Modal dependence logic was introduced recently by Väänänen. It enhances the basic modal language by an operator = (). For propositional variables p 1, . . . , p n , = (p 1, . . . , p n-1, p n ) intuitively states that the value of p n is determined by those of p 1, . . . , p n-1. Sevenster (J. Logic and Computation, 2009) showed that satisfiability for modal dependence logic is complete for nondeterministic (...) exponential time.In this paper we consider fragments of modal dependence logic obtained by restricting the set of allowed propositional connectives. We show that satisfiability for poor man’s dependence logic, the language consisting of formulas built from literals and dependence atoms using ${\wedge, \square, \lozenge}$ (i. e., disallowing disjunction), remains NEXPTIME-complete. If we only allow monotone formulas (without negation, but with disjunction), the complexity drops to PSPACE-completeness.We also extend Väänänen’s language by allowing classical disjunction besides dependence disjunction and show that the satisfiability problem remains NEXPTIME-complete. If we then disallow both negation and dependence disjunction, satisfiability is complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Additionally we consider the restriction of modal dependence logic where the length of each single dependence atom is bounded by a number that is fixed for the whole logic. We show that the satisfiability problem for this bounded arity dependence logic is PSPACE-complete and that the complexity drops to the third level of the polynomial hierarchy if we then disallow disjunction.In this way we completely classify the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem for all restrictions of propositional and dependence operators considered by Väänänen and Sevenster. (shrink)

Collection of original essays on human rights Content: Höffe, Otfried: Transzendentaler Tausch. Eine Legimitationsfigur für Menschenrechte? Tugendhat, Ernst: Die Kontroverse um die Menschenrechte. Lohmann, Georg: Menschenrechte zwischen Moral und Recht. Koller, Peter: Der Geltungsbereich der Menschenrechte. Wildt, Andreas: Menschenrechte und moralische Rechte. Gosepath, Stefan: Zu Begründungen sozialer Menschenrechte. O'Neill, Onora: Transnationale Gerechtigkeit. Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang: Ist Demokratie eine notwendige Forderung der Menschenrechte?. Alexy, Robert: Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechre im demokratischen Verfassungsstaat. Wellmer, Albrecht: Menschenrechte und Demokratie. Dworkin, Ronald: Freiheit, Selbstregierung (...) und der Wille des Volkes. Okin, Susan Moller: Konflikte zwischen Grundrechten. Shue, Henry: Menschenrechte und kulturelle Differenz. Pogge, Thomas: Menschenrechte als moralische Ansprüche an globale Institutionen. (shrink)

In 1972, the young philosopher Peter Singer published "Famine, Affluence and Morality," which rapidly became one of the most widely discussed essays in applied ethics. Through this article, Singer presents his view that we have the same moral obligations to those far away as we do to those close to us. He argued that choosing not to send life-saving money to starving people on the other side of the earth is the moral equivalent of neglecting to save drowning children (...) because we prefer not to muddy our shoes. If we can help, we must--and any excuse is hypocrisy. Singer's extreme stand on our moral obligations to others became a powerful call to arms and continues to challenge people's attitudes towards extreme poverty. Today, it remains a central touchstone for those who argue we should all help others more than we do. As Bill and Melinda Gates observe in their foreword, in the age of today's global philanthropy, Singer's essay is as relevant now as it ever was. This attractively packaged, concise edition collects the original article, two of Singer's more recent popular writings on our obligations to others around the world, and a new introduction by Singer that discusses his current thinking. (shrink)

A historical investigation of the exclusion of Africa and Asia from modern histories of philosophy.

This reissue of his collection of early essays, Logico-Linguistic Papers, is published with a brand new introduction by Professor Strawson but, apart from minor ...

„Das Leben zu erkennen“ (II,5,112) bestimmt Fichte als Gegenstand der „Wissenschaftslehre“ (1794 ff.). Die Aufgabe der Philosophie besteht für ihn nicht darin, „durch die Kraft (der) Syllogismen neue Objekte des natürlichen Denkens“ (II,5,112) zu erschaffen. Er gewichtet seine Philosophie dergestalt, daß sie „das Leben, das System der Gefühle und das Begehren zum Höchsten (macht) und... der Erkenntnis überall nur das Zusehen (läßt)“ (II,5,137). Die herausragende Stellung des Gefühls besteht darin, daß es einerseits als begrifflich explizierbarer Teilaspekt der Reflexionen über die (...) Grundbedingungen der unterschiedlichen Bewußtseins- bwz. Lebensformen des Menschen selbst Bestandteil der „Wissenschaftslehre“ ist und daß es andererseits zugleich als die ausgezeichnete Weise der Selbstmanifestation dieser Lebensformen zu bestimmen ist, deren Genese in der „Wissenschaftslehre“ rekonstruiert wird. Fichte entwickelt im System der „Wissenschaftslehre“ eine weitreichende und complex strukturierte Theorie des Gefühls, die die Bereiche des theoretischen und praktischen, sinnlichen, intellektuellen und intelligiblen Lebens umfaßt. In einem systematisch angelegten Untersuchungsstrang werden Genese, Stellenwert und Funktion des Gefühls in der „Wissenschaftslehre“ und ihren Teildisziplinen entwickelt. In historischer Hinsicht wird Fichtes Lehre vom Gefühl im Kontext der zeitgenössischen Diskussion (Kant, Jacobi u.a.) erörtert. Systematische und historische Zielsetzungen werden parallel aus einer entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Perspektive entfaltet. Im Ausgang von den Jugendschriften bis zur „Wissenschaftslehre 1801“ wird der Begriff des Gefühls in seinen pädagogischen, erkenntnistheoretischen, moralischen und religiösen Bedeutungen untersucht. (shrink)

This study of the "radicalization" of psychiatry analyzes the writings of Laing, Foucault, Szasz, and Goffman, constructs a model for understanding mental illness, and emphasizes collective responsibility for the care of the mentally ill.

Die Universalität der Menschenrechte wird seit Jahren zwischen den verschiedenen Kulturkreisen kontrovers diskutiert. Die vorliegende Untersuchung geht der Frage nach, ob ethische Normen, wie z.B. die Menschenrechte, universal oder nur partikular (für eine bestimmte Wertgemeinschaft) begründbar sind. Zur Klärung werden Beiträge aus dem Protestantismus (u.a. W. Herrmann, E. Troeltsch, K. Barth und T. Rendtorff) und der Philosophie (Naturrechtstradition, R. Alexy, O. Höffe) analysiert. Der Verfasser kommt zu dem Ergebnis, daß ethische Normen immer in einem bestimmten, etwa dem christlichen, Menschenbild fundiert (...) sind, aber zugleich auf universale, im Weltanschauungsdiskurs zu erweisende Plausibilität zielen. (shrink)

For thirty years, Peter Singer's Practical Ethics has been the classic introduction to applied ethics. For this third edition, the author has revised and updated all the chapters and added a new chapter addressing climate change, one of the most important ethical challenges of our generation. Some of the questions discussed in this book concern our daily lives. Is it ethical to buy luxuries when others do not have enough to eat? Should we buy meat from intensively reared animals? (...) Am I doing something wrong if my carbon footprint is above the global average? Other questions confront us as concerned citizens: equality and discrimination on the grounds of race or sex; abortion, the use of embryos for research and euthanasia; political violence and terrorism; and the preservation of our planet's environment. This book's lucid style and provocative arguments make it an ideal text for university courses and for anyone willing to think about how she or he ought to live. (shrink)

The relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is; this is the first and only full-length study of this concept. This book shows that mereology, the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology. Peter Simons surveys and criticizes previous theories, especially the standard extensional view, and proposes a more adequate account which encompasses both temporal and modal considerations in detail. 'Parts could easily be the standard book on mereology for the next (...) twenty or thirty years.' Timothy Williamson, Grazer Philosophische Studien. (shrink)

A complete system of classical Aristotelian logic intended for honors high school and college.

Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confirmation (...) bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in significant developmental and epistemic benefits for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confirmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias. (shrink)

Acknowledgments 1. Culture Is Essential 2. Culture Exists 3. Culture Evolves 4. Culture Is an Adaptation 5. Culture Is Maladaptive 6. Culture and Genes Coevolve 7. Nothing about Culture Makes Sense except in the Light of Evolution.

This chapter provides an introduction to higher-order metaphysics as well as to the contributions to this volume. We discuss five topics, corresponding to the five parts of this volume, and summarize the contributions to each part. First, we motivate the usefulness of higher-order quantification in metaphysics using a number of examples, and discuss the question of how such quantifiers should be interpreted. We provide a brief introduction to the most common forms of higher-order logics used in metaphysics, and indicate a (...) number of questions which can be raised in such systems using logical vocabulary alone. Using a further example, we return to applications of higher-order logics in metaphysics. We also mention key developments in the history of higher-order logic as it pertains to metaphysics. Finally, we mention certain arguments which have been raised against the use of higher-order logic, and some ways of responding to them. (shrink)

Ohne Rücksicht auf disziplinäre Schranken bringt dieses Buch verschiedene nicht-reduktionistische Lerntheorien miteinander ins Gespräch. In einem offenen Diskurs, der die Konzepte zueinander in Beziehung setzt, werden die unterschiedlichen Perspektiven kritisch abgewogen und hinsichtlich ihrer Stärken und Schwächen diskutiert.

Delo se loteva vprašanja aktualnosti pojma subjekta v filozofiji in politiki skozi analizo tistih avtorjev, ki so ga domnevno najbolj radikalno pokopali: pokaže, da vznik radikalno novega in problematika subjekta zavzema osrednje mesto v Deleuzovi filozofiji, kakor tudi v Lyotardovi pozni misli posvečeni praznini, v Foucaultovi obravnavi biopolitike in biooblasti, v delu Negrija in Hardta o Imperiju, ter nazadnje v Badioujevi predelavi temeljnih filozofskih kategorij biti, resnice in subjekta, na osnovi katerih je dandanes znova možna renesansa filozofije. Ta ima po (...) Badiouju štiri razsežnosti, ki se v delu Vznik subjekta nenehno prepletajo: »V osnovi želja filozofije implicira razsežnost upora: ni filozofije brez nezadovoljstva mišljenja v njegovem soočenju s svetom, kakršen je. Pa vendar želja filozofije vključuje tudi logiko: to je, prepričanje v moč argumenta in uma.«. (shrink)

This book examines the philosophical foundations of the realist view of the progress of science as cumulative. It is a view that has recently been faced with a number of powerful attacks in which successive scientific theories are seen, not as extending their scope and honing their explanations, but as incommensurable. There is, it is held, in principle no way of establishing that they are about the same things. From the voluminous literature on the topic, Dr Smith has selected relevantly (...) and incisively and his exposition of the contending arguments is vigourous and clear, without undue technicality. As an explication and defence of realism it will interest all those concerned with this basic question in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as psychologists call them, ideologies. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11%) were underrepresented. Moreover, and strikingly, across the political spectrum, from very left-leaning individuals and moderates to (...) very right-leaning individuals, participants reported experiencing ideological hostility in the field, occasionally even from those from their own side of the political spectrum. Finally, while about half of the subjects believed that discrimination against left- or right-leaning individuals in the field is not justified, a significant minority displayed an explicit willingness to discriminate against colleagues with the opposite ideology. Our findings are both surprising and important, because a commitment to tolerance and equality is widespread in philosophy, and there is reason to think that ideological similarity, hostility, and discrimination undermine reliable belief formation in many areas of the discipline. (shrink)

In this short but meaty book, Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to central problems in philosophy. As Unger hypothesizes, many of these problems are unanswerable, including the problems of knowledge and scepticism, the problems of free will, and problems of causation and explanation. In each case, he argues, we arrive at one answer only relative to an assumption about the meaning of key terms, terms like "know" and like "cause," even while we arrive at (...) an opposite answer relative to quite different assumptions, but equally arbitrary assumptions, about what the key terms mean. (shrink)

This comprehensive and important volume includes contributions by activists, journalists, lawyers and scholars from twenty-one countries. The essays map the directions the movement for women's rights is taking--and will take in the coming decades--and the concomittant transformation of prevailing notions of rights and issues. They address topics such as the rapes in former Yugoslavia and efforts to see that a War Crimes Tribunal responds; domestic violence; trafficking of women into the sex trade; the persecution of lesbians; female genital mutilation; and (...) reproductive rights. (shrink)

What is narrative? What is distinctive about the great literary narratives? In virtue of what is a narrative fictional or non-fictional? In this important new book Peter Lamarque, one of the leading philosophers of literature at work today, explores these and related questions to bring new clarity and insight to debates about narrative in philosophy, critical theory, and narratology.

Narrative thinking -- Narrative thinking about one's past -- Grief : a case study -- Narrative thinking about one's future -- Self-forgiveness : a case study -- The narrative sense of self -- Narrative, truth, life, and fiction.

The norm of assertion, to be in force, is a social norm. What is the content of our social norm of assertion? Various linguistic arguments purport to show that to assert is to represent oneself as knowing. But to represent oneself as knowing does not entail that assertion is governed by a knowledge norm. At best these linguistic arguments provide indirect support for a knowledge norm. Furthermore, there are alternative, non-normative explanations for the linguistic data (as in recent work from (...) Van Elswyk). Direct arguments would rely on normative judgments about the permissibility or impermissibility of assertions with and without the speaker knowing the content asserted. John Turri's work experimental results purport to show that our norm of assertion is factive, and probably knowledge. But as a number of recent experimentalists (Kneer, Reuter and Broessel, Marsili and Wiegmann) have shown, Turri's results rely on the problemmatic use of 'should' as in 'Maria should assert that she owns a 1990 watch.' Correcting for this, these experimentalists provide strong evidence that our norm of assertion is not factive. The standard reply to evidence like this from the assertion of unlucky falsehoods is the excuse maneuver. But Marsili and Wiegmann, following Turri's protocol for testing for excuse validation, show that participants who judge that assertions unlucky falsehoods are permissible are not guilty of excuse validation. Given our current understanding of the experimental evidence, knowledge is not our norm of assertion. (shrink)

Metz holds that we can use African communal ethics to constitute global economic practices such as appropriation, production, distribution and consumption in such a way that promotes harmonious relations. In this article, I will show that Metz’s reformist approach to constituting the global economic practices is problematic as it fails to deal with the fundamental problem that pertains to a racialised world order that is structurally configured by coloniality of being. I will show that reformist approaches such as Metz’s use (...) of African communal ethics to constitute global economic practices in a way that promotes harmonious relations are undesirable attempts that are opposed and curtailed by a structural racialised logic/ontology of the world that governs and supervises the evolution of the world economic structures and practices in a way which undermines harmonious relations and in a way which causes economic marginalisation and impoverishment of historically disadvantaged indigenous Africans. (shrink)

Rauprich O, Marckmann G, Vollmann J: Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit in der modernen Medizin Content Type Journal Article Pages 71-75 DOI 10.1007/s10202-007-0032-0 Authors Elisabeth Weisser-Lohmann, Institut für Philosophie FernUniversität Hagen 58084 Hagen Germany Journal Poiesis & Praxis: International Journal of Technology Assessment and Ethics of Science Online ISSN 1615-6617 Print ISSN 1615-6609 Journal Volume Volume 5 Journal Issue Volume 5, Number 1.

All developed human beings possess a practical mastery of a vast range of concepts, including such basic structural notions as those of identity, truth, existence, material objects, mental states, space, and time; but a practical mastery does not entail theoretical understanding. It is that understanding which philosophy seeks to achieve. In this book, one of the most distinguished of living philosophers, assuming no previous knowledge of the subject on the part of the reader, sets out to explain and illustrate a (...) certain conception of the nature of analytical philosophy. Strawson draws on his many years of teaching at Oxford University, during which he refined and developed what he regards as the most productive route to understanding the fundamental structure of human thinking. Among the distinctive features of his exposition are the displacement of an older, reductive conception of philosophical method in favor of elucidating the interconnections between the complex but irreducible notions which form the basic structure of our thinking; and the demonstration that the three traditionally distinguished departments of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic are but three aspects of one unified enquiry. Strawson has produced an elegant work that will be invaluable to students and stimulating for professional philosophers and general readers alike. (shrink)

In connection with research on humans, the term “vulnerability” is only appropriate to identify the special need for protection of certain sections of the population and individuals, if this term refers to the additional risk of certain groups of subjects. Authors who focus on the additional risk suffering of a subject group when defining vulnerability succeed in considering the specific worthiness of protection in a context-sensitive way. The attempt to define the risk–benefit assessment for vulnerable subject groups on a binding (...) basis faces considerable difficulties. This assessment depends both on the research situation and on the test subject. The normative aspect of this decision could be solved by referring to Rawl’s decision model of an original position. In cases where there is no benefit for the subject, arguments in the discussion of the risks and benefits that are based on a “group or overall benefit” and an “objective interest,” cannot be fully sustained. (shrink)

Despite decades of research, morphogenesis along the various body axes remains one of the major mysteries in developmental biology. A milestone in the field was the realisation that a set of closely related regulators, called Hox genes, specifies the identity of body segments along the anterior–posterior (AP) axis in most animals. Hox genes have been highly conserved throughout metazoan evolution and code for homeodomain‐containing transcription factors. Thus, they exert their function mainly through activation or repression of downstream genes. However, while (...) much is known about Hox gene structure and molecular function, only a few target genes have been identified and studied in detail. Our knowledge of Hox downstream genes is therefore far from complete and consequently Hox‐controlled morphogenesis is still poorly understood. Genome‐wide approaches have facilitated the identification of large numbers of Hox downstream genes both in Drosophila and vertebrates, and represent a crucial step towards a comprehensive understanding of how Hox proteins drive morphological diversification. In this review, we focus on the role of Hox genes in shaping segmental morphologies along the AP axis in Drosophila, discuss some of the conclusions drawn from analyses of large target gene sets and highlight methods that could be used to gain a more thorough understanding of Hox molecular function. In addition, the mechanisms of Hox target gene regulation are considered with special emphasis on recent findings and their implications for Hox protein specificity in the context of the whole organism. BioEssays 30:965–979, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Why do we engage in folk psychology, that is, why do we think about and ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to people? On the standard view, folk psychology is primarily for mindreading, for detecting mental states and explaining and/or predicting people’s behaviour in terms of them. In contrast, McGeer (1996, 2007, 2015), and Zawidzki (2008, 2013) maintain that folk psychology is not primarily for mindreading but for mindshaping, that is, for moulding people’s behavior and minds (e.g., (...) via the imposition of social norms) so that coordination becomes easier. Mindreading is derived from and only as effective as it is because of mindshaping, not vice versa. I critically assess McGeer’s, and Zawidzki’s proposal and contend that three common motivations for the mindshaping view do not provide sufficient support for their particular version of it. I argue furthermore that their proposal underestimates the role that epistemic processing plays for mindshaping. And I provide reasons for favouring an alternative according to which, in social cognition involving ascriptions of propositional attitudes, neither mindshaping nor mindreading is primary but both are complementary in that effective mindshaping depends as much on mindreading as effective mindreading depends on mindshaping. (shrink)

What is the biological function of perception? I hold perception, especially visual perception in humans, has the biological function of accurately representing the environment. Tyler Burge argues this cannot be so in Origins of Objectivity (Oxford, 2010), for accuracy is a semantical relationship and not, as such, a practical matter. Burge also provides a supporting example. I rebut the argument and the example. Accuracy is sometimes also a practical matter if accuracy partly explains how perception contributes to survival and reproduction.

Martine Nida-Rümelin (1996) argues that color science indicates behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion is possible and raises this possibility as an objection to functionalist accounts of visual states of color. I show that her argument does not rest solely on color science, but also on a philosophically controversial assumption, namely, that visual states of color supervene on physiological states. However, this assumption, on the part of philosophers or vision scientists, has the effect of simply ruling out certain versions of functionalism. While (...) Nida-Rümelin is quite right to search for empirical tests for claims about the nature of visual states, philosophical issues remain pivotal in determining the correctness of these claims. (shrink)