Hobbes: Moral Psychology

Hobbes rejects the Aristotelian political animal, a move that enables a malleable psychology in which we are driven by our passions and responses to external objects. Our psychology is accordingly overdetermined by our socio-cultural environment, and managing that environment becomes a central task of the state. A particular problem is what I call the “ontological illusion,” the constitutive human tendency to ontologize products of the imagination. I argue that Hobbes’s strategies for managing the ontological illusion govern part four of Leviathan. (...) Those chapters are intended to convince elites that crediting ontological illusions in policy is disastrous, as his discussion of demonology and its thinly veiled references to witchcraft persecutions readily illustrates. (shrink)

This book presents a new interpretation of the seventeenth-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes’s philosophy of religion. I argue that the key to Hobbes’s treatment of religion is his theory of religious language. On that theory, the proper function of religious speech is not to affirm truths, state facts, or describe anything, but only to express non-descriptive attitudes of honor, reverence, and humility before God, the incomprehensible great cause of nature. The traditional vocabulary of theism, natural religion, and even scriptural religion is (...) preserved intact, but only as a system of natural and conventional signs of honor, as we laud the ‘infinite,’ ‘wise,’ and ‘good’ cause of nature, and speak of it in conventionally-approved scriptural terms—not in an attempt to describe it, but only as a way of expressing our veneration. The proposed reading undercuts the most influential alternative interpretations, revealing that Hobbes is neither an atheist, nor a literal-minded theist with a realist conception of the traditional divine attributes. At the same time, understanding Hobbes’s non-descriptivist approach to religious discourse helps us to see why so many have found either an atheistic or a realist-minded theistic interpretation attractive. The book advances a comprehensive analysis of Hobbes’s highly original philosophy of religion, including both his treatment of natural religion and his treatment of revealed religion and scripture. It also connects his philosophy of mind and language, epistemology, and theory of human nature to his engagé religious politics, including his views on religious toleration, sectarianism, religious education, ecclesiology, and the religious function of the civil state. (shrink)

This chapter approaches the question of biopolitics in ancient political thought looking not at specific political techniques but at notions of the final aim of the political community. It argues that the “happiness” (eudaimonia, beatitudo) that constitutes the greatest human good in the tradition from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas is not a “biopolitical” ideal, but rather a metabiopolitical one, consisting in a contemplative activity situated above and beyond the biological and the political. It is only with Thomas Hobbes that civic (...) happiness becomes “biopolitically” identified with simple survival; for modernity, as Hannah Arendt puts it, mere being alive becomes the greatest human good, and happiness is understood as a subjective “quality of life.” In both models, the political realm is a means to an end. Arendt draws our attention to a neglected third alternative to both the classical/metabiopolitical and the modern/biopolitical ideals: “public happiness” consisting in political participation itself. (shrink)

Offers comprehensive treatment of Thomas Hobbes’s thought, providing readers with different ways of understanding Hobbes as a systematic philosopher As one of the founders of modern political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes is best known for his ideas regarding the nature of legitimate government and the necessity of society submitting to the absolute authority of sovereign power. Yet Hobbes produced a wide range of writings, from translations of texts by Homer and Thucydides, to interpretations of Biblical books, to works devoted to geometry, (...) optics, morality, and religion. Hobbes viewed himself as presenting a unified method for theoretical and practical science—an interconnected system of philosophy that provides many entry points into his thought. A Companion to Hobbes is an expertly curated collection of essays offering close textual engagement with the thought of Thomas Hobbes in his major works while probing his ideas regarding natural philosophy, mathematics, human nature, civil philosophy, religion, and more. The Companion discusses the ways in which scholars have tried to understand the unity and diversity of Hobbes’s philosophical system and examines the reception of the different parts of Hobbes’s philosophy by thinkers such as René Descartes, Margaret Cavendish, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. Presenting a diversity of fresh perspectives by both emerging and established scholars, this volume: Provides a comprehensive treatment of Hobbes’s thought in his works, including Elements of Law, Elements of Philosophy, and Leviathan Explores the connecting points between Hobbes’ metaphysics, epistemology, mathematics, natural philosophy, morality, and civil philosophy Offers readers strategies for understanding how the parts of Hobbes’s philosophical system fit together Examines Hobbes’s philosophy of mathematics and his attempts to understand geometrical objects and definitions Considers Hobbes’s philosophy in contexts such as the natural state of humans, gender relations, and materialist worldviews Challenges conceptions of Hobbes’s moral theory and his views about the rights of sovereigns Part of the acclaimed Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, A Companion to Hobbes is an invaluable resource for scholars and advanced students of Early modern thought, particularly those from disciplines such as History of Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Intellectual History, History of Politics, Political Theory, and English. (shrink)

Many interpreters use Hobbes’s endorsement of “ought implies can” to justify treating Hobbes’s motivational psychology as an external constraint on his normative theory. These interpreters assume that, for Hobbes, something is “possible” for a person to do only if they can be motivated to do it, and so Hobbes’s psychological theory constrains what obligations people have. I argue this assumption about what is “possible” is false and so these arguments are unsound. Looking to Hobbes’s exchange with Bramhall on free will, (...) I argue that the sense of “possible” relevant for “ought implies can” in Hobbes’s philosophy only concerns an agent’s capacity to do something if they decide to do it. Whether a person can be motivated to do something, then, does not determine if it is possible for them. Consequently, Hobbes’s motivational psychology cannot determine what our obligations are by invoking the principle that “ought implies can.”. (shrink)

Contrary to John Bramhall and critics like him, Thomas Hobbes takes the view that no account of liberty or freedom can serve as the relevant basis on which to distinguish moral from nonmoral agents or explains the basis on which an agent becomes subject to law and liable to punishment. The correct compatibilist strategy rests, on Hobbes’s account, with a proper appreciation and description of the contractualist features that shape and structure the moral community. From this perspective human agents may (...) indeed use their liberty to make themselves moral agents. In doing this, however, they are not employing a distinct kind of liberty but rather using a liberty that they share with animals and other nonmoral agents to perform a distinct kind of act (i.e., consent) whereby they become moral agents subject to law and any punishments that are required to enforce it. ____ -/- Originally published in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy in Early Modern Europe - eds. D. Clarke & C. Wilson, OUP 2011 -/- Republished in Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays - OUP 2021: Paul Russell]. (shrink)

Trust is so intimately linked with faith that sometimes trust needs faith to unfold in a relationship. I argue that the role of this faith element in trust is to elevate the status of the one in which we trust so as to emphasize the equal dignity of all the participants in the relationship of trust. Against views that focus on a «rational» trust based on an exaggerated emphasis on the capacity of self-trust as a point of departure for the (...) trust in others, the essay develops toward the depiction of a kind of trust that is rooted in faith and still maintains a «reasonable» character. By way of discussing the implications of Thomas Hobbes’s reflections on covenants and contracts, and Annette Baier’s critique of what she sees as the Hobbesian «fixation» on contracts, I argue toward the identification of what I call a «covenantal trust» in contemporary political ontology. (shrink)

Readers of Hobbes usually take his account of practical deliberation to be a passive process that does not respond to agents’ judgements about what normative reasons they have. This is ostensibly because deliberation is purely conative and/or excludes reasoning, or because Hobbesian reasoning is itself a process in which reasoners merely experience a succession of mental states (e.g. according to purely associative mental structures). I argue to the contrary that for Hobbes deliberation (and hence the basis for voluntary action) is (...) not purely conative and amongst humans it involves reasoning. Furthermore, while non-linguistic reasoning is passive, specifically linguistic reasoning is for Hobbes an active process in which reasoners affirm propositions from which they reason. The historical significance of Hobbes’s new account of agency lies in his attempt, in deploying the tool of language, to weld a materialist determinism to a cognitive account of practical deliberation that can involve reasoning and be reason-responsive. (shrink)

This paper aims to highlight the role played by uncertainties in global justice theories. It will start by identifying four kinds of uncertainties that could potentially have an impact on the nature, content and very existence of global duties: first, uncertainties regarding the causes of global injustices; second, uncertainties regarding the consequences of global justice initiatives; third, uncertainties pertaining to the 'imperfect' character of certain global duties; and fourth, uncertainties regarding the conduct of others. It will discuss each of these (...) uncertainties in turn, with particular attention to their normative implications, their distinctively 'global' source, and the possibility of their being addressed. It will conclude with some reflections on how the normative issues raised by uncertainties related to spatial distance compare to those raised by uncertainties related to temporal distance. (shrink)

Descartes deems wonder the first among the passions. Pride and generosity originate from it. To maintain that generosity originates from wonder, Descartes has to deal with serious and hard theoretical issues. Descartes, I shall argue, tackles these issues to endow generosity with a role in the monitoring passions. I back this conjecture examining Hobbes’ and Spinoza’s theories of passions.

Against a background of civil, political and religious conflict, Montaigne and Hobbes redeveloped a form of anthropological and political thinking that ushered in modernity. This collective work is as much concerned with the points where the two authors converge as with the difference in the paths they follow.

Thomas Hobbes argues that the fear of violent death is the most reliable passion on which to found political society. His role in shaping the contemporary view of religion and honor in the West is pivotal, yet his ideas are famously riddled with contradictions. In this breakthrough study, McClure finds evidence that Hobbes' apparent inconsistencies are intentional, part of a sophisticated rhetorical strategy meant to make man more afraid of death than he naturally is. Hobbes subtly undermined two of the (...) most powerful manifestations of man's desire for immortality: the religious belief in an afterlife and the secular desire for eternal fame through honor. McClure argues that Hobbes purposefully stirred up controversy, provoking his adversaries into attacking him and unwittingly spreading his message. This study will appeal to scholars of Hobbes, political theorists, historians of early modern political thought and anyone interested in the genesis of modern Western attitudes toward mortality. (shrink)

We do not generally take the Hobbesian project to be one that encourages human flourishing. I will argue that it is; indeed, I will propose that Hobbes attempts the first modern project to provide for the possibility of the diversity of human flourishing in the civil state. To do so, I will draw on the recent work of Donald Rutherford, who takes Hobbes to be a eudaimonist in the Aristotelian tradition.

By focusing on the exchange between Descartes and Hobbes on how the self is related to its activities, Berkeley draws attention to how he and Hobbes explain the forensic constitution of human subjectivity and moral/political responsibility in terms of passive obedience and conscientious submission to the laws of the sovereign. Formulated as the language of nature or as pronouncements of the supreme political power, those laws identify moral obligations by locating political subjects within those networks of sensible signs. When thus (...) juxtaposed with Hobbes, Berkeley can be understood as endorsing a theologically inflected version of deontological ethics in which moral laws are linked directly to the constitution of the self. (shrink)

Is Hobbes a normative egoist? That is: does Hobbes think that an agent’s normative reasons are all grounded in her own good? A once-dominant tradition of Hobbes scholarship answers ‘yes’. In an important recent work, however, S.A. Lloyd has argued that the answer to the question is ‘no’, and built an alternative non-egoistic interpretation of Hobbes that stresses reciprocity and mutual justifiability. My aim in this paper is to articulate and defend an original ‘middle way’ interpretation of Hobbes which steers (...) a course between an excessively egoistic and what we might call an excessively ‘moralistic’ interpretation. According to the interpretation I defend, our obligations have their source in self-interest in the sense that they are all self-assumed results of covenants, our reasons for making which are solely self-interested. But the obligations that result from such covenants can sometimes require us to act against our self-interest. (shrink)

This is the first study dedicated to Montaigne's philosophy of the passions. It presents the wisdom of the Essays in a new light. Theoretically original, Montaigne’s anthropology of the passions has a great impact on modern philosophers as Descartes and Hobbes.

Thomas Hobbes’s concept of magnanimity, a descendant of Aristotle’s “greatness of soul,” plays a key role in Hobbes’s theory with respect to felicity and the virtue of justice. In his Critique du ‘De Mundo’, Hobbes implies that only genuinely magnanimous people can achieve the greatest felicity in their lives. A life of felicity is a life of pleasure, where the only pleasure that counts is the well grounded glory experienced by those who are magnanimous. Hobbes suggests that felicity involves the (...) successful pursuit of desires, a pursuit at which the magnanimous are particularly adept. Additionally, Hobbes implies that those who possess the virtue of justice must also possess magnanimity; it is the just person’s “Nobleness or Gallantnesse of courage, (rarely found).” Leo Strauss and Dorothea Krook suggest that this cannot be Hobbes’s “final word” on justice, because, they say, Hobbes considers magnanimity a type of pride, which he derogates and cannot consistently associate with virtue. I argue that magnanimity, associated with well-grounded glory, is not a type of pride; only vain glory is. (shrink)

This chapter examines the views of seventeenth-century British philosophers on the relation between virtue and hedonism, explaining that many philosophers believed that a defense of virtue required rejection of hedonism. It discusses the reformulation of moral philosophy proposed by Thomas Hobbes, and analyzes the reactions of Richard Cumberland and Cambridge Platonists Ralph Cudworth and Henry More. The chapter also considers the revival of Epicureanism and early modern natural law theory.

In deriving his moral code, Hobbes does not appeal to any mind-independent good, natural human telos, or innate human sympathies. Instead he assumes a subjectivist theory of value and an egoistic theory of human motivation. Some critics, however, doubt that his laws of nature can be constructed from such scant material. Hobbes ultimately justifies the acceptance of moral laws by the fact that they promote self-preservation. But, as Hobbes himself acknowledges, not everyone prefers survival over natural liberty. In this essay (...) I show that Hobbes can argue that the desire for self-preservation is rationally required by modifying his subjectivist theory of the good to equate what is good for an agent only with the satisfaction of desires (for her own life) that she has at the time that they are satisfied. It is thus irrational to prefer postmortem glory over survival since an agent must be alive for glory to have any value for her. (shrink)

The subject of the article is the question concerning Thomas Hobbes’ view of human nature. This question goes hand in hand with his famous sentence: homo hominilupus est. In the first part of article, the provenance of this citation is described. Subsequentsections are devoted to an attempt to establish how accurately Hobbes saw the basic features of the human condition. The next issue under consideration is the proper sense of another famous Hobbesian citation: bellum omnium contra omnes.The conclusion of the (...) article runs as follows: the true Hobbesian opinion about human nature is different than that which is ascribed to him. A reconstruction based on the texts seems to be more complex and leads to the conclusion that the main motive behind human actions is fear. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes assigned indispensable, peace-directed roles to conscience in his moral and political philosophy. This paper first locates Hobbes's definition of conscience in its historical context by highlighting commonalities with scholastic and seventeenth-century doctrines. Second, it shows that Hobbes imposed numerous stringent obligations on conscience in the natural condition. Third, it analyses Hobbes's account of conscience as 'shared knowledge' in Chapter 7 of Leviathan and considers the possible targets for his polemics. Finally, it lays out the chief responsibilities of conscience (...) in society, clarifies the relationship between 'private' and 'public' conscience, and identifies major tensions in Hobbes's theory. (shrink)

U radu se razmatra Hobbesovo shvaćanje egoizma, posebno u kontekstu njegove koncepcije individualnosti te koncepcije prirodnog stanja i države. Hobbesovo učenje sagledano je kao istinski početak novovjekovnog razmatranja egoizma i prekid s kršćansko-srednjovjekovnim načinom ocjenjivanja egoizma koje podrazumijeva striktnu osudu egoističkog djelanja.Text examines Hobbes’ understanding of egoism, especially in the context of his concept of individuality and the concept of the state of nature and civil government. Hobbes’ views are considered to be the true beginning of the modern discussion on (...) egoism and the break with the Christian Middle-Age manner of evaluating egoism which implied strict condemnation of egoistic action. (shrink)

This article examines changes in the conception of morality and egoism in early modern Europe. It explains that the postulate that human beings were fractious, covetous, and endowed with a strong drive towards self-aggrandizement was associated with Thomas Hobbes, and his writings produced a strong counterflow in the form of assertions and demonstrations of altruism and benevolence as natural endowments of human beings. It suggests that the modern ethical thought has defined itself by its concern with a specific ethical conception (...) whose distinctness from eudaimonist prudential concerns is part of its very idea. (shrink)

This article introduces the doctrine of the passions in the Hobbesian work, showing its debt with tradition, especially the scholastic Aristotelian one, even if, at the same time, it offers some breach features with this tradition, which are also analysed. In addition, the fundamentals of imagination manifest themselves in the appetitive process, in Hobbes's doctrine as well as in the scholastic Aristotelian tradition, showing their similarities and differences.

The article revisits the originality of Hobbes's concept of happiness on the basis of Hobbes's two accounts found respectively in Thomas White's De Mundo Examined and Leviathan. It is argued that Hobbes's claim that happiness consists in the unhindered advance from one acquired good to another ought to be understood against the background of Hobbes's theory of sensation and the imagination, on the one hand, and Hobbes's doctrine of conatus, on the other. It is further claimed that the account of (...) happiness in White's De Mundo differs from that in Leviathan. In the former work, happiness is defined not as the mere progression from one good to another but as the joy/mental pleasure derived from the awareness of one's unhindered advance. The traditional claim that Hobbes is an ethical subjectivist is examined in connection with Hobbes's view of the subjectivity of happiness and the rejection of the summum bonum. Lastly, Hobbes's distinction between worldly and everlasting happiness is discussed. (shrink)

In this paper, I reconstruct Hobbes’ theory of self-love. I then examine Hume’s arguements that (i) self-love does not properly account for moral behavior and (ii) self-love is unnecessary for moral theory. I argue that Hobbesian self-love can account for both of Hume’s objections. Further, I use an analysis of Hobbes’ Deliberation to show, contra Hume, that self-love does not entail a lack of intention in moral action.

This article introduces the doctrine of the passions in the Hobbesian work, showing its debt with tradition, especially the scholastic Aristotelian one, even if, at the same time, it offers some breach features with this tradition, which are also analysed. In addition, the fundamentals of imagination manifest themselves in the appetitive process, in Hobbes's doctrine as well as in the scholastic Aristotelian tradition, showing their similarities and differences.

This article examines the free will problem as it arises within Thomas Hobbes' naturalistic science of morals in early modern Europe. It explains that during this period, the problem of moral and legal responsibility became acute as mechanical philosophy was extended to human psychology and as a result human choices were explained in terms of desires and preferences rather than being represented as acts of an autonomous faculty. It describes how Hobbes changed the face of moral philosophy, through his Leviathan, (...) in ways that still structure and resonate within the contemporary debate. (shrink)

This article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Xunzi’s and Hobbes’s understandings of human nature are qualitatively different, which is responsible for the difference in their respective normative political theory of a civil polity. This article has two main theses: first, where Hobbes’s deepest concern was with human beings’ unsocial passions, Xunzi was most concerned with human beings’ appetitive desires ( yu 欲), material self-interest, and resulting social strife; second, as a result, where Hobbes strove to transform the pathological (anti-)politics (...) of resentment into the politics of recognition by creating rational egalitarian citizenship under the all-encompassing constitutional sovereign power, Xunzi attempted to nourish human beings’ basic appetitive desires ( yu 欲) by instituting a li 禮 ordered civil entity. This article concludes by showing how Confucian civility that Xunzi reconstructed by means of the li 禮 can effectively deal with unsocial passions. (shrink)

O objetivo deste texto é, primeiramente, expor os contornos gerais as críticas de David Hume ao que o filósofo escocês chamou epicurismo moderno. Trata-se das filosofias de Hobbes e de seus supostos epígonos, que, aos olhos de Hume, elegeram o amor próprio como origem fundamental de nossas ações e juízos. Num segundo momento, trata-se de delinear o lugar central do conceito de simpatia nesta crítica, bem como na constituição da moral humeana.

O objetivo deste texto é, primeiramente, expor os contornos gerais as críticas de David Hume ao que o filósofo escocês chamou epicurismo moderno. Trata-se das filosofias de Hobbes e de seus supostos epígonos, que, aos olhos de Hume, elegeram o amor próprio como origem fundamental de nossas ações e juízos. Num segundo momento, trata-se de delinear o lugar central do conceito de simpatia nesta crítica, bem como na constituição da moral humeana.

1. Introduction: 1.1 Difficulties of Approach; 1.2 Philosophical Background. 2. The Context of Early Modern Theories of the Passions: 2.1 Changing Vocabulary; 2.2 Taxonomies; 2.3 Philosophical Issues in Theories of the Emotions. SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS: Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Theories of the Emotions; Descartes; Hobbes; Malebranche; Spinoza; Shaftsbury; Hutcheson; Hume.

Is there a specifically "Hobbesian moment" in the extremely complex history of the idea of conscience? In order to answer this question and to understand why Hobbes's conception of conscience was so innovative, one needs to look at the materials he used to build his system, including the medieval doctrine of synderesis. The article examines the way this doctrine was both perpetuated and altered in Renaissance England.

The position of rational egoism centres upon the thought that the rational thing to do must be to pursue one's own self-interest. Focusing on the work of Hobbes and Sidgwick, this book is an extensive history and evaluation of rational egoism. They are, after the ancients, the foremost exponents of rational egoism. He also considers other figures - Grotius, Samuel Clarke, John Clarke, Butler, Hume, Reid, Kant, Paley and Bentham - and a related position: the instrumental theory of rationality. Robert (...) Shaver's conclusion is that none of the arguments for rational egoism or the instrumental theory are cogent. This is an important book not just for historians of philosophy but for all readers in philosophy or the social sciences interested in theories of morality and rationality. (shrink)

Philosophy begins in wonder, according to Plato and Aristotle. However, they did not expand a great deal on what precisely wonder is. Does this fact alone not raise curiosity in us as to why this passion is important? What is its role in our thinking except to end as soon as one begins conceptually delimiting its nature? The thinkers Thomas Hobbes and René Descartes both expanded upon earlier brief articulations of wonder in natural, supernatural and practical ways. By means of (...) an historical and philosophical examination of these two early modern thinkers, this article hopes to begin to answer the question: ‘What is wonder?’. (shrink)

Hobbes's understanding of love, and its significance for his political thought, has received insufficient attention. This essay contends that Hobbes has a consistent and comprehensive teaching on love that directly repudiates what he regards as the Platonic teaching on eros. In attacking the Platonic idea of eros, Hobbes undermines a pillar of classical political philosophy and articulates a significant aspect of his new understanding of the passions in terms of power, which is itself a critical part of his new political (...) science most famously presented in Leviathan. (shrink)

(2007) History of Philosophy Quarterly. 24, 147-168.

Les théories contractualistes de l’âge classique se fondent sur la conception d’un état de nature qui devient, à cause de ses contradictions internes, un état de guerre auquel il faut remédier par un artifice rationnel, le pacte. Alors même que ces contradictions sont issues des passions humaines, celles-ci semblent impensables dans le cadre purement juridique de ces théories, où ne sont analysés ni les mécanismes passionnels d’adhésion au politique, ni la menace de dissolution de l’État. Nous nous attachons à comparer (...) le rôle que Hobbes et Spinoza font jouer aux passions dans l’élaboration de leurs doctrines politiques : tandis que Hobbes témoigne d’un souci constant des passions, tout en les mettant à l’écart lorsqu’il s’agit de penser la construction et le fonctionnement de l’édifice politique, Spinoza permet de penser deux groupes de passions – celles qui résistent nécessairement au corps politique et celles qui lui font obstacle ponctuellement. Ces dernières constituent tout à la fois des facteurs de décomposition et de recomposition du corps collectif. Cette approche du politique à partir des causes de sa dissolution permet d’apporter un éclairage à la signification du droit naturel moderne tel qu’il se construit chez Hobbes et chez Spinoza. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo intentaré desarrollar cómo se relacionan el melancólico y la política en el pensamiento de Thomas Hobbes. Para ello, describiré en primer lugar su concepción de la naturaleza humana. En base a ella, luego, su noción de melancolía y del comportamiento melancólico. En tercer lugar, explicaré brevemente la idea iusnaturalista del hombre de Malmesbury para, finalmente, tratar de mostrar que el melancólico encarna una contradicción y no es, para Hobbes, parte de la vida política.

We are asking what motivates human beings to reflect morally, which is both a philosophically interesting question and one that would seem necessarily interesting for anyone involved in character education. What motivates us to think about subjects with a moral eye, makes us reason our way to moral clarity, and sustains our efforts until we reach moral judgments. Here, we limit the response to this question to the moral theories of Hobbes and Hume, from which we hope to infer how (...) these two philosophers would have responded to the question themselves. ;Hobbes thinks we derive moral standards through reflection on how we ought to live our lives so as to avoid the state of war and achieve a peaceful, comfortable existence in which we may hope for more of the same. Achieving this existence depends on coming to know the means to a state of peace and living according to those means, according to the laws of nature. We discern the means to peace through reasoning driven by desire not for immediate goods but for "long term" goods. The desire necessary to discover moral laws is trained on what is "commonly a good"---on public interest, not on private. The impartial desire necessary to discern and seek such a good is only possible in a quiet mind. Moral reflection is motivated by the desire to know the means to peace driving a quiet mind. ;Hume also acknowledges the necessity of moral reflection. Beyond having social and psychological incentives for taking an interest in morality, we are moved to moral reflection by our natural passion for the "good of mankind," which Hume calls the affection of humanity . This passion moves us to reflect morally only when we are disposed to the attitude which he refers to as the principle of sympathy and are thinking from a general point of view. Sympathy conveys to us the relevant pleasure and pain of others, and the general point of view frees us from self-centeredness. The affection of humanity moves us to moral judgment, approval of what benefits and disapproval of what diminishes humankind. (shrink)