At first sight, while taking into account the harmony of sensible reality, relation would seem to be a fundamental category of Plotinian thought. However, when one considers the references within the Enneades to relation, one discovers that this way of being should remain excluded from the supersensible realm and that, in last analysis, it only represents a weak surrogate within the sensible world for the unity proper to intelligible reality. The connection between the hypostases and between them and sensitive reality (...) cannot be explained by means of relation. (shrink)

The article attempts to answer the question raised by Aristotle in NE I, 4 1096 b 26 by presenting, in a synthetic way, the meaning and scope of homonymy in Aristotle’s thought. The categorial argument deployed by Aristotle to criticize Plato’s position regarding the good is subsequently analyzed. However, that argument does not lead to affirm conclusively the real homonymy of the good, as Aristotle himself seems to admit. The fact that the good appears in diverse domains of reality does (...) not assure its polivocity, which is a necessary condition for homonymy. Besides, the article points out the meaning of analogy with regards to the good. Next, it analyzes the argument that seems to be critical to assure the polivocity of the good and its relative homonymy, the argument in which the distinction between the good in itself and the good for the sake of another good is grounded. Thus admitted the relative homonymy of the good — without excluding its analogical relationship —, the article attempts to understand the real answer — not indicated by Aristotle — to the question regarding the way in which the good is predicated; the answer, which is circumscribed to the practical sphere, would be that only for the virtuous person is the good a homonym reality related to a first good, happiness. (shrink)

Just after my return from a symposium at the University of Navarre on the dialogue between faith and culture in Christian antiquity, I had the opportunity to read Peroli's book. His approach is strikingly in accord with many of the claims made at Navarre. The overall approach of his study may be summed up with the following words: early Christian thought effected an authentic inculturation, [[sic]] not just by expressing the faith in the dominant philosophical categories of the time, but (...) by transforming those very categories in order to rationally express Christian belief. This is precisely the core achievement of the philosophical anthropology of Gregory of Nissa. St. Gregory actively fed upon neo-Platonism. He made use of Platonic/neo-platonic thought in order to demonstrate the rationality of Christian faith, even in those areas of reflection where the faith might seem most distant from the reigning philosophical tenets. (shrink)