The present paper attempts to explore and problematize some of the prominent sides of Nietzsche’s understanding of truth from a critical point of view. Nietzsche’s conception of truth is modeled on the parameters of scientific relations to the world. Truth, on this assumption, is the function of objectifying reason and is grounded in the agreement between facts and propositions. When Nietzsche questions the value of truth and downplays it, he actually does that from the perspective of thus understood truth. Nietzsche (...) also believes that the supremacy of truth in life leads to nihilism as is very much the case in the modern world and proposes Dionysian art as a remedy against truth. This reductive view of truth, I argue, proves incapable of doing justice to the multi-faceted function of truth in all spheres of human life including science and art. A more fundamental view of truth is required not only to ground the workings of objectifying reason but also to defend the value of art. Truth is actually embedded, intrinsic and operative in the immediate context of human existence (what Heidegger calls “being-in-the-world”) and derives all its uses from this living context. This meaningful context as the realm of truth is the beginning of human being. It is the ground in which the artist stands and produces. It is thus what lends value and meaning to the work of art. It is likewise what makes it possible for scientific propositions to agree with facts. (shrink)