Principal propositions -- Synergetic and homeostatic transformations of energies in the natural space -- Mathematical basis for the applicability of synergy and homeostasis in the normative systems -- Natural normative order and comparison of the aggression of nonhuman and human animals -- Applicability of synergy and homeostasis for the normative transformations in civil society -- Applicability of synergy and homeostasis for the normative transformations in legal order -- Human rights and applicability of synergy and homeostasis for the normative transformations in (...) state -- The theory on the prevention of environmental disaster. (shrink)

Many professional bodies now include activist committees devoted to better serving the broad public interest. Some of the different ways that these groups operate are explored and analyzed. In particular, professional activist groups are divided into two general categories: those dealing mainly with standards of professional practice, and those dealing with political and social issues relevant to the larger social milieu. By participating in such groups, professionals can give the public an alternative view of their profession, and set the stage (...) for public demand for more responsive, socially controlled, professional practices. (shrink)

In this paper i show that no fewer than thirteen distinct interpretations of peirce's views on truth exist in the literature, that most are the product of sloppy scholarship, that the standard view is wrong, and that the only two plausible views are offered by n rescher and david savan respectively. whether the correct view of what peirce argued is defensible is not examined.

This paper argues against the thesis of Professor Savan, that Spinoza's views about words and about the imagination are such that he could not consistently say, and indeed did not think, that philosophical truths can be expressed adequately in language. The evidence for this thesis is examined in detail, and it is argued that Spinoza should have distinguished between two types of imagination, corresponding roughly to Kant's transcendental and empirical imagination. Finally, it is suggested that the bulk of the argument (...) of the Ethics is conducted on the level of the ?second kind of knowledge?, reason, but that it also contains examples of the use of the first and third kinds of knowledge. (shrink)

The chapters of the book do not situate Spinoza among the natural philosophical giants who opened the way to modern science. Rather they explore Spinoza's relation to the sciences in a variety of ways. Contributors: Joseph Agassi, Thomas Cook, Marjorie Grene, Hans Jonas, André Lecrivain, Genevieve Lloyd, Alexandre Matheron, Nancy Maull, Debra Nails, Michel Paty, Richard H. Popkin, David Savan, Heine Siebrand, and Joe D. Van Zandt.

Stuart Hampshire's Spinoza depicts Spinoza as having tried to free language from its intimate association with the imagination in order to enable it to convey the clear and distinct ideas of true philosophy. The inaccuracy and insufficiency of this account was pointed out by David Savan in an article in the Philosophical Review in 1958. Savan showed that concerns about language were more deeply and widely woven into Spinoza's thought than Hampshire had noticed; and he argued that, for Spinoza, understanding (...) occurs by a sort of simple mental perception, after we have weaned ourselves from our natural dependence on words and images. Savan's paper appeared in the heyday of linguistic analysis and was articulate... (shrink)

Se expone la relación entre el signo en tanto gnoseológica y semánticamente subordinado a la imaginación y el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar las verdades filosóficas por parte de Spinoza. Al respecto, se revisan tres posturas: (i) la de David Savan, quien sostiene la inadecuación del lenguaje para expresar verdades filosóficas debido a la vinculación spinoziana entre las palabras y la imaginación; (ii) la de G.H.R. Parkinson, quien afirma que el uso del lenguaje no es inconsistente con la (...) expresión de las proposiciones filosóficas por parte de Spinoza, sino que, la mayor parte de lo propuesto en la Ética pertenece al conocimiento de razón y las nociones comunes y; (iii) la de Mogens Laerke, quien defiende la posibilidad de atribuir coherencia al uso del lenguaje, por un lado, y a la filosofía spinoziana, por el otro, a partir del recurso matemático de la demostración geométrica. Finalmente, se argumenta una interpretación propia con base en el análisis semiótico del signo en Spinoza, a partir de la cual (i) es posible atribuirle al signo una función dentro del entendimiento, sin detrimento de su capacidad gnoseológica y semántica para alcanzar verdades filosóficas y, por consiguiente, (ii) validar el uso del lenguaje como medio para expresar su filosofía. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of which kinds of knowledge Spinoza himself employs in developing the system of the Ethics. The problem is raised by Professor D. Savan and further discussed by G. H. R. Parkinson. The thesis is (1) that no occurrence of the first kind of knowledge is to be found in the Ethics (against Parkinson), (2) that the main part of the analysis in the Ethics is conducted on the level of the second kind of knowledge (in (...) agreement with Parkinson), and (3) that the third kind of knowledge occurs frequently and plays a most important role in the Ethics (in part against Parkinson). The relation between knowledge and language, the distinction between two types of imagination, or two ways of imagining things, the translation of knowledge of modes of extension into knowledge of the mind, and the relation between the second and third kind of knowledge are main parts of the argument. The third kind of knowledge derives its significance in the Ethics from the definitions and axioms, particularly in Part 1. These definitions and axioms form the basis of the whole system of the Ethics, and at least some of them, it is suggested, belong to the third kind of knowledge. (shrink)

Utjecajni Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon Christiana Gottlieba Jöchera u svom trećem svesku sadržava natuknicu o filozofu Frani Petriću. Izuzevši dvojbe o mjestu rođenja, Jöcherovi su podaci točni, ali oskudni. Da bi se ustanovilo kojim je podacima raspolagao ili mogao raspolagati njemački leksikograf, proučeni su Jöcherovi izvori. Od njih devet, koje je Jöcher popisao na kraju svoje natuknice o Petriću, njemački se leksikograf poslužio samo djelom Les Eloges des hommes savans Antoinea Teissiera i drugim izdanjem rječnika Dictionaire historique et critique Pierra Baylea. Najstariji (...) i najmlađi među Jöcherovim izvorima, Elogia illustrium Belgii scriptorum Auberta Le Mirea i Mémoires Jean-Pierrea Nicerona, nemaju ni retka o Petriću. Ostalih pet Jöcherovih izvora sadržavaju vrijedne podatke o Petriću, ali se Jöcher njima nije poslužio.The third volume of the authoritative Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon , compiled by Christian Gottlieb Jöcher, contains an entry on the philosopher Frane Petrić. Apart from Petrić’s obscure place of birth, Jöcher’s data, if scarce, are correct. In order to establish the information that had been or may have been available to the German lexicographer, Jöcher’s sources have been traced. Out of the nine sources Jöcher listed at the end of his entry on Petrić, the German lexicographer consulted only the work Les Eloges des hommes savans by Antoine Teissier and the second edition of the Dictionaire historique et critique by Pierre Bayle. The oldest and most recent among Jöcher’s sources, Elogia illustrium Belgii scriptorum by Aubert Le Mire and Mémoires by Jean-Pierre Niceron, make no reference to Petrić. Although the remaining five sources contain valuable information on Petrić, Jöcher failed to consult them. (shrink)

Sostendremos en este artículo que las palabras, lejos de ser un obstáculo a remover en su impulso racionalista, como se deduce de los análisis de Stuart Hampshire o de David Savan, son dentro de la filosofía de Baruch Spinoza un problema no sólo metodológico sino político de primer orden. Las palabras no sólo dan morada al sentido y al sinsentido comunitarios, sino a la misma verdad, a la vez que su análisis a lo largo de la obra del filósofo holandés (...) permite visualizar con claridad el orden político favorecido por el autor: un orden de comunicación que se contrapone a la existencia de una autoridad arbitraria, encargada en términos monopólicos de la definición histórica del sentido y del contenido de la verdad, al interior de la comunidad. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions THE UNITY OF WISDOM AND TEMPERANCE The attempt of Socrates to establish the unity of the virtues has long been an object of philosophic suspicion. Particular attention has been directed to the argument at Protagoras 332a-333b, in which Socrates seeks to demonstrate the unity of wisdom and temperance, by showing that they must be identified as the contrary of folly. The argument proceeds on the assumption (...) that wisdom and temperance are distinct, and so terminates in a contradiction between 'Whatever admits of a contrary admits of one only' and 'Folly, which is one thing, has two contraries, wisdom and temperance.' Scholars have generally rejected Socrates' proof of the second of the contradictory propositions. However, in a recent paper, Professor David Savan has claimed that the contradiction is derived in a formally valid way from premisses which either need no argument or are accepted by Protagoras} My intent in this paper is to cast doubt on this claim, and so to restore the status quo. According to the critics, the weak point in the argument is Socrates' defence of the statement 'Foolish acts and temperate acts are contraries.' But Saran holds that this statement follows from three conditionals, all stated by Socrates and accepted by Protagoras. These conditionals, referred to by Savan as F G and H, will here be termed P1-3. P1 If an act is right and advantageous, then it is temperate. Symbolically: (r.a) D t P2 If an act is wrong, then it is foolish. w~f P3 If an act is foolish, then it is not temperate. fD -t From these, Saran argues, "it follows that 'An act is right' and 'An act is temperate ' are truth functionallyequivalent, as are 'An act is wrong' and 'An act is foolish'.... Since right and wrong are either contraries or contradictories, temperate and foolish acts must also be either contraries or contradictories" (p. 24). Savan then argues that Protagoras, on the basis of his remarks earlier in the dialogue, must take right and wrong to be contradictories, so that temperate and foolish actions are also contradictories, rather than contraries. I want first to consider whether the material equivalences alleged to follow from P1-3 do in fact follow. They may be symbolized: Clr~t C2w =f It is immediately clear that neither C1 nor C2 follows from P1-3. But this is not surprising, because some expression of the relation between 'right' and 'wrong' 1D. Saran, "Socrates'Logic and the Unity of Wisdom and Temperance," in R. J. Butler (ed.), AnalyticalPhilosophy,2nd series(Oxford: BasilBlackwell,1965),pp. 20-26. [157] 158 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY must appear among the premises. Since Savan raises the question whether 'right' and 'wrong' are contraries or contradictories only after he claims to establish C1 and C2, we may suppose that the argument should hold whichever relation we assume. If 'right' and 'wrong' are contraries we add the premise: P4A r D --w And ifthey are contradictorieswe add the stronger premise: P4B r -- --w But neither C1 nor C2 follows from PI-3 together with either P4A or P4B. However, it may be urged, the argument fails only because 'advantageous' has been treated as an independent term. P1 should be replaced by: PI* r ~ t We now find that PI*-3 and P4B are sufficientto derive C1 and C2. But PI*-3 and P4A do not suffice.The most we can establish, using only P4A, is the disjunction : C1 vC2r -- t-v-w -- f And this is useless for the purposes of Socrates' argument. One further way of strengthening the premises might be suggested. Instead of dropping 'advantageous' from the argument, one might take it as related both to 'right' and to 'foolish.' That is, one might introduce additional premises from the pairs: P5A r ~ a P5B r - a and: P6A a D -f P6B a ---- -f P5A, added to P1-3 and P4B, will suffice for the derivation of C1 and C2. But no combination of premises not including P4B will do; from P1-3, P4A, P5B and P6B, one can derive C1 but not C2. It is, therefore, necessary to modify Savan's claim in two fairly important... (shrink)

BOOK REVIEWS 461 Edwin Curley's "Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece: Spinoza and the Science of Hermeneutics" takes as its starting point Savan's claim that Spinoza is the "founder of scientific hermeneutics." Rejccting the most extreme interpretation of this claim -- i.e., that Spinoza created scientific hermeneutics ex nihilo -- Curlcy carefully compares Spi- noza's contributions to Biblical criticism with those of Hobbes and Isaac La Peyr~re, and concludes that Spinoza's work possesses, in addition to a generally higher level of hermeneutical (...) rigor, something quite specific that they do not -- namely, "a well worked-out theory of what is required for the interpretation of a text." This theory demands that we begin by applying to textual interpretation the Cartesian strategy of "removing all prejudices" and preconceptions; doing so allows us to interpret a text such as the Bible in the light of a "natural history," drawn from the resources of the text itself. Curley's essay is essential reading for anyone interested in hermencutics, Biblical criticism, Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, or Spinoza's general philoso- phy of science. Manfred Walthcr's related essay focuses more narrowly on a case in which the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus appears to violate its own requirement that scripture be interpreted through scripture itself. That case is the treatment of miracles, the Biblical reports of which Spinoza seems to discount on external and.. (shrink)

This book arose from the author’s recent dissertation written under the Gerhard Schonrich at Munich. It focuses on Peirce’s theory of categories and his epistemology. According to Baltzer, what is distinctive in Peirce’s theory of knowledge is that he reconstrues objects as “knots in networks of relations.” The phrase may ring a bell. It suggests a structuralist interpretation of Peirce, influenced by the Munich environs. The study aims to shows how Peirce’s theory of categories supports his theory of knowledge and (...) how “question concerning a priori structures of knowledge” are transformed within this relational framework. A chief critical target is David Savan’s semiotics, specifically the idea that “the multiplicity of development of the categories” is “conditioned by nothing but the indefiniteness of the categories.”1 But in contrast with this, if there is any indefiniteness in the categories, they cannot fully direct their own application, and this is to say regarding them “that our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum...”2 If the doctrine of continuity applies to the categories, they also have a continuum to swim in. (shrink)

(Also titled "A Place for Peirce's Categories?"in Meaning without Analyticity.) This book arose from the author’s recent dissertation written under the Gerhard Schönrich at Munich. It focuses on Peirce’s theory of categories and his epistemology. According to Baltzer, what is distinctive in Peirce’s theory of knowledge is that he reconstrues objects as “knots in networks of relations.” The phrase may ring a bell. It suggests a structuralist interpretation of Peirce, influenced by the Munich environs. The study aims to shows how (...) Peirce’s theory of categories supports his theory of knowledge and how “question concerning a priori structures of knowledge” are transformed within this relational framework. A chief critical target is David Savan’s semiotics, specifically the idea that “the multiplicity of development of the categories” is “conditioned by nothing but the indefiniteness of the categories.” But in contrast with this, if there is any indefiniteness in the categories, they cannot fully direct their own application, and this is to say regarding them “that our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum...” If the doctrine of continuity applies to the categories, they also have a continuum to swim in. (shrink)

460 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 Graeme Hunter, editor. Spinoza: The Enduring Questions. Toronto: University of To- ronto Press, 1994. Pp. xi + 182. Cloth, $70.00. This volume of eight essays is dedicated to the memory of the late David Savan, and originated from a conference held in his honor prior to his untimely death. The lead essay is by Savan himself, and most of the other essays acknowledge the influence of his work. The first three (...) essays address not only an "enduring question," but a question about enduring: namely, the nature of eternality and immortality in Spinoza's metaphysics. In a dense and detailed essay that amply rewards close analysis, Savan aims to clarify Spinoza's conception of eternity. That conception, Savan argues, cannot be identified with any of the three main conceptions dominant in previous philosophizing: eternity as sempiternity; eternity as Platonic timelessness; and eternity as neces- sary existence, following from a thing's own essence. Chief among his.. (shrink)

In general, the eleven, previously unpublished papers are not as strong as those in the first series. Bromberger attempts to detail the necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being an explanation; Anscombe offers some provocative but inconclusive remarks on the intentionality of sensation; Malpas examines some criteriological puzzles which arise in considering the location of sound as a bit of unlearned perceptual behavior. The rest of the papers are second order assessments and attacks upon positions maintained by other analytical philosophers. (...) Of these Putnam's attack on Malcolm's brand of behaviorism and Butler's attempted dissolution of Goodman's "grue" paradox make their points most effectively. Moravcsik contends, against Strawson, that events are at least as primitive in our conceptual scheme as physical bodies. Wiggins questions some Fregean analyses of the logic of identity-statements; taking off from Strawson, Woods distinguishes a principle of individuation from a criterion of identity and attempts to clarify their separate but related roles by an analysis of the sorts of questions that require their use in giving answers. Rundle is concerned to modify certain Quinean answers to paradoxes of tense requirements that arise in the quantification of modal statements; Savan questions Vlastos' ascription of fallacies to the Socratic argument on the unity of Wisdom and Temperance in the Protagoras. Finally, Shorter points out the general inconclusiveness of "transformational analysis" by exhibiting specific shortcomings of Vendler's analysis of causality in the first volume of this series.—E. A. R. (shrink)