Karl Popper suggested that the utilitarian formula "Maximise happiness" should be replaced by the formula "Minimize suffering" - a view which has been called "negative utilitarianism". Can such a view be spelled out in a plausible way? Examining several ways of understanding the alleged ethical priority of pain over pleasure, I come to the conclusion that none of them is satisfactory as a basis for a theory of benevolence. However, once we move from hedonistic to preference utilitarianism two possible views (...) emerge which, although not fundamentally different from classical utilitarianism, diverge from it in interesting ways and seem to warrant further study. (shrink)

Parfit's Mere Addition Paradox seems to show that we must give up one of three very plausible beliefs about the relative goodness of certain outcomes, which would put a strong damper on our hopes of finding an acceptable theory of benevolence dealing with issues of procreation. I shall argue that such a result can be avoided if we challenge some basic assumptions about moral reasoning which underlie Parfit's argument. An alternative account of the nature of moral reasoning will be given, (...) and a non-standard version of Utilitarianism capable of solving the Paradox will be developed and defended. (shrink)

Karl Popper suggested that the utilitarian formula "Maximise happiness" should be replaced by the formula "Minimize suffering" - a view which has been called "negative utilitarianism". Can such a view be spelled out in a plausible way? Examining several ways of understanding the alleged ethical priority of pain over pleasure, I come to the conclusion that none of them is satisfactory as a basis for a theory of benevolence. However, once we move from hedonistic to preference utilitarianism two possible views (...) emerge which, although not fundamentally different from classical utilitarianism, diverge from it in interesting ways and seem to warrant further study. (shrink)