Why Neo was too confident that he had escaped the Matrix

Abstract

According to a typical skeptical hypothesis, the evidence of your senses has been massively deceptive. Venerable skeptical hypotheses include the hypotheses that you have been deceived by a powerful evil demon, that you are now having an incredibly detailed dream, and that you are a brain in a vat. It is obviously reasonable for you now to be confident that neither of the above hypotheses is true. Epistemologists have proposed many stories to explain why that is reasonable. One theory is that those hypotheses are inherently much less plausible than the hypothesis that your senses are basically reliable. Another theory is that you currently don’t believe any of those hypotheses, and that you need no justification to continue in that disbelief, given that your current beliefs cohere properly. A third theory is that —given that your senses are working properly—your sensory experiences themselves justify you in believing propositions such as the proposition that you have hands. Neo is given very good evidence that some skeptical hypothesis is true. He rightly becomes doubtful that his senses are or have been trustworthy. In fact, he becomes confident of a particular hypothesis: that AI’s created the Matrix, etc. But this is just one of many types of hypotheses that might account for his experiences. These types include.

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