The DNA‐passage activity of topoisomerase II accidentally produces DNA knots and interlinks within and between chromatin fibers. Fortunately, these unwanted DNA entanglements are actively removed by some mechanism. Here we present an outline on DNA knot formation and discuss recent studies that have investigated how intracellular DNA knots are removed. First, although topoisomerase II is able to minimize DNA entanglements in vitro to below equilibrium values, it is unclear whether such capacity performs equally in vivo in chromatinized DNA. Second, DNA (...) supercoiling could bias topoisomerase II to untangle the DNA. However, experimental evidence indicates that transcriptional supercoiling of intracellular DNA boosts knot formation. Last, cohesin and condensin could tighten DNA entanglements via DNA loop extrusion (LE) and force their dissolution by topoisomerase II. Recent observations indicate that condensin activity promotes the removal of DNA knots during interphase and mitosis. This activity might facilitate the spatial organization and dynamics of chromatin. (shrink)

The paper compares the suitability of two different epistemologies of counterfactuals—(EC) and (W)—to elucidate modal knowledge. I argue that, while both of them explain the data on our knowledge of counterfactuals, only (W)—Williamson’s epistemology—is compatible with all counterpossibles being true. This is something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based account of modal knowledge relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) cannot satisfactorily (...) elucidate modal knowledge. Third, from a naturalistic perspective, the nature of this second problem favours (EC) against (W). (shrink)

The paper argues against Peacocke's moderate rationalism in modality. In the first part, I show, by identifying an argumentative gap in its epistemology, that Peacocke's account has not met the Integration Challenge. I then argue that we should modify the account's metaphysics of modal concepts in order to avoid implausible consequences with regards to their possession conditions. This modification generates no extra explanatory gap. Yet, once the minimal modification that avoids those implausible consequences is made, the resulting account cannot support (...) Peacocke's moderate rationalism. (shrink)

The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non-epistemic versions of conceivability-based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non-epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.

A respectable assessment of priority-based ontic structuralism demands an elucidation of its metaphysical backbone. Here we focus on two theses that stand in need of clarification: the Fundamentality Thesis states that structures are fundamental, and the Priority Thesis states that these structures are prior to putative fundamental objects, if these exist. Candidate notions to illuminate and such as supervenience and ontological dependence failed at this task. Our purpose is to show that grounding is the best competitor to articulate and, and (...) regiment such theses in a desirable unified way. Our strategy is two-fold. First, we make the case that grounding does better than ontological dependence and supervenience. Second, we show that the distinction between partial and full grounds permits us to respond to an objection raised by Kerry McKenzie against the proposal of interpreting priority-based Ontic Structuralism in the idiom of metaphysical determination. Our conclusion is that priority ontic structuralists have compelling reasons for adopting a grounding-based approach. (shrink)

Grounding is claimed to offer a promising characterization of the fundamental as thatwhich is ungrounded. Detractors of this view argue that there can be fundamental and yet mutuallygrounded entities. Such a possibility undermines the denition of the fundamental as theungrounded. I aim to show, however, that the possibility of fundamental mutually grounded entitiesdoes not force us to renounce the prospects of characterizing fundamentality in terms of ground-ing. To accomplish this aim, I defend a grounding-based view that accommodates fundamentalmutually grounded entities (...) straightforwardly. My denition of fundamentality is similar to, butimportantly different from, one that Karen Bennett discusses. I conclude by resisting two objec-tions raised by Jessica Wilson against the Bennettian framework that also target theproposed view. (shrink)

What grounds facts of ground? Some metaphysicians invoke fundamental grounding laws to answer this question. These are general principles that link grounded facts to their grounds. The main business of this paper is to advance the debate about the metaphysics of grounding laws by exploring the prospects of a plausible yet underexplored minimalist account, one which is structurally analogous to a familiar Humean conception of natural laws. In the positive part of this paper, I articulate such a novel view and (...) argue for its merits. The minimalist account shuns essences and takes laws to be unmysterious elite regularities. Therefore, it is a promising alternative for theorists of ground who spurn the acceptance of essentialism about the grounding laws but think that these are needed in our theorizing. In the negative part, I argue that widely accepted principles of ground, coupled with the tenets of minimalism, jeopardize the fundamentality of the grounding laws. I discuss two immediately available and prima facie appealing strategies to evade this threat. However, I show that both have undesirable theoretical costs. I conclude by casting doubts on whether the benefits of a minimalist account of fundamental grounding laws outweigh such costs. (shrink)

In contemporary metaphysics, the doctrine that the fundamental facts are those which are wholly ungrounded is the received view or something near enough. Against this radical brutalism, several metaphysicians argued in favour of the existence of fundamental facts that are moderately brute or merely partially grounded. However, the arguments for moderately brute facts rely on controversial metaphysical scenarios. This paper aims to counteract the tendency in favour of radical brutalism on scientific grounds. It does so by showing that naturalistic metaphysicians (...) can appeal to plausible considerations from physical theory to establish the existence of moderately brute facts. But should the naturalistic metaphysician embrace moderate brutalism, namely the view that the fundamental facts are those which are merely partially ungrounded? Here I argue for a negative answer, recommending a more inclusive pluralism about the kinds of brute facts we can expect to find in nature. (shrink)

Ao dar conta da sua obra global de Paul Ricoeur, o presente estudo, em forma de glosa filosófica, busca apresentar os 'mundos do homem' sob o signo da relação de ipseidade e alteridade, da ipseidade colhida como 'identidade reflexiva' e da alteridade apreendida nos múltiplos registos filosoficamente permitidos. Para concretizar este objectivo são exploradas a Psicologia e Psicanálise, a História, a Linguagem e a Filosofia Prática, terminando a investigação com uma conclusão aporética sobre a ontologia em jogo.

Este trabajo titulado " El Deber de Adoptar y los Derechos de la niñez en Chile" será incluido en el Volumen 24. Número 86(2024) de Revista Iberoamericana en la sección Foro de Debate denominada “Infancias Latinoamericanas: desafíos para la garantía de derechos en la región".

Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to the Identity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional and qualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, the Identity Theory holds a contentious identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this view faces a (...) contradiction objection that undermines its merits. We should therefore consider an alternative version that does not embrace the identity claim. My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of the Identity Theory without embracing the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative. I shall argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of the identity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I will conclude that even if the identity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities. (shrink)

Ground is all the rage in contemporary metaphysics. But what is its nature? Some metaphysicians defend what we could call, following Skiles and Trogdon (2021), the inheritance view: it is because constitutive forms of metaphysical explanation are such-and-such that we should believe that ground is so-and-so. However, many putative instances of inheritance are not primarily motivated by scientific considerations. This limitation is harmless if one thinks that ground and science are best kept apart. Contrary to this view, we believe that (...) ground is a highly serviceable tool for investigating metaphysical areas of science. In this paper, we defend a naturalistic version of the inheritance view which takes constitutive scientific explanation as a better guide to ground. After illustrating the approach and its merits, we discuss some implications of the emerging scientific conception for the theory of ground at large. (shrink)

DIREITO À INFORMAÇÃO NAS RELAÇÕES DE CONSUMO DE PRODUTOS ALIMENTÍCIOS NO ATACADO E NO VAREJO: PARTICULARIDADES SOBRE COMPOSIÇÃO, CARACTERÍSTICAS, PREÇO E QUANTIDADE DO PRODUTO.

Pode a história das instituições de ensino superior nos ajudar a compreender as causas de controvérsias filosóficas e os processos de mudança intelectual pelo qual velhos estilos intelectuais são substituídos por novos? Neste artigo, associo a emergência da filosofia pós-analítica nos Estados Unidos a partir da década de 1970 à reforma e expansão do sistema de ensino superior daquele país na segunda metade do século XX, que afetou a filosofia enquanto disciplina acadêmica e profissão. Tomando como ponto de partida as (...) reflexões de Richard Rorty a respeito do estado da disciplina no início dos anos 1980, mostro como seu diagnóstico de crise disciplinar, elaborado na forma de uma crítica filosófica aos pressupostos teóricos e metodológicos da filosofia analítica, é resultado de um processo mais longo e amplo de transformação das bases institucionais da vida filosófica profissional nos Estados Unidos. (shrink)

The present work is completely grounded in the methodology of textual analysis as present in buddhist studies and has three essential pretentions. The first one is to discuss the relationship between the conceptual and non-conceptual dimensions of buddhist practice from the standpoint of the concept of the three wisdoms. The second one is to define a central standpoint able to judge the difference between buddhist practice proper and the therapeutic and scientific approaches to meditation. The third one tries to think (...) the complete autonomy of the conceptual dimension from an analysis of the relationship between the three wisdoms and the three worlds in the Satya-siddhi-Sãstra. (shrink)

RESUMO Este artigo pretende analisar o tópico das "Duas Verdades" na história do pensamento budista. Seu objetivo consiste em elucidar esse tópico a partir do ponto de vista do "Satya-siddhi-śāstra". Parte-se aqui de uma consideração metodológica referente ao problema das múltiplas tradições intelectuais do universo budista, desenvolvendo-se uma análise do conceito das "Duas Verdades" presente no "Satya-siddhi-śāstra". ABSTRACT This article hopes to analyze the topic of the "Two truths" in the history of Buddhist thought. The subject is to elucidate this (...) topic from the point of view of the "Satya-siddhi-śāstra". The starting point is the methodological considerations concerning the multiple intellectual traditions present in the Buddhist universe developing an analysis of the "Two truths" as present in the "Satya-siddhi-śāstra". (shrink)

L'intersecnonnalité est devenue en quelques années un concept central aussi bien en sciences sociales qu'au sein des luttes sociales en particulier féministes. Forgée pour penser l'imbrication des rapports de domination l'intersectionnalité constitue aujourd'hui un champ d'études et d'expérimenta rions théoriques foisonnant. Pour la première fois en France des universitaires abordent ses multiples dimensions épistémologigues. théoriques. poli tiques et les recherches récentes qu'elle a permis d'ouvrir dans des espaces aussi différents que la France, l'Amérique latine ou l'Europe de l'Est. Que peut (...) nous offrir cette notion pour penser le genre la théorie féministe et les mobilisations sociales? Comment contribuer à pro mouvoir un usage de l'intersectionnalité qui renforce son potentiel critique et insurgé", plutôt que figé sur des identités? Cet ouvrage témoigne à partir d'exemples de la force d'un tel outil lorsqu'il s'agit d'éclairer des processus sociaux et politiques complexes. En offrant un regard à la fois rétrospectif et contemporain sur les enjeux politiques de la production d'un savoir intersectionnel, il veut aussi montrer que l'intersection naine n'est pas seulement un agencement de critique théorique indispensable mais aussi une plate forme à partir de laquelle construire des sujets poli tiques collectifs nécessaires au projet d'émancipation féministe et de la société."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This book provides new theoretical approaches to the subject of virtuality. All chapters reflect the importance of extending the analysis of the concept of “the virtual” to areas of knowledge that, until today, have not been fully included in its philosophical foundations. The respective chapters share new insights on art, media, psychic systems and technology, while also presenting new ways of articulating the concept of the virtual with regard to the main premises of Western thought. Given its thematic scope, this (...) book is intended not only for a philosophical audience, but also for all scientists who have turned to the humanities in search of answers to their questions. (shrink)

Dispositional essentialism is the view that all or many fundamental properties are essentially dispositional, orpowers. The literature on the dispositional essence of powers is abundant. In contrast, the question of how to understand the fundamentality of fundamental powers has received scarce interest. Therefore, the fundamentality of powers stands in need of clarification. There are four main conceptions of the fundamental, namely as that which is (i)metaphysically independent; or (ii)belonging to a minimally complete basis; or (iii)perfectly natural; or (iv)metaphysically primitive. Here, (...) I present and discuss each of these approaches from the viewpoint of dispositional essentialism. I show that (i) is incompatible with the metaphysics of powers and (ii)–(iv) have more drawbacks than merits. Therefore, my conclusion is that the dispositional essentialist should seek an alternative. Although I offer no positive account, I pave the way to more fruitful views by identifying the shortcoming of these unpromising options. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem o objetivo de analisar a influência do pensamento de Jean Piaget na proposta das Concepções Abertas no ensino da Educação Física. A epistemologia do autor constituiu uma das referências para a proposta em questão, o que torna necessário o estudo dos pressupostos gnosiológicos e ontológicos da teoria piagetiana para a melhor compreensão das implicações político-pedagógicas do ensino aberto. É possível identificar problemas e limitações das Concepções Abertas, que, por herdar as visões de homem e sociedade defendidas (...) por Piaget, encontra-se presa aos parâmetros do ensino centrado no aluno.This paper aims to analyze the influence of the Piaget’s thought in the proposal of Open Conceptions in the teaching of Physical Education. The epistemology of the author was one of the references to the proposal in question, which calls for the study of epistemological and ontological assumptions of piagetian theory for better understanding of the political and pedagogical implications of open education. It’s possible to identify problems and limitations of Open Conceptions, which, by inheriting the visions of man and society advocated by Piaget, is attached to the parameters of education focused on students. (shrink)

L’on montre dans quelles circonstances et pourquoi le problème des valeurs s’est posé dans la philosophie moderne. Jusqu’à la Renaissance et à Descartes, être et valeur sont identiques parce que l’être est défini par sa fonction et cette fonction par son rapport au tout. Dès que l’on admet, au contraire, l’univocité de l’être, il en résulte cette indifférence de l’être aux valeurs, qui se marque dans le principe d’inertie ou dans la relativité. Dans une pareille conception de l’être, les valeurs (...) ne peuvent être qu’autonomes par rapport à l’être, et c’est la recherche de cette autonomie qui caractérise la théorie moderne des valeurs. (shrink)