This essay was completed in January 2016 and accepted for publication in a collection on occasionalism by Nazif Muhtaroglu. It attempts to update the doctrine of occasionalism to make it independent of theism and fit better with contemporary physics and a modern understanding of causation. We find that modern physics provides an avenue to support the essential core of occasionalism.

This article offers a way of approaching the question of causality in Ibn ʿ Arabī’s relational and processual metaphysical system. Ibn ʿ Arabī’s metaphysics is relational in the sense that entities are perceived as the totality of their relationships to God. The Divine Names are theological categories denoting these relations. It is processual in that it perceives the world as the multiplicity of the incessant and ever-changing process of the manifestations of the divine qualities. The world is recreated anew at (...) each moment and entities are societies of divine acts or theophanies. In this framework, causal power is attributed to God and causality describes the regularity and predictability of the related theophanic individualities. The article, then, turns to examine how Ibn ʿArabī presents a participatory account of freedom in accordance with his understanding of causality. The paper, first, briefly summarizes different accounts of causality offered by Muslim theologians and philosophers before Ibn ʿArabī. The second section introduces some relevant aspects of Ibn ʿArabī’s metaphysics for our discussion and rethinks the question of causality within this larger framework. The third section discusses the question of freedom and responsibility of the moral agents. Finally, the paper offers a comparative examination of Ibn ʿArabī’s theory of causality. (shrink)

In this volume, Ozgur Koca offers a comprehensive survey of Islamic accounts of causality and freedom from the medieval to the modern era, as well as contemporary relevance. His book is an invitation for Muslims and non-Muslims to explore a rich, but largely forgotten, aspect of Islamic intellectual history. Here, he examines how key Muslim thinkers, such as Ibn Sina, Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Arabi, Suhrawardi, Jurjani, Mulla Sadra and Nursi, among others, conceptualized freedom in the created order as an (...) extension of their perception of causality. Based on this examination, Koca identifies and explores some of the major currents in the debate on causality and freedom. He also discusses the possible implications of Muslim perspectives on causality for contemporary debates over religion and science. (shrink)

The article examines Ibn Sīnā’s account of necessity and freedom both in God and in the created order. The first part of the article argues that Ibn Sīnā attempts to reconcile seemingly contradictory notions of divine freedom and divine necessity on the premise that if there is necessity in the First this comes solely from ontological, moral, and intellectual perfection and not from an external source or principle, or an internal desire to realize an unrealized potentiality. The First acts, necessarily (...) and voluntarily, in conformity with Its perfection. Hence, the First’s acts may be described as simultaneously necessary-cum-voluntary. The article then, in light of the previous discussion, turns to examine how Ibn Sīnā establishes freedom in the created order. The second part of the article focuses on the notion of existence and how Ibn Sīnā’s distinction between physical and metaphysical causality leads to the idea that the ‘gift’ of existence grounds freedom in entities. The third section examines his construction of essences as uncaused and eternal objects of the divine knowledge. The First knows and existentiates essences in accordance with Its knowledge, but It does not determine what they are. The idea that there is no cause for an entity to be what kind of entity it is in the First’s knowledge further affirms the idea of freedom in the created order. (shrink)

This study aims to critically compare and contrast the views of Ibn Arabi and Whitehead on God, the world, and the relationship between the two. I argue that there are significant overlaps in their systems that are sufficient to start a scholarly and enriching dialogue between the two thinkers. Both seem to envisage the world as a continuum of events, as a process. They also appear to agree that the primordial nature of God includes all potentialities that are also the (...) metaphysical principles that ground regularity in a world that is otherwise defined by pure change. The concept of relationality lies at the core of their conception of the God-world relationship and of the relationships of entities with each other. We can also see an emphasis on God's immanence without losing the distinction between God and the world. They both hold that God can be best understood by bringing antitheses together They make similar distinctions between God's primordial and consequent natures. The article also alludes to points of divergence between the two thinkers. These divergences do not exclude the possibility of a dialogue, but, in contrast, render the interaction between the two a meaningful and enriching one. (shrink)