The aim of this paper is to evaluate etiological accounts of functions for the domain of technical artefacts. Etiological theories ascribe functions to items on the basis of the causal histories of those items; they apply relatively straightforwardly to the biological domain, in which neo‐Darwinian evolutionary theory provides a well‐developed and generally accepted background for describing the causal histories of biological items. Yet there is no well‐developed and generally accepted theory for describing the causal history of artefacts, so the application (...) of etiological theories to the technical domain is hardly straightforward. In this paper we consider the transposition of etiological theories in general from the biological to the technical domain. We argue that a number of etiological theories that appear defensible for biology become untenable for technology. We illustrate our argument by showing that the standard etiological accounts of Neander and Millikan, and some recent attempts to improve on them, provide examples of such untenable theories.1Introduction2Desiderata for theories of functions3Etiological theories in general3.1Common core and divergent aims3.2Reproduction versus non‐reproduction etiological theories3.3Intentionalist versus non‐intentionalist etiological theories4Problems for etiological theories in the technical domain5The failure of existing reproduction theories6The failure of existing non‐reproduction theories7Improving reproduction by hybridisation8Conclusions. (shrink)

The philosophy of artifacts is as marginal as it is one-sided. The majority of contributions to it are asides in works devoted to other subjects and focus on one characteristic feature: that artifacts are objects with functions. Indeed many artifacts, such as screwdrivers and toasters, come in functional kinds. Perhaps for this reason, philosophers elevated functions to the essences of artifacts or have developed general theories of function to describe artifacts along with their main subject: biological items. Most such theories (...) present one monolithic notion of function that applies to both. Dissident voices claim autonomy for artifact functions, or at least a small measure of conceptual independence, but it is seldom questioned that a theory of artifacts consists merely of a theory of artifact functions. (shrink)

Wybo Houkes - A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4 554-555 Book Review A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger Michael Friedman. A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger. Chicago: Open Court, 2000. Pp. xv + 175. Paper, $24.95. For present-day philosophers, the division between "analytic" and "continental" philosophy is a fact of life. In this elegant little book, (...) Michael Friedman studies its origins. In earlier essays, collected in his Reconsidering Logical Positivism , Friedman argued that Carnap and other logical empiricists are best understood as adapting their Neokantian heritage to, among other things, the rapid developments in logic and physics. In A Parting of the Ways, Friedman broadens.. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to evaluate etiological accounts of functions for the domain of technical artefacts. Etiological theories ascribe functions to items on the basis of the causal histories of those items; they apply relatively straightforwardly to the biological domain, in which neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory provides a well-developed and generally accepted background for describing the causal histories of biological items. Yet there is no well-developed and generally accepted theory for describing the causal history of artefacts, so the application (...) of etiological theories to the technical domain is hardly straightforward. In this paper we consider the transposition of etiological theories in general from the biological to the technical domain. We argue that a number of etiological theories that appear defensible for biology become untenable for technology. We illustrate our argument by showing that the standard etiological accounts of Neander and Millikan, and some recent attempts to improve on them, provide examples of such untenable theories. 1 Introduction 2 Desiderata for theories of functions 3 Etiological theories in general 3.1 Common core and divergent aims 3.2 Reproduction versus non-reproduction etiological theories 3.3 Intentionalist versus non-intentionalist etiological theories 4 Problems for etiological theories in the technical domain 5 The failure of existing reproduction theories 6 The failure of existing non-reproduction theories 7 Improving reproduction by hybridisation 8 Conclusions. (shrink)

About three decades ago, the late Ronald Giere introduced a new framework for teaching scientific reasoning to science students. Giere’s framework presents a model-based alternative to the traditional statement approach—in which scientific inferences are reconstructed as explicit arguments, composed of (single-sentence) premises and a conclusion. Subsequent research in science education has shown that model-based approaches are particularly effective in teaching science students how to understand and evaluate scientific reasoning. One limitation of Giere’s framework, however, is that it covers only one (...) type of scientific reasoning, namely the reasoning deployed in hypothesis-driven research practices. In this paper, we describe an extension of the framework. More specifically, we develop an additional model-based scheme that captures reasoning in application-oriented practices (which are very well represented in contemporary science). Our own teaching experience suggests that this extended framework is able to engage a wider audience than Giere’s original. With an eye on going beyond such anecdotal evidence, we invite our readers to test out the framework in their own teaching. (shrink)

This paper systematically compares two frameworks for analysing technical artefacts: the Dual-Nature approach, exemplified by the contributions to Kroes and Meijers , and the collectivist approach advocated by Schyfter , following Kusch . After describing the main tenets of both approaches, we show that there is significant overlap between them: both frameworks analyse the most typical cases of artefact use, albeit in different terms, but to largely the same extent. Then, we describe several kinds of cases for which the frameworks (...) yield different analyses. For these cases, which include one-of-a-kind artefacts and defect types, the Dual-Nature framework leads to a more attractive analysis. Our comparison also gives us the opportunity to respond to Vaesen’s critical paper. We do so by distinguishing two readings of the Dual-Nature framework and pointing out that on the sustainable, weaker reading, Vaesen’s considerations supplement the framework rather than offering an alternative to it.Keywords: Technical artefact; Dual Nature framework; Collectivist framework; Artefact use. (shrink)

I argue that technological functions warrant specific epistemological attention, which they have not received thus far. From a user’s perspective, knowledge about the possible functions of an artefact is not provided exclusively by beliefs about its physical characteristics; it is primarily provided by know-how related to its use. Analysing the latter shows that standards of practical and not just theoretical reasoning are involved. Moreover, knowledge of the function of artefacts is primarily based on testimony and a social division of labour (...) with respect to rational artefact use. Combining these two features, knowledge of functions can be shown to create a rich normative context, manifest in notions such as ‘improper’ use: designers inform users about how they ought to use artefacts. This normativity in knowledge of functions, which takes a different shape for possible and proper functions, is lacking in standard, descriptive knowledge.Keywords: Epistemology; Function; Knowing-how; Testimony; Artefact; Practical rationality. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the possibilities of combining two central intuitions about artefacts: that they are functional objects, and that they are non-natural objects. We do so in four steps. First we argue that, contrary to common opinion, functions cannot be the cornerstone of a characterisation of artefacts. Our argument suggests an alternative view, which characterises artefacts as objects embedded in what we call use plans. Second, we show that this plan-centred successor of the function-focused view is at odds (...) with the non-naturalness intuition. Third, we show that this intuition can be developed by defining artefacts as produced or human-made objects, but that the resulting definition might collapse into the plan-centred view, and has trouble distinguishing artefact types or kinds. Finally, we propose a division of labour between production and use plans: among objects in general, artefacts are distinguished as human-made objects; within the domain of artefacts, types or kinds are characterised by the use plans in which artefacts are embedded. (shrink)

We examine to what extent an adequate ontology of technical artefacts can be based on existing general accounts of the relation between higher-order objects and their material basis. We consider two of these accounts: supervenience and constitution. We take as our starting point the thesis that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, that is, that they are both material bodies and functional objects. We present two criteria for an adequate ontology of artefacts, ‘Underdetermination’ and ‘Realizability Constraints’ , which address aspects of (...) the dual nature thesis. Assessing supervenience accounts, we find them either wanting with respect to these criteria or insufficiently informative. Next, we argue that a recent application of Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view to artefacts cannot meet our criteria, although the broader view leaves room for improvement. Based on our evaluation of the most promising candidates, we conclude that so far general metaphysical views fail to address the most salient features of artefacts. Although they can account for the fact that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, they do not offer the conceptual resources needed to describe the relation between these natures; this relation raises a hard problem in metaphysics.Keywords: Metaphysics; Artefact; Supervenience; Constitution; Underdetermination. (shrink)

In this paper we present an action-theoretic account of artefact using and designing and describe our ICE-theory of function ascriptions to technical artefacts. By means of this account and theory we analyse the thesis of the dual nature of technical artefacts according to which descriptions of technical artefacts draw on structural and intentional conceptualisations. We show that the ascription of technical functions to technical artefacts can connect the intentional and structural parts of descriptions of artefacts, but also separate these parts. (...) Our conclusion is that the concept of technical functions forms a ‘conceptual drawbridge’ between the intentional and structural natures of technical artefacts.Keywords: Intentional and structural descriptions; Technical artefacts; Function theory; Action theory; Use; Design. (shrink)

Michael Weisberg has argued that robustness analysis is useful in evaluating both scientific models and their implications and that robustness analysis comes in three types that share their form and aim. We argue for three cautionary claims regarding Weisberg's reconstruction: robustness analysis may be of limited or no value in evaluating models and their implications; the unificatory reconstruction conceals that the three types of robustness differ in form and role; there is no confluence of types of robustness. We illustrate our (...) central first claim with a case study: the application of Lotka-Volterra models to technology diffusion. (shrink)

Nudging is a tool of libertarian paternalism. It involves making use of certain psychological tendencies in order to help people make better decisions without restricting their freedom. However, some have argued that nudging is objectionable because it interferes with, or undermines, the rational decision-making of the nudged agents. Opinions differ on why this is objectionable, but the underlying concerns appear to begin with nudging’s threat to rational decision-making. Those who discuss this issue do not make it clear to what this (...) threat to rationality amounts. In this paper I evaluate what effect nudging has on our decision-making and I argue that it does not typically interfere with our rationality in a problematic way. Perhaps nudging is objectionable for other reasons, but we should not argue that nudging is objectionable based on concerns about rational decision-making. (shrink)

The notion of template has recently been discussed in relation to cross-disciplinary transfer of modeling efforts and in relation to the representational content of models. We further develop and disambiguate the notion of template and find that, suitably developed, it is useful in distinguishing and analyzing different types of transfer, none of which supports a non-representationalist view of models. We illustrate our main findings with the modeling of technology substitution with Lotka-Volterra Competition equations.

In this paper we examine the possibilities of combining two central intuitions about artefacts: that they are functional objects, and that they are non-natural objects. We do so in four steps. First we argue that, contrary to common opinion, functions cannot be the cornerstone of a characterisation of artefacts. Our argument suggests an alternative view, which characterises artefacts as objects embedded in what we call use plans. Second, we show that this plan-centred successor of the function-focused view is at odds (...) with the non-naturalness intuition. Third, we show that this intuition can be developed by defining artefacts as produced or human-made objects, but that the resulting definition might collapse into the plan-centred view, and has trouble distinguishing artefact types or kinds. Finally, we propose a division of labour between production and use plans: among objects in general, artefacts are distinguished as human-made objects; within the domain of artefacts, types or kinds are characterised by the use plans in which artefacts are embedded. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the possibilities of combining two central intuitions about artefacts: that they are functional objects, and that they are non-natural objects. We do so in four steps. First we argue that, contrary to common opinion, functions cannot be the cornerstone of a characterisation of artefacts. Our argument suggests an alternative view, which characterises artefacts as objects embedded in what we call use plans. Second, we show that this plan-centred successor of the function-focused view is at odds (...) with the non-naturalness intuition. Third, we show that this intuition can be developed by defining artefacts as produced or human-made objects, but that the resulting definition might collapse into the plan-centred view, and has trouble distinguishing artefact types or kinds. Finally, we propose a division of labour between production and use plans: among objects in general, artefacts are distinguished as human-made objects; within the domain of artefacts, types or kinds are characterised by the use plans in which artefacts are embedded. (shrink)

In this paper we use our work in the philosophy of technology to formulate a pluralist view on artefact categories and categorisation principles, as studied in cognitive science. We argue, on the basis of classifications derived by philosophical reconstruction, that artefacts can be clustered in more than one way, and that each clustering may be taken as defining psychological artefact categories. We contrast this pluralism with essentialism and super-minimalism on artefact categories and we argue that pluralism is coherent with experimental (...) results regarding the context-dependence of artefact categorisation. (shrink)

This article reviews models of the cerebellum and motor learning, from the landmark papers by Marr and Albus through those of the present time. The unique architecture of the cerebellar cortex is ideally suited for pattern recognition, but how is pattern recognition incorporated into motor control and learning systems? The present analysis begins with a discussion of exactly what the cerebellar cortex needs to regulate through its anatomically defined projections to premotor networks. Next, we examine various models showing how the (...) microcircuitry in the cerebellar cortex could be used to achieve its regulatory functions. Having thus defined what it is that Purkinje cells in the cerebellar cortex must learn, we then evaluate theories of motor learning. We examine current models of synaptic plasticity, credit assignment, and the generation of training information, indicating how they could function cooperatively to guide the processes of motor learning. (shrink)

Intellectual humility has attracted attention in both philosophy and psychology. Philosophers have clarified the nature of intellectual humility as an epistemic virtue; and psychologists have developed scales for measuring people’s intellectual humility. Much less attention has been paid to the potential effects of intellectual humility on people’s negative attitudes and to its relationship with prejudice-based epistemic vices. Here we fill these gaps by focusing on the relationship between intellectual humility and prejudice. To clarify this relationship, we conducted four empirical studies. (...) The results of these studies show three things. First, people are systematically prejudiced towards members of groups perceived as dissimilar. Second, intellectual humility weakens the association between perceived dissimilarity and prejudice. Third, more intellectual humility is associated withmoreprejudice overall. We show that this apparently paradoxical pattern of results is consistent with the idea that it is both psychologically and rationally plausible that one person is at the same time intellectually humble, epistemically virtuous and strongly prejudiced. (shrink)

In the mathematics education research literature, there is a growing body of scholarship on how mathematicians practice their craft. The purpose of this chapter is to survey some of this literature and explain how it can contribute to the philosophy of mathematical practice. We first describe how mathematics educators use empirical methodologies to investigate the behaviors of mathematicians and argue that findings from these studies can inform the philosophy of mathematical practice. We then illustrate this by summarizing research on mathematicians’ (...) understandings and mathematicians’ proof reading. (shrink)

The data on the cellular mechanism of LTD that is presented in four target articles is synthesized into a new model of Purkinje cell plasticity. This model attempts to address credit assignment problems that are crucial in learning systems. Intracellular signal transduction mechanisms may provide the mechanism for a 3-factor learning rule and a trace mechanism. The latter may permit delayed information about motor error to modify the prior synaptic events that caused the error. This model may help to focus (...) future cellular studies on issues that are particularly critical for a computationally viable concept of cerebellar plasticity, [CRÉPEL et al.; HOUK et al.; KANO; LINDEN; VINCENT]. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a template-based analysis to include several elements of _processes_ through which templates are transferred between fields of inquiry. The analysis builds on Justin Price’s identification of the importance of a “landing zone” in the recipient domain, from which “conceptual pressure” may be created. I will argue that conceptual pressure is a characteristic feature of the process of template transfer; that this means that there are costs to the process of transfer as well as benefits; and (...) that it would be reasonable if modelers try to mitigate these costs. I will discuss two such mitigation strategies: ‘conceptual embedding’ and ‘customization’. I illustrate the claims, focusing on the mitigation strategies, with a case study: that of pioneering applications of reaction–diffusion equations in mathematical ecology. (shrink)

In recent years, attention for the work of Rudolf Carnap has shifted from polemical discussion to placing Carnap in his intellectual context. Thus, the central question is no longer whether Carnap contributes to solving our current problems, but whether he solved the problems of his day and age. This contextualist approach has resulted in a deeper and more refined understanding of, in particular, Carnap’s early works and has focused on Der logische Aufbau der Welt.

In this paper, it is examined to what extent functions, as analysed in the philosophy of technical artefacts, can serve a role in explaining the aesthetic appreciation of these objects. The main conclusion is that, despite first appearances, so-called ‘Functional Beauty’ accounts cannot derive strength from analyses of artefact functions; on the contrary, these analyses constrain the possibilities for developing a suitable, function-based account of aesthetic appreciation. The paper follows a conceptual-engineering approach. After presenting desiderata for an account of aesthetic (...) appreciation, relevant insights are reviewed that are drawn from philosophical work on artefact functions. Combining the desiderata and insights, three major issues are identified that complicate the relation between function ascriptions to and aesthetic appreciation of technical artefacts. In closing, options are offered for resolving these complications or avoiding them altogether. (shrink)

On several levels, there is now a debate whether the concept of God can be made compatible with modern science. In an attempt to elucidate this debate, I give an account of my own experiences from writing a book on the foundation of quantum mechanics. In my opinion, one can give two independent arguments for the existence of God by taking as departure an epistemic (knowledge-based) interpretation of quantum theory. However, I also argue that any religious belief should be the (...) result of an existential choice governed by each person’s own context (history and culture). In particular, I give my account of Christianity as a religion connected to our western culture, how one as a scientist can relate to the relevant dogmas. (shrink)

The well known Bell experiment with two actors Alice and Bob is considered. First the simple deduction leading to the CHSH inequality under local realism is reviewed, and some arguments from the literature are recapitulated. Then I take up certain background themes before I enter a discussion of Alice’s analysis of the situation. An important point is that her mind is limited by the fact that her Hilbert space in this context is two-dimensional. General statements about a mind’s limitation during (...) a decision process are derived from recent results on the reconstruction of quantum theory from conceptual variables. These results apply to any decision situation. Let all the data from the Bell experiment be handed over to a new actor Charlie, who performs a data analysis. But his mind is also limited: He has a four-dimensional Hilbert space in the context determined by the experiment. I show that this implies that neither Alice nor Charlie can have the argument leading to the CHSH inequality as a background for making decisions related to the experiment. Charlie may be any data analyst, and he may communicate with any person. It is argued that no rational person can be convinced by the CHSH argument when making empirical decisions on the Bell situation. (shrink)

Scientific disagreements sometimes persist even if scientists fully share results of their research. In this paper we develop an agent-based model to study the impact of diverging diagnostic values scientists may assign to the evidence, given their different background assumptions, on the emergence of polarization in the scientific community. Scientists are represented as Bayesian updaters for whom the diagnosticity of evidence is given by the Bayes factor. Our results suggest that an initial disagreement on the diagnostic value of evidence can, (...) but does not necessarily, lead to polarization, depending on the sample size of the performed studies and the confidence interval within which scientists share their opinions. In particular, the more data scientists share,the more likely it is that the community will end up polarized. (shrink)

:Academic Medical Centers offer patient care and perform research. Increasingly, AMCs advertise to the public in order to garner income that can support these dual missions. In what follows, we raise concerns about the ways that advertising blurs important distinctions between them. Such blurring is detrimental to AMC efforts to fulfill critically important ethical responsibilities pertaining both to science communication and clinical research, because marketing campaigns can employ hype that weakens research integrity and contributes to therapeutic misconception and misestimation, undermining (...) the informed consent process that is essential to the ethical conduct of research. We offer ethical analysis of common advertising practices that justify these concerns. We also suggest the need for a deliberative body convened by the Association of American Medical Colleges and others to develop a set of voluntary guidelines that AMCs can use to avoid in the future, the problems found in many current AMC advertising practices. (shrink)

A deflationary perspective on theories of cultural evolution, in particular dual-inheritance theory, has recently been proposed by Lewens. On this ‘pop-culture’ analysis, dual-inheritance theorists apply population thinking to cultural phenomena, without claiming that cultural items evolve by natural selection. This paper argues against this pop-culture analysis of dual-inheritance theory. First, it focuses on recent dual-inheritance models of specific patterns of cultural change. These models exemplify population thinking without a commitment to natural selection of cultural items. There are grounds, however, for (...) doubting the added explanatory value of the models in their disciplinary context—and thus grounds for engaging in other potentially explanatory projects based on dual-inheritance theory. One such project is suggested by advocates of the theory. Some of the motivational narratives that they offer can be interpreted as setting up an adaptationist project with regard to cumulative change in cultural items. We develop this interpretation here. On it, dual-inheritance theory features two interrelated selection processes, one on the level of genetically inherited learning mechanisms, another on the level of the cultural items transmitted through these mechanisms. This interpretation identifies a need for further modelling efforts, but also offers scope for enhancing the explanatory power of dual-inheritance theory. (shrink)

This article may be seen as a summary and a final discussion of the work that the author has done in recent years on the foundation of quantum theory. It is shown that quantum mechanics as a model follows under certain specific conditions from a quite different, much simpler model. This model is connected to the mind of an observer, or to the joint minds of a group of communicating observers. The model is based upon conceptual variables, and an important (...) aspect is that an observer (a group of observers) must decide on which variable to measure. The model is then linked more generally to a theory of decisions. The results are discussed from several angles. (shrink)

The principle of autonomy is widely recognized to be of utmost importance in bioethics; however, we argue that this principle is often misapplied when one fails to distinguish two different contexts in medicine. When a particular patient is offered treatment options, she has the ultimate say in whether to proceed with any of those treatments. However, when deciding whether a particular intervention should be regarded as a form of medical treatment in the first place, it is the medical community who (...) has the ultimate say. Some argue that particular interventions should be allowed by virtue of the fact that they are autonomously requested. But making such an argument fails to distinguish between these two contexts and misapplies the principle of autonomy, ultimately having the potential to instigate problematic changes in the practice of medicine. (shrink)

Legal and ethical concerns have been raised since the inception of the commercial mug shot website industry in the United States. These issues include the violation of the presumption of innocence, privacy interests, humiliation, extortion, and sensationalizing crime. These websites lend comparison to Bedlam asylum, which allowed visitors to mock and humiliate the patients. The popularity of these websites renders it essential that the legality and ethics of these websites be reevaluated. The deontological and utilitarian perspectives offer converging assessments regarding (...) the need to regulate the industry and to modify the practices of law enforcement agencies and news organizations. (shrink)

Ce texte est tiré de I. Baxmann et al., Arbeit und Rhythmus – Lebensformen im Wandel, Paderborn, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2009, p. 15-36. La traduction en a été assurée par Anthony Liébault et déjà mise en ligne par la revue Agôn. Nous remercions Inge Baxman de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. L'époque moderne et la critique de la conception séculaire du travail « Travailler, c'est danser ». Voilà ce que prétend Karl Bücher, économiste allemand originaire de Leipzig, (...) dans son ouvrage de 1896 intitulé - 1er XXe siècle – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Evolutionary anthropologists and archaeologists have been considerably successful in modelling the cumulative evolution of culture, of technological skills and knowledge in particular. Recently, one of these models has been introduced in the philosophy of science by De Cruz and De Smedt (Philos Stud 157:411–429, 2012), in an attempt to demonstrate that scientists may collectively come to hold more truth-approximating beliefs, despite the cognitive biases which they individually are known to be subject to. Here we identify a major shortcoming in that (...) attempt: De Cruz & De Smedt’s mathematical model makes one particularly strong tractability assumption that causes the model to largely miss its target (namely, truth accumulation in science), and that moreover conflicts with empirical observations. The second, more constructive part of the paper presents an alternative, agent-based model, which allows one to much better examine the conditions for scientific progress and decline. (shrink)

The human enhancement debate typically centres on moral issues regarding changes in human nature, not on the means for these changes. We argue that one cannot grasp what is morally salient about human enhancement without understanding how technologies affect human action and practical reasoning. We present a minimalist conception of human agents as bounded practical reasoners. Then, we categorise different effects of technologies on our possibilities for action and our evaluation of these possibilities. For each, we discuss whether enhancement technologies (...) have morally salient effects; which technologies show these effects; and whether these differ significantly from those of other, non-enhancement technologies. We conclude that enhancement technologies are morally salient in several respects, that not all enhancement technologies share all those morally salient respects, and that continuities with traditional technologies may be found in all morally salient respects. (shrink)

The consensus among cultural evolutionists seems to be that human cultural evolution is cumulative, which is commonly understood in the specific sense that cultural traits, especially technological traits, increase in complexity over generations. Here we argue that there is insufficient credible evidence in favor of or against this technological complexity thesis. For one thing, the few datasets that are available hardly constitute a representative sample. For another, they substantiate very specific, and usually different versions of the complexity thesis or, even (...) worse, do not point to complexity increases. We highlight the problems our findings raise for current work in cultural-evolutionary theory, and present various suggestions for future research. (shrink)

The objective was to test the Theory of Planned Behavior and the proposition that relative measures should be used in travel mode choice situations. Data from a survey in Norway was analyzed using regression analysis. The results indicated that factors of the Theory of Planned Behavior and past behavior predicted intentions to travel by car, public, transport, bicycle, and on foot. The results supported the idea that there is a split in perceived behavioral control in controllability and self-efficacy, as controllability (...) was a significant predictor only for intention to travel by car. The use of relative measures added to the predictive strength of all predictors and increased prediction of behavioral intention for all travel modes. The results supported the Theory of Planned Behavior and the proposition regarding choice situations. Previous tests of the theory may have underestimated its predictive power. Attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control predict travel intentions and may be targeted in interventions aimed at promoting travel mode choice. (shrink)