Para abordar a questão moral do aborto de fetos sem cérebro, inicialmente são apresentados e considerados insatisfatórios dois argumentos que defendem a punição para a gestante que aborta: a sacralidade da vida e a atribuição ao feto do caráter de “pessoa”. Em seguida, são apresentados e considerados satisfatórios quatro argumentos contra a punição da gestante: a morte certa do feto, o caráter terapêutico e não-eugênico do aborto, o sofrimento, sem fi nalidade evidente, dos envolvidos na situação e o direito da (...) mulher sobre seu corpo. Na terceira seção, discutem-se as exigências da compaixão. Chega-se à conclusão de que abortar ou não fetos anencefálicos deve ser uma decisão individual, não coletiva, que deveria ser tomada por cada mulher, e não pelo Estado democrático e então imposta às mulheres. A mulher tem o direito moral tanto de continuar quanto de interromper a gravidez de fetos anencefálicos. To approach the moral issue of the abortion of anencephalic fetuses, we fi rstly present and consider unsatisfactory two arguments for the punishment of the pregnant woman who makes an abortion: that of the sanctity of life and of the attribution of the status of a person to the fetus. After that, we present and consider satisfactory four arguments against the punishment of the pregnant woman: the certain death of the fetus, the therapeutic and non-eugenic character of the abortion, the inutility of the suffering brought by the situation to the woman and other people and the woman’s right over her body. On the third section, we discuss the demands for compassion. The conclusion is that the decision about the abortion of anencephalic fetuses should be an individual decision and not a collective one; it should be made by each woman, not by the democratic Estate and then imposed on women. The woman has the right of interrupting and of continuing the pregnancy of an anencephalic fetus. (shrink)

Regulatory approach to the right to abortion in Europe is diverse and basically related to the issue of when the right to life begins and how this question is reflected in national legislation. Such an approach and diversity is tolerated by the European Court of Human Rights, but only if some specific standards and criteria formulated in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights are reflected in national legislation. Research of the Lithuanian legal acts conducted in the light (...) of the jurisprudence of the Court shows that they are not in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the solutions are therefore suggested. The aim of the article is to systematically analyse the Lithuanian legal acts regulating issues of abortion and to identify the existing problems and provide suggestions as to how to solve those problems with the help of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in abortion cases. Analysis of the Lithuanian legal acts reveals that the existing legal regulation and practice is confusing and ambiguous. Abortion questions are regulated in Lithuania by means of secondary legislation, namely by order of the Health Minister which is more than 15 years old, and the classification of diseases dangerous to woman’s health and life is based on international classification that is invalid. The order is not in reconciled with the Lithuanian criminal law. Some other ambiguities and problems are identified in the article. Abortion on a woman’s request in Lithuania is possible by the end of the 12 week of pregnancy and during the entire pregnancy, if it causes danger to woman’s health and life. The Lithuanian legislator requires that both conditions – danger to woman’s health and life – are met in order to terminate pregnancy what is unnecessary and sometimes even confusing. The author suggests providing two separate bases for abortion – danger to woman’s life or health. Foetus problems – if a foetus is irreversibly damaged or suffering from an incurable life-threatening disease, it is not a separate basis for abortion in Lithuania, however those abnormalities of the foetus are related to the health and life of a pregnant woman. In the opinion of the author, looking into the practice of the other EU countries, it is better to provide a separate ground for abortion because of abnormalities of the foetus. The basic problem in Lithuania that is similar in Poland and in Ireland is that there is no clear procedure in case a pregnant woman is not satisfied with the decision of the medical commission regarding the question of her abortion or if the opinion of members of the commission is diverse – no time guidance or appeal institution is provided. (shrink)

This article investigates the use of natural law in biolaw from the specific perspective of an attorney practising before the European Court of Human Rights. Starting from an exploration of the question of who is a human and thereby to be protected under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particular emphasis is placed on the right to life under Art. 2(1) ECHR. It is shown that natural law can – and should – impact the interpretation of the European Convention (...) on Human Rights and that concrete consequences follow from this approach, most notably the requirement to ensure that every human being, including the unborn, is actively protected as concerns the right to life. (shrink)