How to deal with the ever more complex religious relationships is not only a significant issue for Chinese central government and the Communist Party but also a cutting-edge topic for the religious academy at home and abroad. Based on the review of the latest internationally acknowledged four theoretical orientations, namely religious market model, religious ecological model, religious compatibilism, and religious praxism, this article proposes an innovated framework, positive orientating theory of Chinese religious relations. The author intends to explore more (...) active thoughts on theories and policies that would particularly reflect on and align with the typical characteristics of religious relationships in Chinese context. Contribution: Based on the review of the latest internationally acknowledged four theoretical orientations, namely religious market model, religious ecological model, religious compatibilism, and religious praxism, this article proposes an innovated framework, positive orientating theory of Chinese religious relations. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. (...) To the extent that one’s considered judgments agree with those of the folk (or to the extent that one is unwilling to contravene widespread judgments), this constitutes a strong prima facie case against neo-Ryleanism. (shrink)

The philosophical roots of Malinowski's functionalism are in the academic circles of Krakow, where three figures seem to have exerted a particularly strong influence: Pawlicki, Straszewski, and Heinrich. The predominant trend in philosophy at that time was empiriocriticism, as developed by Mach and Avenarius. Also important were F. A. Lange's interpretation of Marburg neo-Kantianism. It should be noted that the historical philosophy field was extremely broad and diverse. Functionalism, a philosophically open concept, cannot be subordinated to any one philosophical system, (...) although the "openness" of functionalism is not absolute but complemented by its "closedness" to certain other philosophies. Praxism pervades functionalist theory and even creates its foundation. Malinowski approach is entirely scientific, but functionalism is never just empirical. Malinowski realized that pure experience is as impossible as pure reasoning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:132 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Wittgenstein occasionally lapse into philosophical theorizing of a kind congenial to Ayer. It is certainly true that their disciples do. But one does have to appreciate the fact that the main thrust of their arguments is to deny the propriety of raising such philosophical questions at all. If it was Ayer's intention to vindicate Moore and RuSsell as proponents of a certain conception of philosophy, (...) he must meet that challenge. He has failed to do so. And this, in a sense, affects his book as a piece of history. A few years ago a disciple from the "other camp" wrote a book Philosophical Analysis covering much the same ground covered by Ayer in this book. One might think that Urmson's advocacy might adversely affect the fairness of his treatment. And in a sense, here and there it does. But as an over-all picture of the drift of English philosophy it is much the better history, since Urmson sees what happened in the course of time to the views of men like Russell and Moore. Ayer's book, in contrast, should not be read or thought of as history, but as part of the past to be examined. A. R. I.oucH Claremont Graduate School Verit~ e Interpretazione. By Luigi Pareyson. (Mllano: U. Mursia and Co., 1971. Pp. 260. Life 3800) This study by the eminent director of the Institute of philosophy at the University of Turin is not an epistemological essay on truth but basically a historical study, a sustained effort of defending traditional philosophy against the inroads of "ideology," of scientism, of fideism and "panpolificism" which in usurping the place due to philosophy proper lead to political and religious fanaticism. "Ideology" is the main target of Pareyson's assault which he considers as converting thought into a mere instrumentality of action, a sort of "praxism." There are according to Pareyson two kinds of philosophical thought: the genuine one which is revelatory and tries to penetrate truth and the expressive one which is not more than an emotional and temporary expression or reaction to an existent historical situation. This emotive and expressive thought can also be identified with what is called "ideology" of Marxist or nonMarxist kind. It is on the basis of such a distinction that Pareyson would construct a new kind of philosophical historiography. Pareyson calls any recognized relationship between man and world a sort of interpretation. He first used this concept in the aesthetic field but after a study of Heidegger, Dilthey and Jaspers generalized it to become a means of reconciling the existence of a multiplicity of philosophical systems with the basic unity of philosophical thought aiming at truth--as against ideology which has no such aim. We see in the philosophies of the past that they are all personal and rooted in their own historical time, yet they are ultra-temporal and it is necessary to consider their historical setting, but also their speculative content. Schelling was a philosopher of this import, especially in his second period. He then not only anticipated but surpassed Heidegger's merely negative ontology. Pareyson calls his philosophy ontological personalism. True philosophies always mean a personal link with true being. If Heidegger remained within the confines of negative ontology, it is because he confused the inexhaustibility of truth with its ineffability. Our culture is characterized by an integral historicism which is very different from classical historicism--such as for instance the one practiced by Hegel. According to integral historicism a philosophy has merely the meaning of being the expression BOOK REVIEWS 133 of its time and nothing beyond that, while in classical historicism every philosophy was a step in the progressive manifestation of truth not only a historical phenomenon. As a result it iustified not only a historicist treatment but also a speculative discussion of its truth-content. These genuine philosophies may be nonetheless rooted in their own time as we all are, but in philosophy as in life everybody is confronted with a decision whether he wants to be merely a part of history or whether he wants to have history, i.e. also to have the link with true being. Pareyson... (shrink)