On Nudging’s Supposed Threat to Rational Decision-Making

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 44 (4):403-422 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Nudging is a tool of libertarian paternalism. It involves making use of certain psychological tendencies in order to help people make better decisions without restricting their freedom. However, some have argued that nudging is objectionable because it interferes with, or undermines, the rational decision-making of the nudged agents. Opinions differ on why this is objectionable, but the underlying concerns appear to begin with nudging’s threat to rational decision-making. Those who discuss this issue do not make it clear to what this threat to rationality amounts. In this paper I evaluate what effect nudging has on our decision-making and I argue that it does not typically interfere with our rationality in a problematic way. Perhaps nudging is objectionable for other reasons, but we should not argue that nudging is objectionable based on concerns about rational decision-making.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,100

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Informed consent and nudging.William Simkulet - 2018 - Bioethics 33 (1):169-184.
Nudging and Informed Consent.Shlomo Cohen - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (6):3-11.
What can Neuroscience Contribute to the Debate Over Nudging?Gidon Felsen & Peter B. Reiner - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):469-479.
Nudging for Liberals.Andrés Moles - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (4):644-667.
Nudging, informed consent and bullshit.William Simkulet - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):536-542.
Cogniton, Rationality and Decision.José Gaxiola - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 33:67-73.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-07-30

Downloads
40 (#399,111)

6 months
10 (#270,763)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Timothy Houk
College of The Sequoias

References found in this work

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government.Philip Pettit (ed.) - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government.Philip Pettit - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):415-419.
The Ethics of Nudge.Luc Bovens - 2008 - In Mats J. Hansson & Till Grüne-Yanoff (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology. Springer, Theory and Decision Library A. pp. 207-20.

View all 25 references / Add more references