This is the first book to examine behavioral theories on social preference from institutional and philosophical perspectives using economic experiments. The experimental method in economics has challenged central behavioral assumptions based on rationality and selfishness, proposing empirical evidence that not only profit seeking but also social preferences matter in individuals' decision making. By performing distribution experiments in institutional contexts, the author extends assumptions about human behavior to understand actual social economy. The book also aims to enrich behavioral theories of economics (...) directed toward institutional evolution. The author scrutinizes how specific institutional conditions enhance or mute individuals' selfish incentives or their fairness ideals such as egalitarian, performance-based, labor-value radicalism or libertarianism. From experimental results and their analysis, implications for actual problems in social economy and institutional change are derived: why performance-based pay often fails to promote workers' productivity; why labor wages decline whereas shareholder's values increase after financialization; and whether socially responsible investment can be a social institution for corporate governance. The book is also addressed to philosophers of social sciences interested in how experimental methods can contribute to developing cognition of human behaviors and be extended to social theories. Referring to behavioral theorists in the history of economic thought, the author discusses the meanings of experiments in the methodology of social sciences. She also proposes new ways of interpreting experimental results by reviving historic social theories and applying them to actual social problems. (shrink)

Excessive dog barking is among the leading sources of noise pollution world-wide; however, the reasons for the annoyance of barking to people remained uninvestigated. Our questions were: is the annoyance rating affected by the acoustic parameters of barks; does the attributed inner state of the dog and the nuisance caused by its barks correlate; does the gender and country of origin affect the subjects’ sensitivity to barking. Participants from Hungary (N = 100) and Brazil (N = 60) were tested with (...) sets of 27 artificial bark sequences. Subjects rated each bark according to the inner state of the dog and the annoyance caused by the particular bark. Subjects from both countries found high-pitched barks the most annoying: however, harsh, fast-pulsing, low-pitched barks were also unpleasant. Men found high-pitched barks more annoying than the women did. Annoyance ratings showed positive correlation with assumed negative inner states of the dog, positive emotional ratings showed negative correlation with the annoyance level. This is the first indication that acoustic features that were selected for effective vocal signalling may be annoying for human listeners. Among the explanations for this effect the role of affective communication and similar bioacoustics of particular animal vocalizations and baby cries are discussed. (shrink)

In talks given early in the 1990s, Jean-Michel Grandmont (1998) introduced the concept of the self-fulfilling mistake. This phenomenon can emerge when economic agents cannot distinguish between randomness and determinism, a situation that can occur when the underlying true dynamics are chaotic (Radunskaya, 1994), although such a situation could arise with other forms of complex nonlinear dynamics besides those involving chaotic dynamics. In such a situation, agents may be unable to discern the true dynamics and may adopt simple, boundedly rational (...) “rules of thumb” based on some kind of backward-looking adaptive expectations (Bullard, 1994). For certain kinds of underlying processes, agents may be able to mimic the actual dynamics with such an “incorrect” behavioral rule, an outcome known as a consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE), a concept formalized by Hommes (1998) as meaning that the two processes have identical means and also autocorrelation coefficients at all leads and lags. Sorger (1998) and Hommes and Sorger (1998) have shown how in some cases agents can learn to converge on such CEEs, or self-fulfillingly mistaken behavior. These models all involve discrete dynamics. The first realization that a discrete chaotic dynamic could be mimicked by a simple linear autocorrelation function is due to Bunow and Weiss (1979) and Sakai and Tokumaru (1980), the latter demonstrating the possibility for the case of the asymmetric tent map, a result studied in more depth by Brock and Dechert (1991) and Radunskaya (1994). (shrink)