents disagree with, but rather that it is handled by physicians in the regular health-care system. (shrink)

The following essay, perceptological in character, has a twofold goal: firstly, to show how the method devised by Magritte – which aims at making a thing visible – is grounded on the rules and the modalities of phenomenical giveness. Secondly, to suggest that the perceptual analysis of artworks sheds light on the nature of pictorial representation. Hence, the proposal is about the relationship between perception and image: one’s idea of perception guides the results of one’s theoretical enquiry. The present analysis (...) is based on a phenomenological (experimental) approach, with a special attention for the Gestalt tradition and the notion of immediate experience. In sight of this, Magritte’s theoretical thought will be reprised without any pretension of exhaustiveness: we are just interested in his praxis, in his methodology. For this reason, our reflection on the phenomenical appearance of the thing will not take into account the Magrittes’ underlying metaphysics. (shrink)

Ethical Aspects Related to Nursing Care for Persons with Disabilities: A Qualitative Analysis Aspectos éticos relacionados com a atenção de enfermagem em pessoas com deficiência: uma análise qualitativa The purpose of the study is to describe ethical aspects related to nursing care for persons with disabilities; a population considered socially vulnerable and in conditions of inequality. It corresponds to the first phase of a primary study conducted in Atacama, Chile using a qualitative methodology and content analysis. Nursing graduates are interviewed (...) respecting Ezekiel Emanuel’s ethical criteria. The main findings account for ontological categories such as moral reasoning, value system, nurse-patient relationship model, consequences of the ethical nursing action, strategies to overcome moral conflicts, and barriers in care. It is concluded that caring for people with disabilities is a source of dilemma and moral anguish for nurses, especially when it comes to individuals with sensitive or cognitive disabilities. The paternalistic medical model predominates in the clinical context, limiting the right to autonomy of persons with disabilities. Instrumental values such as efficiency are added to traditional moral values promoted by nurses. Civic values considered fundamental to the challenge of human diversity and life in a democracy are not mentioned. Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Campillay-Campillay M, Rivas-Rivero E, Dubó-Araya P, Calle-Carrasco A. Aspectos éticos relacionados con la atención de enfermería en personas en situación de discapacidad: un análisis cualitativo. Pers Bioet. 2020;24:43-56. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2020.24.1.4 Recibido: 19/07/2019 Aceptado: 12/11/2019 Publicado: 07/05/2020. (shrink)

This paper inquires into the nature and causes of credulous belief and proposes a way of making negative evidence more salient to believers so that they are less likely to fall into the habit of credulous believing. Contrasting the work of Richard Swinburne with recent work in cognitive psychology, the author argues that for the “strong credulity hypothesis”, namely that our comprehension of testimony is closely linked to an initial (albeit temporary) acceptance of what speakers claim. That is, we are (...) literally “set up” to believe irrespective of whether the belief in question is reasonable. In order to “neutralize” the effect of initial credulity, the author describes a pro/con procedure (suitable for a number of classes, e.g. critical thinking) that allows for the systematic analysis of beliefs and testimony. (shrink)

En mi experiencia como docente universitario he apreciado la dificultad que tienen los jóvenes estudiantes de Filosofía para acercarse a la Crítica de la Razón Pura de Immanuel Kant. Así mismo, también es notable la cantidad de malentendidos y prejuicios con los que se acercan los estudiantes a este autor clásico. Esto se debe principalmente, a una confusión de contextos teóricos y a un desconocimiento del alcance y validez de la obra. Dicha confusión se origina debido a que los estudiantes (...) primero conocen las objeciones y los debates contemporáneos del filósofo, antes que una aproximación crítica al autor mismo. Teniendo en cuenta esto, considero necesario realizar un breve texto con una función propedéutica que le permita comprender al estudiante del pensamiento de Kant y cómo se articulan sus preocupaciones conceptuales en el contexto filosófico de la edad moderna. (shrink)

The analysis of Hannah Arendt's Socrate opens up the possibility of a fruitful rethinking of the sense and way of conceiving philosophy with children. A way that in this proposal is defined as "Utopian", since it intends to resume, with the Socratic lesson, just how much remains in it open, undetermined, capable of reviving with enchantment in the living of the orality of a philosophical dialogue- absolutely unprecedented and unpredictable - such as that with children. The space given to the (...) unexpected, to listening, to free divergence, then becomes radical, comes to be a paradoxical foundation of a "methodology" that cannot be captured in structured schemes and paths, since it remains open to the "utopian" space of philosophizing. The comparison with Arendt is therefore interleaved, through references to other readings that are contemporary of the Socratic lesson, with the experience lived of the author, who has been leading for years philosophy workshops with primary school children. Of course, Socrates has never been and never wanted to act as a "master": his conducting the dialogue, although always being asymmetric, is aimed at bringing the interlocutor on his line of reasoning and never the opposite, has never had as end the teaching of some doctrine. How much, rather, to lead the interlocutor from the presumed certainty to radical uncertainty, from opinion to doubt, from affirmation to aporia. Thiswe must authentically experiment, before anything else, when we place ourselves inlistening to children's questions, when we try to dialogue with them, to "do philosophy", to "think together". (shrink)

Don Quixote is not only a novel which represents Spanish culture, but a hero that reveals the relation between life and reason. I will compare two interpretations of Don Quixote. The first phenomenological interpreta-tion belongs to Ortega Y Gasset, and the second to Lithuanian philosopher Algis Mickūnas. The interpretations of Don Quixote are related to the question about an ideal. What is the role of ideals in culture? Are ideals principles con-structed by reason? Do these principles deny the reality of (...) life, or are ideals related to the self life-world rationality? Then what does the idealism of Don Quixote mean? Does it represent a utopian rationality or does it seek to show values that are not reduced to circumstance? Ortega criticizes Don Quixote as an idealist, who can’t find any ideal values in the nearest environment. Mickūnas suggests interpreting Don Quixote’s idealism as a phenomenological bracketing, which allows one to doubt the blind dependence on this life-world and question its value.Don Quijote no es únicamente una novela que representa la cultura española, sino también un héroe que revela la relación entre vida y razón. Compararé dos interpretaciones de Don Quijote. La primera interpretación fenomenológica pertenece a Ortega y Gasset y la segunda al filósofo lituano Algis Mickūnas. Las interpretaciones de Don Quijote se relacionan con la cuestión acerca de los ideales. ¿Cuál es el papel de los ideales en la cultura? ¿Son los ideales principios construidos por la razón? ¿Niegan tales ideales la realidad de la vida o bien se encuentran los ideales relacionados con la racionalidad misma del mundo de la vida? ¿Qué significa entonces el idealismo de Don Quijote? ¿Representa acaso una racionalidad utópica o trata más bien de mostrar valores que no se hallan reducidos a la circunstancia? Ortega critica a Don Quijote como un idelista, que no es capaz de encontrar valores ideales en su entorno más próximo. Mickūnas propone inter-pretar el idealismo de Don Quijote como un poner entre paréntesis de tipo fenomenológico, que nos permite dudar de la ciega dependencia del mundo vital y cuestionar su valor. (shrink)

Readers of Hobbes usually take his account of practical deliberation to be a passive process that does not respond to agents’ judgements about what normative reasons they have. This is ostensibly because deliberation is purely conative and/or excludes reasoning, or because Hobbesian reasoning is itself a process in which reasoners merely experience a succession of mental states (e.g. according to purely associative mental structures). I argue to the contrary that for Hobbes deliberation (and hence the basis for voluntary action) (...) is not purely conative and amongst humans it involves reasoning. Furthermore, while non-linguistic reasoning is passive, specifically linguistic reasoning is for Hobbes an active process in which reasoners affirm propositions from which they reason. The historical significance of Hobbes’s new account of agency lies in his attempt, in deploying the tool of language, to weld a materialist determinism to a cognitive account of practical deliberation that can involve reasoning and be reason-responsive. (shrink)

Se aborda la idea de razón pública, atendiendo en particular a su concomitante ideal de razonabilidad. Se expone la continuidad de esta noción desde John Locke a John Rawls, destacando su vínculo con la religiosidad doctrinalmente minimalista de la tradición erasmista. Se cuestiona que, dado tal vínculo, esta ida pueda servir de criterio para evaluar la presencia de otras voces religiosas en la vida pública. The article addresses the idea of public reason, treating in particular its concomitant ideal of reasonableness. (...) It exposes the continuity of this notion from John Locke to John Rawls, highlighting its connection to the minimalist doctrinal religiosity of the Erasmist tradition. It questions if this idea can serve as criteria to evaluate the presence of other religious voices in public life, given this connection. (shrink)

Husserl rejects the contrast between human life as an irrational factum and reason as an objectifying force that is hostile to life. Hence he moves away from the incompatibility between philosophy as science and philosophy of life. This paper has two purposes. First, it attempts to analyze the sequence of living horizons of reason, i.e., to lay out a progressive bringing-into-play that begins in a primal history linked to instinct, goes through history proper with its manners of practical reason, and (...) reaches its culmination in a second historicity with a teleological development. In his last dated manuscript, Husserl speaks of “the upright, fair reason of the natural, sound human understanding” that plays a role before “the scientific, philosophical reason”. Secondly, against this background, phenomenology of reason is considered as a view that is grounded in passive fulfillments, traces theory back to life, and emphasizes the interpenetration of the various manifestations of reason. It is argued that the relationship between intention and fulfillment pervades the movement from latent to manifest reason, renders possible different modes of rational legitimation, and shows distinctive traits in each mode. With regard to the vitality of Husserlian reason, a brief epilogue for the Spanish speaking world deals with some of J. Ortega y Gasset’s views on the issue.Husserl rechaza la contraposición entre la vida humana como un factum irracional y la razón como una fuerza objetivante hostil a la vida. Por eso se aparta de la incompatibilidad entre la filosofía como ciencia y la filosofía de la vida. Este trabajo tiene dos propósitos. Prime-ro, intenta analizar la secuencia de horizontes vitales de la razón, es decir, desplegar una progresiva puesta-en-juego que se inicia en la protohistoria ligada al instinto, pasa a través de la historia en sentido propio con sus modalida-des de razón práctica, y culmina en una segun-da historicidad con un desarrollo teleológico. En su último manuscrito fechado, Husserl habla de “la proba y honrosa razón del entendimiento humano natural” que desempeña un papel con anterioridad a “la razón científica, la filosófica”. En segundo lugar, frente a este trasfondo, se examina la fenomenología de la razón como una visión que se funda en cum-plimientos pasivos, refiere la teoría a la vida, y pone énfasis en la compenetración de las varia-das manifestaciones de la razón. Se sostiene que la relación entre intención y cumplimiento atraviesa el movimiento desde la razón latente a la razón patente, hace posible diversos modos de legitimación racional, y muestra rasgos distintivos en cada uno de los modos. Respecto de la vitalidad de la razón husserliana, un breve epílogo para hispanoparlantes considera algu-nos puntos de vista de J. Ortega y Gasset sobre la cuestión. (shrink)

Pensadores griegos y orientales, filósofos antiguos, medioevales y modernos, han tocado el tema de lo corporal de manera fragmentaria que reducen lo corpóreo a mero instrumento. Para evitar este tipo de interpretaciones, queda el expediente de acudir a la síntesis holística; a la versión del "cuerpo total" que somos. La economía imperante es la del "cuerpo poseído". Se tasa, vende y desecha en el mercado la fuerza de trabajo. Se ejerce sobre él una violencia que nos rebasa en todos los (...) frentes; es radical, porque atenta contra la integridad y la dignidad de los cuerpos. Restañar las heridas corporales de nuestros pueblos requiere de la formulación y siembra del conocimiento de la Ética del cuerpo que deberá ir acompañada por un proceso de reconstrucción simbólica de la idea de "cuerpo" en el que todos participemos. Si armonizan necesidades y capacidades corporales propias y ajenas y compaginan nuestras acciones con el respeto al entorno natural, casa del cuerpo, podremos vislumbrar que vamos sobre el camino correcto. The Greek and Eastern thinkers, ancient, medieval and modern philosophers, have dealt with the body only in a fragmentary way that sees it as a mere instrument. To avoid this kind of interpretation we resort to a holistic synthesis-the "total body" version that we really are. The dominant economics is the one of the "possessed body" that can be priced, sold and disposed of as working force. An overpowering violence is applied to it; it is a radical violence as it attempts on bodies' integrity and dignity. The healing of the wounded bodies of our people requires formulating and planting the seeds of the body's ethics that will accompany the reconstruction of an idea of body to be shared by all of us. If we harmonize our own and others' body's needs and abilities, and our actions are in accordance with our natural surroundings, we will be able to make out the right path. (shrink)

The modern concept of 'dialogue' among persons and groups of different religions or 'world-views' is the fruit of interaction between Christian tradition and the technique of dialogue in Greek philosophy. Dialogue in general requires a classification of those in dialogue , a prototype and an archetype of mediation , a teleotype or final objective , a procedural type , and a representation of spacial logic . This article examines especially the Thomistic approach, through demonstrative and probable reasons.

In the context of a wider investigation into Christianity as dialogue with non-Christians, and following up on a study of the approach of Thomas Aquinas through «demonstrative or probable reasons», the present study examines the approach of Francis of Assisi, who went off to preach to the Sultan and ordered his friars to give witness to the Gospel without resorting to discussions or conflicts, and that of Bonaventure, who, like Paul in the First Letter to the Corinthians, insisted on (...) the power of the signs of God and of his Word. (shrink)

In broad outlines, the first of these claims that beliefs and other cognitive states, on their own, can never motivate a new desire, intention, or action. Rather, on this view, what motivates us to desire, intend, or act is always the cooperation of some desire (or other conative state) with such cognitive states. Thus, on HTM, practical motivation is always the product of two fundamentally distinct categories of mental states operating in conjunction with one another.

Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is the reason coherent? This is an attempt to say exactly what is involved in such a thought, with special reference to the case of con-reasons, reasons that count against the action the agent eventually choses.