RNA binding proteins (RBPs) are key factors for the regulation of gene expression by binding to cis elements, i.e. short sequence motifs in RNAs. Recent studies demonstrate that cooperative binding of multiple RBPs is important for the sequence‐specific recognition of RNA and thereby enables the regulation of diverse biological activities by a limited set of RBPs. Cross‐linking immuno‐precipitation (CLIP) and other recently developed high‐throughput methods provide comprehensive, genome‐wide maps of protein‐RNA interactions in the cell. Structural biology gives detailed insights into (...) molecular mechanisms and principles of RNA recognition by RBPs, but has so far focused on single RNA binding proteins and often on single RNA binding domains. The combination of high‐throughput methods and detailed structural biology studies is expected to greatly advance our understanding of the code for protein‐RNA recognition in gene regulation, as we review in this article. (shrink)

This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. Our focus is a defence of the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory’s groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to consistently envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem we combine insights from three distant corners of the philosophical landscape: theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams (...) and other realists, Frankfurt School-inspired Critical Theory, and recent analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology, and social construction. The upshot is a novel account of realism as empirically-informed diagnosis- critique of social and political phenomena. This view rejects a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so is an alternative to the anti- empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise. (shrink)

To what extent are questions of sovereign debt a matter for political rather than scientific or moral adjudication? We answer that question by defending three claims. We argue that (i) moral and technocratic takes on sovereign debt tend to be ideological in a pejorative sense of the term, and that therefore (ii) sovereign debt should be politicised all the way down. We then show that this sort of politicisation need not boil down to the crude Realpolitik of debtor-creditor power relations—a (...) conclusion that would leave no room for normative theory, among other problems. Rather, we argue that (iii) in a democratic context, a realist approach to politics centred on what Bernard Williams calls ‘The Basic Legitimation Demand’ affords a deliberative approach to the normative evaluation of public debt policy options. (shrink)

According to the aspect theory of instantiation, a particular A instantiates a universal B if and only if an aspect of A is cross-count identical with an aspect of B. This involves the assumption that both particulars and universals have aspects, and that aspects can mediate between different ways of counting things. I will ask what is new about this account of instantiation and, more importantly, whether it is an improvement on its older relatives. It will turn out that the (...) part of it that is new is the notion of cross-count identity among aspects. As I will show, this notion is both dubious and unnecessary. I will end by presenting a simplified aspect theory of instantiation that does not involve cross-count identity. (shrink)

Raymond Geuss has been viewed as one of the figureheads of the recent debates about realism in political theory. This interpretation, however, depends on a truncated understanding of his work of the past 30 years. I will offer the first sustained engagement with this work which allows understanding his realism as a project for reorienting political theory, particularly the relationship between political theory and politics. I interpret this reorientation as a radicalization of realism in political theory through the combination of (...) the emphasis on the critical purpose of political theory and the provision of practical, contextual orientation. Their compatibility depends on Geuss’ understanding of criticism as negative, of power as ‘detoxified’ and of the critical purchase of political theory as based on the diagnostic engagement with its context. This radicalization particularly challenges the understanding of how political theory relates to its political context. (shrink)

The Practical Turn in Political Theory sounds like the monograph political theorists have been waiting for – a monograph that identifies ‘practices’ as a uniting theme that runs through several recently influential debates on non-ideal theory, practice dependence, realism and pragmatist theories of legitimacy and democracy, and then discusses the promise and limits of this uniting theme for the future of political theory. However, The Practical Turn is driven by selective portrayals, omissions and misrepresentation, and hence is not a good (...) source to turn to for understanding the debates it surveys or whether they manifest a ‘practical turn in political theory’ or not; rather, it serves as a warning of how struggles over power can influence and even structure seemingly the most purely intentioned of practices. (shrink)

This paper seeks to show that Bernard Williams’ approach to legitimacy falls short of its aspirations in ways that cast doubt on its fitness for guiding the practice of future realist political theory. More precisely, the paper focuses on the shortcomings of Williams’ realism in establishing a connection to (the practices of) politics, and on how to redeem those shortcomings in a way that would render them suitable for guiding future realist political theory. The first substantive section of the paper (...) considers how compatible Williams’ commitments to diagnosis and interpretation are, with how he spells out his realist thought. The second section argues that making good on Williams’ commitments requires realist political theorists to rethink the sources of their insights and the basis of their claims, and sketches pragmatist and ethnographic approaches as promising examples of how realists could match theoretical commitments in practice. (shrink)

We argue that a reinvention of the plebeian tribunate should play a key role in addressing the challenges stemming from increasing concentrations of, and inequalities in, social, political, economic, and cultural power in liberal democracies. Addressing these challenges, which negatively affect parliamentary representation, requires a form of institutional innovation that gives voice to non-elites who are ruled but do not rule. We propose revisions of the composition and tasks of the tribunate that are tailored to these current challenges. Our fully (...) randomly selected tribunate emerges as a vehicle not only for contesting concentrated power but also for articulating lines of conflict, disruptive agenda-setting, and political experimentation. Our proposal contributes to developing realist democratic theory. We argue that the reinvented tribunate not only meets realist commitments to avoiding moralization and idealization but also demonstrates the underexploited capacity of realism to inform institutional innovation and thus contribute to substantial political analysis. (shrink)

In this paper we put forward a realist account of the problem of the accommodation of conflicting claims over sacred places. Our argument takes its cue from the empirical finding that modern, Western-style states necessarily mould religion into shapes that are compatible with state rule. So, at least in the context of modern states there is no pre-political morality of religious freedom that states ought to follow when adjudicating claims over sacred spaces. In which case most liberal normative theory on (...) religious accommodation turns out to be wrong headed. As an alternative, we suggest the question of contested sacred places should be settled with reference to the state’s purposes—at least as long as one is committed to the existence of modern states. If one finds the state’s treatment of religion unsatisfactory, then our argument provides a pro tanto reason for seeking alternative forms of political organisation. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Motivation is a concept more frequently found in venues concerned with educational psychology than in ones concerned with educational philosophy. Under the influence of psychology, and its typically dualistic way of making sense of the world, motivation in education has tended to be viewed in dichotomous terms, for example, as intrinsic or extrinsic in character. Such psychology-derived theories of educational motivation operate within a dichotomous ontology, traceable to structuralist notions of agency versus (rather than within) structure, while exemplifying the tendency (...) in psychology that philosopher R. S. Peters identified over half a century ago, of seeking to provide totalizing, comprehensive theories of human behaviour in emulation of the achievements of the natural sciences. This article offers an alternative reading of motivation in terms of Foucauldian ethical self-formation that attempts to recognize motivation as arising from the individuals? socially situated and constrained agency, and that focuses on how individuals pursue learning as a way of creating a particular desired version of the self. We illustrate this approach through a vignette of Wolfgang, a Hong Kong learner of German as a third language. Although we are certainly not seeking to supplant other approaches to theorizing motivation, we believe that the approach we elaborate here contributes significantly to the repertoire of motivational research in education. (shrink)

Aristotle’s aitiai are middle terms in Aristotelian syllogisms. I argue that stating the aitia of a thing therefore amounts to re-describing this same thing in an alternative and illuminating way. This, in turn, means that a thing and its aitiai really are one and the same thing under different descriptions. The purpose of this paper is to show that this view is implied by Aristotle’s account of explanation, and that it makes more sense than one might expect.

In Western democracies, people harbor feelings of disgust or hatred for politics. Populists and technocrats even seemingly question the value of politics. Populists cry that they are not politicians and that politics is necessarily corrupt. From the opposite side, technocrats view politics as a pointless constraint on enacting the obviously right policies. Are Western democracies facing a rejection of politics? And is politics worth defending? This paper offers a vindicatory genealogy of politics, vindicating the need human beings have for this (...) practice and clarifying the extent of its contemporary rejections. To achieve these contributions, the paper connects the literatures on pragmatic genealogy and on political realism, revealing how they can complement each other. Following pragmatic genealogy, the practice of politics is vindicated, because it meets an inevitable functional need for collectively binding decision‐making. However, and importantly, political realism allows us to see that the functional mechanisms through which politics fulfills this need vary contextually and thus require careful empirical scrutiny. The paper thus dispels confusion about seeming rejections of politics by clarifying what is unavoidable, and what is revisable about politics. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is widely recognized as one of three major approaches in contemporary moral philosophy and arguably the most influential normative theory in business ethics. Despite its rich pedigree in Western and Eastern philosophy, most work in contemporary virtue ethics is part of the Western tradition. The purpose of this Thematic Symposium is to foster dialogue between Western and Eastern conceptions of virtue in business and engage them with questions about the nature, justification, and content of the virtues in each (...) tradition. This Editorial offers a brief introduction to the problem, a summary of Western and Eastern varieties of virtue ethics, an overview of the six articles included in this Thematic Symposium, and a section with five common themes for further exploration and future collaborative research. (shrink)

Argues for the primacy of the phylogenetic system as the general reference system in biology. This book, first published in 1966, generated significant controversy and opened possibilities for evolutionary biology.

China is a country with a long-standing and rich history. This rich history is also expressed in its cultural, religious and philosophical diversity. One of China’s most prominent and influential philosophical strands is Daoism, which is still practiced today despite the political turmoil of the 20th century. It came into existence at roughly the same time as Confucianism. This paper focuses on a particular work of the Daoist canon, which at the same time is one of its most prominent ones: (...) The Dao De Jing by Laozi. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate in how far the virtues described in the Dao De Jing are applicable in a business context. Thereby this paper presents a first draft to turn the Dao De Jing into a “virtue ethics for business” by a thorough and comprehensive analysis of all 81 chapters based on drawing on eight different translations. (shrink)

Avicenna on the Ontology of Pure Quiddity. By Janos Damien.

Avicenna says that intellectual cognition involves the emanation of an intelligible form by the ‘agent intellect’ upon the human mind. This paper argues that in order to understand why he says this, we need to think of intellectual cognition as a special case of a much more general phenomenon. More specifically, Avicenna's introduction of an agent intellect will be shown to be a natural consequence of certain assumptions about the temporality, the completion, and the teleology of the causal processes by (...) which things acquire forms. (shrink)

RésuméJe soutiens qu'Avicenne admet au moins un cas où il est possible pour notre intellect de saisir un individu particulier en soi : chaque intellect humain peut s'appréhender comme étant numériquement lui-même sans avoir recours à une notion ou un concept général. Car l’être humain préserve son identité lorsqu'il est séparé de son corps. Nous discutons des textes où Avicenne semble affirmer et nier qu'un être humain peut s'appréhender lui-même. Nous concluons que, contrairement à la conscience de soi qu'invoque Avicenne (...) dans l'expérience de pensée de « l'homme volant», l'auto-intellection humaine est une réalisation rare et nous expliquons ce qui la distingue de l'auto-intellection plus complète de l'intellect divin. (shrink)

This article follows the history of the idea of adventure in the Soviet Union, which started as a dream of the great communist adventure but two decades into the revolution turned into the nightmare of the Great Terror. Adventure was implicated in the violent realities of Stalinism through tropes of the adventure genre, such as the loneliness of the adventurer in a precarious world impenetrable by reason. Understanding this situation requires a focus on philosophies of both adventure and terror. For (...) instance, Hegel’s philosophy of adventure will help us to reveal features of the lived experience in times of terror, whilst Mikhail Ryklin’s philosophy of terror sheds light on the significance of the adventure genre in the Soviet 1930s. This double focus allows articulation of a primary feature of violence that is often overlooked, namely, the fundamental reciprocity that structures it. In the Soviet context, we find historically neglected but critically important reflections on the relation between violence and adventure in the life and works of Lev Kopelev. We also find a unique deliberation on the dialectics of violence (and counter-violence) in Evgeni Shvarc’s adventure tale The Dragon (1943) which can be fruitfully read in dialogue with Arendt’s vital distinction between violence and power. Reconsidering these sources is an important task for today given that Russian politics has once again, 30 years after perestroika, regressed into mass violence. (shrink)

This roundtable discussion is based on an online symposium – The Promise of Photography: Scale, Measure and Proportion in a Conflicted Visual Milieu – which took place on 17 September 2021. Since its inception, photography has promised to set things to scale, to grant them measure and proportion, a series of promises that have also entailed moments of irrationality or conflict that persist in and continue to shape the era of global networked digital imaging technologies. The symposium started out from (...) the diagnosis that, whilst photography continues to promise an ordered, proportionate and measured world in which things can be set to their proper scale, it also acts in many ways as an agent of dismeasure, disproportion and the unscalable. In light of this, the roundtable discussion presented here examines a range of different meanings that scale, measure and proportion have accrued in the photographic context and sets out to explore conceptual frameworks and research methodologies through which the current situation might be understood. (shrink)

Russian constructivism's motif of an »insurgence of things« leads to the imperative of a liberation of things, which turns away from their representation and declares a Bilderverbot (prohibition of representation) in order to create new things for »new men.« These things – for example, clothing and articles of daily use – overleap the opposition between object and thingness. Their essence, as contemporary Russian phenomenology (Gustav Špet, Nikolaj Žinkin) affirms, is not constituted by any »ideal object«, but by social usage, which (...) involves it in an interminable metamorphosis. (shrink)

Den Begriff, unter den Sokrates in dem Satz „Sokrates ist ein Kluger“ gebracht wird, sollte man nicht als „Klugheit“ fassen, sondern als den Klugen als solchen. Der Kluge wird also von Sokrates ausgesagt. Der Kluge als solcher ist ein abstraktes Ding, keine Eigenschaft. So gesehen ist ohne weiteres klar, dass der Begriff des Klugen (= der Kluge als solcher) selbst klug ist, und zwar ebenso buchstäblich, wie Sokrates klug ist.

Röhren und Schläuche bilden zentrale menschliche Organisationsformen: Sie ordnen die Ströme unseres Atem-, Verdauungs- und Blutkreislaufs, durch sie vollziehen sich Zeugung, Geburt – und intensivmedizinisch auch der Tod am vom Schläuchen umschlungenen Körper. Ebenso basieren die wichtigsten Waren-, Energie- und Datenströme ganz oder zumindest teilweise auf diesem zirkulatorischen Prinzip möglichst engwandiger und zugleich tausende Kilometer und Meilen weit verschlungener Wege: ob in Straßen- oder Eisenbahntunneln, Erdgaspipelines oder den Land- und Seekabeln für Telefon- und Internet, ohne die der Welthandel quasi zum (...) Erliegen käme: Die Anthropologie berührt sich hier mit der Kultur- und Technikanthropologie. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 45 Heft: 1 Seiten: 158-177.

Changing Modes: The Recent History of the Voice Recordings in the Berlin Sound Archive. The Sound Archive (Lautarchiv) of the Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin is a collection of language and voice recordings dating back to recording activities in prisoner of war camps during World War I. Since 1990 the recordings have been included in and used for various scientific and cultural modes of research and presentation. This article illustrates the ways in which the collection in both its entirety as well as (...) in its individual objects have been transformed and relocated, thus changing their meanings within these different contexts. Particularly their inclusions into these very different structural and cultural modes have not only opened up new dimensions and opportunities, but at the same time also have shown specific limitations and determinations. The Sound Archive appears to thus be an example of an academic collection at the interfaces of both cultural and scientific activity in a constant process of transformation. (shrink)

Data from further human experiments touch four open questions in the target article. (1) Extinction of reward acquisition postulated by Depue & Collins's model could not be confirmed if correlating craving for, liking of, and satisfaction from smoking. (2) Intraindividual correspondence between responsivity to dopamine agonists and antagonists could likewise not be confirmed. (3) Nicotine craving and drug-induced hormone responses were not substantially correlated. (4) Low serotonin can be the cause and not just the moderator of dopaminergic sensitivity, and personality (...) correlates of low dopamine/low MAO (aggressive impulsive traits) can hardly be related to the positive emotion associated with dopaminergic activity. (shrink)

I will argue that Aristotle’s fourfold division of four causes naturally arises from a combination of two distinctions (a) between things and changes, and (b) between that which potentially is something and what it potentially is. Within this scheme, what is usually called the “efficient cause” is something that potentially is a certain natural change, and the “final cause” is, at least in a basic sense, what the efficient cause potentially is. I will further argue that the essences of things (...) and changes are not features or attributes of them, but paradigms that set the standards according to which these things and changes may be judged to be natural or typical. The “formal cause” of a natural thing will be shown to be its essence in this sense: it sets the standards of typicality that apply to instances of its kind. The final cause will be shown to set the standard of typicality for natural changes. When we understand Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes in this way, it becomes clear on what basis he could convincingly argue that final causality is operative in the whole of nature. (shrink)

Although Descartes is often said to have coined the modern notion of ‘consciousness’, he defines it neither explicitly nor implicitly. This may imply (1) that he was not the first to use ‘conscientia’ in its modern, psychological sense, or (2) that he still used it in its traditional moral sense. In this paper, I argue for the latter assumption. Descartes used ‘conscientia’ according to the meaning we also find in texts of St. Paul, Augustine, Aquinas and later scholastics. Thus the (...) Cartesian conscientia is, technically speaking, a shared knowledge of the specific value of our thoughts as thoughts and at the same time the cause of this value. This means that it is not itself a kind of individual knowledge, awareness, or a particular thought. Rather, ‘conscientia’ refers to the evaluative knowledge of an ideal observer. (shrink)