Zájem současné sociologie a dalších společenských věd o výzkumy spokojenosti a štěstí zatemňuje skutečnost, že původně právě sociologie chtěla „štěstí" poskytovat a nahrazovat tak náboženské přístupy ke světu. Tento implicitně nábo- ženský charakter je patrný i v rané české sociologii v dílech prvních propagátorů sociologie, jako byl především Emanuel Makovička, a později u některých následovníků a epigonů T. G. Masaryka, v meziválečném období zejména u Ladislava Kunteho, R. I. Malého, Alexandra Sommera-Batěka, Jindřicha Fleischnera a Jana Duška. Z hlediska vývoje české (...) sociologie šlo o zcela okrajové postavy, ačkoli mnohé z nich vynikly v jiných oblastech, jako celek jsou nicméně vyjádřením jednoho z aspektů dobových teoretických úvah o společnosti, jejím uspořádání a vývoji, na který by nemělo být zapomínáno. Zatímco T. G. Masaryka a pozdější akademické sociology „omezoval" vědecký charakter jejich práce, a i pokud směřovali k sociálnímu reformismu, oddělovali jej od teoretické sociologie, „sociologie vedoucí ke štěstí" nalezla plné uplatnění ve vizích a ambiciózních projek- tech těchto amatérských takésociologů - třebaže skončily faktickými nezdary nebo ani nedošly praktického naplnění, ostatně stejně jako v případě jejich pravzoru, Comtova pozitivistického apoštolátu. (shrink)

Âlemin zaman içinde vücûda gelip gelmediğine dair tartışma düşünce tarihinde kadim bir geçmişe sahiptir. Platon öncesi döneme kadar izleri sürülen söz konusu tartışma İslâm düşünce tarihinde de önemli bir yer işgal eder. Kelam ile felsefe ekolleri arasında cereyan eden münazaralarda kelamcılar, âlemin yokluğu üzerinde bir zaman geçtikten sonra yaratıldığını ileri sürerken filozoflar ise Allah’ın âlemden zamansal olarak değil zatî bir öncelikle mukaddem olduğunu savunurlar. Klasik dönem sonrası devam eden tartışmalarda probleme dair yeni çözümler ortaya konulmuştur. Bu makale klasik dönem sonrası (...) İslam felsefesinin önemli simalarından biri olan Molla Sadrâ’nın hudûs anlayışını konu almaktadır. Kendinden önceki hudûs yaklaşımlarını değerlendiren Molla Sadrâ, hareket-i cevherî teorisi bağlamında probleme yeni bir yorum getirir. Hareket ve zamanı, seyyal varlığın birer boyutu olarak gören Sadrâ’ya göre hareketin bizzat kendisi anlamına gelen yaratmanın olmadığı mevhum bir zamanın varlığı söz konusu olamaz. Bu anlamda âlem, öncesinde yokluk olan muayyen bir zaman diliminde yaratıldığı anlamda hâdis değil, yaratmanın zaman mecrasında gerçekleştiği anlamda hâdistir. Metafiziğin en girift meselelerinden biri olan bu problem hakkında Molla Sadrâ’nın yorumu kelamcılar ile filozoflar arasında kısırdöngüye dönüşen tartışmalarda bir uzlaştırma ve inkişaf sadedinde görülebilir. (shrink)

This study focuses on the value of the logical universal in terms of being universal in the philosophy of Avicenna, and al-Ghazālī’s criticisms of Avicenna in the context of the logical universal. A philosophical analysis of al-Ghazālī’s criticisms of Avicenna is made by mentioning how these two thinkers explained the universal and its types, and by revealing the meaning that the universal corresponds to in their thought system. Accordingly, Avicenna talks about three types of universal. The intercourse between these universals (...) is based on an intrinsic relation. The one that determines this kind of relationship and gives a principle has to be an outsider of the universals. According to Avicenna the concept of being determines the meaning of universals and the personal relationship between universal types. In this respect, the rational universal is the reasonable of the universal; the rational universal may be necessary for the logical universal. Therefore, the concept of universal in Avicenna is related to existence. In al-Ghazālī’s thought, we can talk about three types of the universal. He does not name the types of the universal, but distinguishes them by describing them. In his distinction, the concept of partnership is considered in terms of being actual and potential, and being is divided based on these conceptual distinctions. In this respect, we cannot talk about a random distinction between the meaning attributed to universals by Avicenna and by al-Ghazālī but an inherent difference. Based on this separation, al-Ghazālī’s criticisms of Avicenna are also of a essential nature. One of the clearest signs of al-Ghazālī’s criticism of Avicenna lies in the meaning he attributes to the logical universal and the example he gives in the context of the logical universal. al-Ghazālī considers the logical universal as a meaning that does not accept commonality in terms of potential and actual, and attributes the commonality in it to a reason other than what it is. While Avicenna agrees that the meaning that al-Ghazālī’s attributes to the logical universal, saying that it is outside of approval, clearly emphasizes being the subject of conceptualization. al-Ghazālī, on the other hand, ignored this reference of Avicenna and emphasized that Avicenna would accept this, based on the example of “divine/dieu” he gave in the context of the logical universal. However, in Avicenna's philosophical system, it is not possible for the word "divine" to be the subject of imagination, because the “god” is not conceived, but perceived. According to him, the things which are the subjects of imagination potentially contain multiplicity. But the word "god” is not suitable to be the subject of imagination as it is a necessary being. In this respect, it can be analyzed whether al-Ghazālī’s criticisms are austere or nonsense in terms of the five arts (sophistry). The meaning that al-Ghazālī attributed to the logical universal and the examples he gave for this meaning constitute the inherent quality of his criticisms being of the kind of fallacy. (shrink)

The matter of ḥusn (goodness) and qubḥ (evil), which is the result of the disagreements on the source of moral value in human actions, is one of the main disputes between the Sunnī schools and the Muʿtazilī school of theology. This study examines the reasons why Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī, the Ash‘arī scholar, argues that the values of the ḥusn- qubḥ in actions are relative (i‘tibārī) against to the Mu‘tazilī school that considers these values to be inherent in actions. According to (...) the Ash‘arīs, and specifically al-Āmidī, if the actions make people worth of either praise in this world and reward (thawāb) in afterlife or blame in this world and punishment in afterlife, those actions are named as ḥasan (good) or qabīḥ (bad). Therefore, if the action of a person provides him/her praise in this world and reward in afterlife, the action is called ḥasan. If an action necessitates condemnation in this world and punishment in the afterlife, the action is called qabīḥ. The moral values in actions can only be determined by the Sharī‘a. In other words, human reason cannot know which actions are included in the category of ḥasan and qabīḥ. In addition to their contentious meanings in the doctrine, ḥasan and qabīḥ have two more meanings. The first one is the suitability and contrariety to the purpose or disposition while the second one is the agent’s right of doing any given action. However, there is no debate about these two meanings. (shrink)