Summary |
In (practical) deliberation we aim to decide what to do by
considering reasons to act. Deliberation of this sort raises many questions,
including: (i) What is the relationship between deliberation and acting for
reasons? For instance, is deliberation necessary for acting for a reason? (ii)
To what extent is it possible for us to take into account things other than
reasons for and against doing A in deliberating about whether to A? What explains
any such restriction? (iii) What kind of freedom, if any, is presupposed in
deliberation? (iv) What is the relationship between rational deliberation and
rational action? For instance, does rational deliberation which concludes in a
decision to A ensure that it is rational to A? (v) What kinds of factors make
for rational deliberation? Is deliberation about whether to A rational only
insofar as it responds to reasons for and against A-ing? Or do other factors –
for instance, about the benefits of being disposed to deliberate in certain
ways – also bear on the rationality of deliberation? Some
philosophers have also discussed the possibility of doxastic deliberation –
deliberation about what to believe. Some philosophers have argued that features of doxastic deliberation support the view that belief is essentially normative. |