Cosmopsychism, the idea that the universe is conscious, is experiencing something of a revival as an explanation of consciousness in philosophy of mind and is also making inroads into philosophy of religion. In the latter field, it has been used to formulate models of certain forms of theism, such as pantheism and panentheism, and has also been proposed as a rival to the classical theism of the Abrahamic faiths. It has been claimed by Philip Goff that a certain form of (...) cosmopsychism, namely agentive cosmopsychism, poses a threat to classical theism because it can explain features of the universe like fine-tuning without having to deal with the problem of evil. This is because, unlike the classical theist, the cosmopsychist can deny at least one of the divine attributes motivating the problem of evil, namely omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. In this paper, I shall consider which of the divine attributes the cosmopsychist should focus on when responding to the problem of evil and shall conclude that the rejection of omnibenevolence is the most satisfactory option. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall argue that Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), a disorder in which seemingly independent identities (alters) arise within the same individual, can have considerable consequences in Christian theology. I shall focus on traditional Christian understandings of the afterlife. I shall begin by outlining DID, and shall argue that in some DID cases, alters appear to be different persons according to some definitions of personhood in Christian theology. I shall then illustrate the difficulty this raises for two influential (...) ideas in the Christian tradition: the heaven and hell understanding of the afterlife, and the idea of the resurrection of the body. Finally, I shall consider some objections to the problem, and shall highlight which responses are the most plausible. (shrink)

J. L. Schellenberg's hiddenness argument is one of the key contemporary justifications for atheism and has prompted numerous responses from those defending the plausibility of belief in God. I will outline a recent counterargument from Michael C. Rea, who claims that relationships with God are far more widely available than Schellenberg assumes. However, I will suggest that it invites a response from proponents of the hiddenness argument because it leaves some nonbelievers unaccounted for. I will rectify this by suggesting that (...) a model of panentheism in which God is embodied in the cosmos allows all, including all nonbelievers, to have a relationship with God. I will then claim that semantic externalism and externalism about beliefs can enable nonbelievers to get to know this God. I will then challenge the hiddenness argument by suggesting that these relationships can accommodate the key motivations behind Schellenberg's insistence on personal relationships without requiring subjects to recognize that they are in a relationship with God. (shrink)

The primal sin is an unprecedented event because it is the moment at which creation first became corrupted. This makes it remarkably difficult to explain. In contemporary analytic discussions of the primal sin, a dichotomy has emerged. Generally, scholars working in this area accept inexplicability to avoid blaming God, resulting in a labelling of the primal sin as mysterious. In this paper, I will outline a Felix Culpa model of the primal sin, which I shall call the Primigenius Felix Culpa (...) model. Through this model, I will suggest that the primal sin was made inevitable by God to maximise the value of the actual world. I will argue that, despite inheriting many of the disadvantages that come with a Felix Culpa, this model significantly reduces the inexplicability of the primal sin. (shrink)

The primal sin is an unprecedented event because it is the moment at which creation first became corrupted. This makes it remarkably difficult to explain. In contemporary analytic discussions of the primal sin, a dichotomy has emerged. Generally, scholars working in this area accept inexplicability to avoid blaming God, resulting in a labelling of the primal sin as mysterious. In this paper, I will outline a Felix Culpa model of the primal sin, which I shall call the Primigenius Felix Culpa (...) model. Through this model, I will suggest that the primal sin was made inevitable by God to maximise the value of the actual world. I will argue that, despite inheriting many of the disadvantages that come with a Felix Culpa, this model significantly reduces the inexplicability of the primal sin. (shrink)