The purpose of this article is to discuss the criminalization of conduct based on human dignity arguments. It proposes a modest version of integrating human dignity into discussions about criminalization. After a critical examination of both the notion of “human dignity as an objective value” and the assumption that the meaning of human dignity can be explained by referring to Kant’s moral philosophy, human dignity violations are characterized as severe humiliations.

The article examines whether state officials may shoot down a hijacked airplane which carries uninvolved passengers, if it is known that the plane will be used against the lives of other human beings. In its first sections, it explains the German Federal Constitutional Court’s verdict against such a permission, and it scrutinizes the crucial arguments in this ruling. The author then extends the discussion beyond the path taken by the court. She examines the defensive claims of passengers aboard the plane (...) and the protective claims of potential victims who are present at the hijackers’ target zone. In contrast to the German Federal Constitutional Court, she concludes that state officials must take the claims of both groups of potential victims equally serious, and that such conditions allow applying a consequentialist calculus because it is the only way out of a genuine dilemma. (shrink)

In this article, I comment on Simester and von Hirsch’s theory of criminalization and discuss general principles of criminalization. After some brief comments on punishment theories and the role of moral wrongdoing, I examine main lines of contemporary criminalization theories which tend to focus on the issues of harm, offense, paternalism and side-constraints. One of the points of disagreement with Simester and von Hirsch concerns the role of the harm principle. I rely on a straightforward normative concept of “rights of (...) others,” not in the sense of rights granted in positive law but in the sense of rights which are to be justified in political philosophy. With a rights-centered rather than a harm-centered approach, a prima facie reason for criminalization is the violation of others’ rights. It is unnecessary to develop a separate category of “offense to others,” and paternalistic interventions can be criticized straightforwardly because rights can be waived. (shrink)

Definition of the problem The article asks whether vaccination status could become relevant if it is unavoidable to prioritize between patients in intensive care units during a pandemic. The aim is to analyze different approaches and arguments in favor of and against the inclusion of vaccination status. Arguments The following arguments are assessed: First, it has been argued that it is unnecessary to open this discussion. Second, one could make the point that public debates about touchy subjects should be avoided. (...) A third, frequently expressed opinion claims that physicians must never discriminate between vaccinated and unvaccinated patients, either because this is in conflict with human rights or because this is incompatible with the general principle that patients’ prior conduct does not matter. Fourth, behavioral economists argue that intensive care medicine should take vaccination status into account with the goal to improve the overall numbers of vaccinations. A fifth line of thinking argues that it is more just to take vaccination into account. Conclusion The author concludes that the omission to get a necessary and recommended vaccination may be taken into account if patients’ prospects to survive are similar. She points out that lotteries would be worse. (shrink)