The article starts from the question of where the theses that we are ruled by sadists today come from, both in conspiracy theories and in explanations of the prevalence of violence and cruelty in modern society. The article first highlights some important recent changes in politics, economics, and society (the fall of the Berlin Wall; victimisation; the crisis of politics and the rise of neoliberalism; the changing dynamics of capitalism, which appropriates and valorises affect and favours the bizarre; the new (...) social media; the shift of obscenity from the margins to the centre; the paradoxes of the “end of history” and historical stagnation; the pandemic; the change in the general mood from anxiety to nightmare, in which the main problem is the enjoyment of the Other). The article then looks at the historical changes in the term “sadism”, which in the 19 th and 20 th centuries reduced Sade’s work to a clinical category, defined the meaning of “sadism” as the pleasure of torturing others, and constructed the term “sadomasochism” in Freud, the Freudians, and the Frankfurt School. The latter was used to analyse Nazism, and was later rightly criticised by Deleuze as something that had nothing to do with Sade and Masoch. War propaganda, clichés, and other processes play a special role in this process of forming the general conception of sadism; they are also responsible for the fact that “sadomasochism” as a sexual practice and as a fashion has recently become something socially acceptable, although, on the other hand, it has played a part in the “pornification” of society and in the recent enforcement of extremely violent forms of pornography. Notwithstanding all these distortions of sadism and notwithstanding the uselessness of sadomasochism in a concrete analysis of the functioning of modern social bonds, a certain form of sadism in general, especially in the face of all the social and political changes mentioned above (trolls, haters), retains its power over society. To analyse this in more detail, one must include the ubiquitous but little analysed phenomenon of _schadenfreude_, especially on the part of the public, and cruelty as a phenomenon to which society is both distanced and fascinated. The third step is to explain what _schadenfreude_ and cruelty are and how they relate to Lacan’s concept of _objet petit a_. (shrink)

The paper proceeds in three steps. First, it addresses what urgency and emergency are in their simplest terms; then, it places this in the context of the now very popular metaphor of imprisonment, which supposedly describes what is happening to us today; and in the final steps, it presents the task of critical theory today. Starting from the distinction between urgency and emergency (the main difference being that in the latter case there is an immediate threat or danger to life, (...) health, property, or the environment, while in the case of urgency there is no such immediate threat or danger), the paper proposes the concept of Super-emergency as a name for a (contemporary) situation that is out of control and feeds on our own antagonisms and contradictions. The accompanying atmosphere or mood is the “mood of nightmare”, which also explains why it seems so natural for us today to speak of arrest, imprisonment, or entrapment. By pointing out some consequences of prison metaphors, we suggest in the last part of the paper that it is not only urgent to think about and deal with urgency and emergency per se, but also with their particular deviation – the Super-emergency. Even if we do not have time to think and act differently, as our leaders, the media, and propaganda keep claiming (“now we do not have time to listen, to discuss, to exchange opinions, to talk”), it is precisely urgent situations that provide time for reflection and radical action to reclaim our common future. In other words, what is really urgent and necessary for us now, today, is to free ourselves from this yoke of emergency in which we are trapped and which we call here the Super-emergency. (shrink)

The text treats the theme of cruelty starting from how it appears in the everyday dominant ideology. If we want to feel the pulse of our modern ideological landscape, we cannot ignore the fact that it has recently been severely shaken by the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The war in Ukraine has repeatedly been called cruel, and cruelty in general is today unanimously seen as something reprehensible and repulsive. But the same is true of torture, which, although in principle prosecuted, (...) is carried out in secret. And if every war is cruel, what does the statement “the war in Ukraine is cruel” mean? In what contexts does it fit? The text explores this question on several levels, beginning with modern understandings of war and cruelty, moving to the broader historical context in which the statement is made, and finally asking whether it means that we still have one foot in the 20th century in some sense. Following Badiou’s work _The Century_, which emphasises the role of the passion of the real, war (which is intended to end all wars), and cruelty in the twentieth century, this statement also means that the twentieth century is not (yet) over in a sense, and that this century may be settling accounts with itself (again) with the war in Ukraine. (shrink)

Članek skuša ponazoriti zagato, ki jo za intepretaeijo Kantove filozofije kot razmejitvene geste predstavlja reč na sebi. Če namreč drži, da imamo v Kantovi filozofiji vselej opravka z razmejitvijo dveh področij in če drži, daje ta razmejitev, čeravno predpostavljena, šele vnazajšnji produkt, se zdi, da obstaja vsaj ena ločnica, vsaj en primer, kjer ta interpretacija ne drži - ločnica med pojavi in rečmi na sebi. Ta ločnica je paradoksna, kolikor prvi člen, pojav, za Kanta še zdaleč ni sporen, medtem ko (...) je drugi člen, reč na sebi, nekaj najbolj spornega v Kantovi filozofiji sploh. Kantove izjave o statusu reči na sebi močno variirajo, tako, daje mogoče reč na sebi razumeti na različne načine, izmed katerih pa nobeden ni združljiv s temeljnimi premisami Kantove teoretične filozofije in videti je, da je Kantu uspelo nastalo zagato razrešiti šele v svojem zadnjem, a neobjavljenem delu Opuspostumum. (shrink)

Our point of departing consists of two concepts, pleasure and desire, pointed out by Gilles Deleuze in his analysis and critique of Foucault’s work. Foucault responded and hastened to show that his concept of pleasure has nothing in common with either the ordinary understanding of pleasure or with the conception attributed to him by Deleuze. In the essay the question of what Foucault’s own conception of pleasure consists of is further elaborated. It turns out, finally, that Foucault in fact appears (...) to be near Deleuze, condemning the idea of pleasure in the Deleuzian vein as a rotten idea, trying to maintain positivity, etc. However, precisely here, where he appears closest to Deleuze, he is also at the same time the farthest from him. Deleuzian desire is namely something “out-of-joint”, something which can be properly considered only by departing from the break of Modernity. In other words, Foucault’s own theoretical project is in crisis, as diagnosed by Deleuze, precisely because it does not have and it does not want to have a concept of crisis as such. (shrink)

V pričujočem prispevku nas zanima obravnava Kantovega predkritičnega spisa Edini možni dokazni temelj za demonstracijo božjega obstoja, ki jo podaja Kant v Kritiki čistega uma. Med obemi deli obstaja skorajda več vzporednic kot pa razlik, zato je še posebej zanimiva Kantova kritika Spisa, pri čemer se postavlja tudi vprašanje, do katere mere je ta kritika upravičena. Ker pa v poglavju "Ideal čistega uma" zavzema centralno mesto koncept transcendentalnega ideala, nas poleg tega zanima tudi vprašanje, če in v kateri točki, je (...) v Spisu že najti na delu ta koncept. (shrink)

In the essay possible thematic connections between Copernicus and Lyotard are elaborated. In his late opus Lyotard elaborates the problematic of making the invisible visible, presenting the unpresentable, the emergence of something new. This theme not only throws new light on the very emergence of the Copernican revolution, if there ever was one, but also presents something which is at the very heart of the dispositive of modern science as such: a link between contingency, necessity and impossibility, elaborated by Lyotard (...) through his new yet unfinished conceptions of time, cause and subject. Finally, some paradoxes of Lyotard’s project carried out in the name of the second Copernican turn are shown. (shrink)

The paper presents a critique of untheorized elements in what is called the paradigm of resistance, which today presents a major part of the theory and practice of the Left. The critique is limited to the concept of will to be against found in Hardt and Negri. Parallels are shown with the demands of capitalist dynamics and the birth of the counterculture, as well as between the concept of resistance and management theory and advertising in the 50s and 60s. The (...) paper pleads for the abandonment of the very paradigm of resistance. In order for all acts of subversion, resistance, and rebellion to succeed today, a reinvention of the politics of the universal, a redefinition of radical politics, and a critique of political economy are needed. (shrink)

Our point of departure in this issue of Filozofski vestnik is the thesis that the repetition of a certain gesture of Lenin's is needed today in philosophy – as Lenin withdrew in the midst of the most ferocious battles during World War I to study and to rethink theoretical questions in order to act differ- ently. What we need today is a new and radical rethinking of the theoretical and practical presuppositions of contemporaineity.

Delo se loteva vprašanja aktualnosti pojma subjekta v filozofiji in politiki skozi analizo tistih avtorjev, ki so ga domnevno najbolj radikalno pokopali: pokaže, da vznik radikalno novega in problematika subjekta zavzema osrednje mesto v Deleuzovi filozofiji, kakor tudi v Lyotardovi pozni misli posvečeni praznini, v Foucaultovi obravnavi biopolitike in biooblasti, v delu Negrija in Hardta o Imperiju, ter nazadnje v Badioujevi predelavi temeljnih filozofskih kategorij biti, resnice in subjekta, na osnovi katerih je dandanes znova možna renesansa filozofije. Ta ima po (...) Badiouju štiri razsežnosti, ki se v delu Vznik subjekta nenehno prepletajo: »V osnovi želja filozofije implicira razsežnost upora: ni filozofije brez nezadovoljstva mišljenja v njegovem soočenju s svetom, kakršen je. Pa vendar želja filozofije vključuje tudi logiko: to je, prepričanje v moč argumenta in uma.«. (shrink)

“The world” as a concept necessarily involves many difficulties and contradictions. The text presents some of them in a rather circular way, underlining the fact that we are always confronted with the dilemma of what to do with the world, or rather, what, which, and whose world we are dealing with. Beginning with some arguments about the claim that “the world is,” and then moving on to certain dilemmas related to some views on the two-world theory, one inevitably comes across (...) Marx’s thesis that the ultimate goal in relation to the world should be to “change it”. The text also presents some contemporary views thereon of Badiou, Nancy, and Ruda. Taking into account all these arguments and adding insights from Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, and Adorno as to the world and one’s worldview, we can only agree with Badiou’s statement about the only true goal of philosophy: “Philosophy has no other legitimate aim except to help find the new names that will bring into existence the unknown world that is only waiting for us because we are waiting for it.”. (shrink)