In the present paper, it is shown that Kant in his theory of fine art from the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment proves to be a proponent of aesthetic cognitivism, according to which art is, first, a source of non-trivial knowledge and, second, this knowledge also has aesthetic relevance. This issue has been raised several times in the recent research literature, but has not been substantiated, or only briefly. Central to this is Kant's conception of aesthetic ideas, with which fine art (...) symbolizes intellectual ideas of various genesis and with which his theory of art acquires a content-aesthetic dimension. Discussing recent research literature, an interpretation for the conception of aesthetic ideas and the accompanying expressive dimension of fine art is offered in a first part. Based on this, it will be shown in a second part that Kant hereby proves to be a representative of aesthetic cognitivism; this is shown by the fact that his theory of art confirms both criteria of aesthetic cognitivism. (shrink)

During the period of competitive capitalism legal theory understands by law only the general rule and not every command of the sovereign. To say that the law is general is to give not only a description of its formal structure but also to indicate that it has a minimum of material content in that it guarantees a minimum of freedom. General law alone makes possible the independence of judges. It provides regulations for human spheres of freedom (personal, political, economic, and (...) social) and for human institutions. The main institution of modern society, private property in the means of production, is surrounded by supplementary liberties, namely, freedom of contract and of trade which serve to protect it and to implement its operation. In the period of competitive capitalism the legal system is considered to be a closed system of general norms which are to be applied by the judge ; the interpretation of law is therefore dogmatic.Legal theory and legal practice undergo decisive changes in the stage of monopoly capitalism. The German republic, based upon a series of social contracts, attempted to realize the principle of pluralism, that is to say, a parity between workers and employers, between Reich and federal states, between church and state. The very nature of this pluralistic structure, however, strengthened the power of the bureaucracy and thereby weakened the rule of law. Although the theory of the generality of law had disappeared from German constitutional theory during the Bismarckian period, it was restored in the Weimar Republic. This period is also characterized by the victory of the school of free discretion which demands that the judge is freed from the fetters of positive law and shifts the center of gravity of the legal system to those legal standards of conduct which grant to the judge considerable free discretion. These legal standards of conduct are stressed since they are an excellent means for furthering monopolistic interests to which rational law merely constitutes an obstacle. The administrative act which, as the command of the sovereign, directly protects monopolistic situations, became the new supplementary institution of property. The legal theory of monopoly capitalism is the institutionalism which National Socialism calls „thinking according to concrete orders and structures.“ Institutionalism hypostatizes the concept of institution and divorces it from the property owner. The reason for this change is that the concept of the legal person facilitates the discovery of the fact that only a few people exercise economic power. At the same time law becomes an arcanum dominationis, that is to say, a mere command of the Leader. If we understand by law a system of norms distinguished from the will or command of the sovereign, then we must deny a specific legal character to the legal system of the authoritarian state.Pendant la période du capitalisme de concurrence, la théorie du droit réserve le nom de loi à la seule loi universelle et non pas à tout commandement du souverain. La généralité ne caractérise pas seulement la structure formelle de la loi, elle implique aussi un certain contenu, en ce sens qu'elle garantit un minimum de liberté. Car seule la loi générale rend possible la véritable indépendance du juge. La loi générale règle les sphères de la liberté (personnelle, politique, économique et sociale) et les institutions humaines. L'institution fondamentale de la société bourgeoise, la propriété privée dés instruments de production, est entourée de libertés connexes, à savoir celles du contrat et de l'activité économique, nécessaires à la protection et à l'exercice de la propriété. Dans le capitalisme de concurrence, le système juridique est un système fermé, sans lacunes, de normes générales que le juge n'a qu’à appliquer. Aussi, la jurisprudence est, elle aussi, dogmatique.Dans le capitalisme de monopole, théorie et pratique juridiques subissent une transformation décisive. La république allemande qui reposait sur une multiplicité de contrats sociaux, avait tenté de réaliser le principe du pluralisme, c'est-à-dire de mettre sur le même plan travailleurs et entrepreneurs, Reich et pays, État et Église. Mais précisément cette construction pluraliste accrut la puissance de la bureaucratie et affaiblit ainsi l'autorité de la loi. L'idée de l'universalité de la loi, disparue pendant la période bismarckienne de la théorie allemande de l'État, fut restaurée durant la République de Weimar. En même temps, l'école du droit libre triomphe, école qui veut libérer le juge des chaînes de la loi positive et qui met l'accent sur les formules générales qui laissent une large place à la libre appréciation du juge. Ces formules sont maintenant au centre de la théorie aussi bien que de la pratique, parce qu'elles sont pour les intérêts de monopole un excellent instrument, tandis que le droit rationnel constitue pour ceux-ci un obstacle. Désormais c'est l'acte d'administration par lequel la souveraineté de l'État protège directement les situations de monopole, qui devient l'annexe institutionnel de la propriété privée. La théorie juridique du capitalisme de monopole est l'institutionalisme qui, dans le national-socialisme, prend le nom de „pensée concrète de l'ordre et de l'organisation“. L'institutionalisme donne une valeur absolue au concept de l'institution et le détache du propriétaire. Car le concept juridique de la personne permet de découvrir qu'un petit nombre d'individus exercent une énorme puissance économique. En même temps l'autorité devient mystère, pur et simple commandement du chef.Si l'on entend par droit un système* de normes, qui se distingue de la volonté du souverain, il faut refuser au droit de l'État autoritaire le caractère spécifiquement juridique. (shrink)

First published in 1987. The legal and political writings of the German Social Democrats Kirchheimer and Neumann, from the period prior to the National Socialist seizure of power, are little known to English readers. This volume presents a selection of important essays from this period, which focus on the prospects for the constitutional realization of a social democratic order in the first German Republic - the Weimar Republic, created out of the collapse of the monarchy in 1918, and destroyed by (...) the National Socialists in 1933. Both Kirchheimer and Neumann were active as lawyers in the later 1920s and early 1930s, the latter especially having a close connection with trade union legislation and labour law. From their viewpoint as Social Democrats and lawyers they present incisive analyses of the problems confronted by the attempt to realize the ideal of a social Rechtsstaat in a political environment increasingly dominated by forces on left and right which saw constitutional order only as a means to seize power, and not as a legitimate form of order in itself. In these circumstances, political issues translated into constitutional issues, and thus could be analysed in terms of the aims and objectives of a given constitutional order. A substantial introduction by the volume's editor, Keith Tribe, presents the political and theoretical background to these essays, which range over questions of industrial democracy, political representation, parliamentary rule and the role of judicial review. These issues are once more on the political agenda of Western industrial democracies, and the analyses of Kirchheimer and Neumann have lost none of their force and relevance, despite the catastrophic 'failure' of Weimar democracy in 1933. (shrink)

Es ist mir eine grosse Genugtuung, die vorliegende Sammlung von Ar­ beiten eines Autors einzufuhren, der es verdient hatte, dass seine philo­ sophischen Schriften schon Hingst ihren Weg zum Verleger gefunden hatten. Da Dr. Frederick Neumann aber, nach seiner Auswanderung nach Amerika, seine ganze Zeit seinen Theologiearbeiten in englischer Sprache gewidmet hatte, war es seiner Witwe, Edith Neumann, be­ schieden, dieselben erst nach seinem Tode an wiirdiger Stelle zu ver­ offentlichen. Ich selbst bin die Witwe seines Freundes Philip Merlan, der, (...) wie ich, diese Arbeiten unseres Studienkameraden aus der Wiener Universitats­ zeit ungemein hochgeschatzt und Frederick Neumann immer zur Aus­ gabe seiner J ugendschriften zugeredet hat. Frederick Neumann ist am IO. Januar I899, in Wien, geboren und hat, wahrend und nach Beendigung seiner Studienzeit, bei Gomperz, Husserl und Heidegger gearbeitet. Er ist spater seiner eigenen Ge­ dankenrichtung gefolgt und hat gehofft einmal, in Musse, seine philo­ sophischen Arbeiten, moglicherweise in kompletterer Fassung, dem Druck zu ubergeben. Sein Interesse fur Religionsphilosophie und Theologie leitete ihn fruh zur praktischen Seelsorge und, im Jahre I938, zur Ordination als Minister der "Congregational Union of England and Wales." Nach vielseitiger Tatigkeit als Pfarrer und Lehrer, wurde er, nach seiner Auswanderung nach Amerika, Pastor der Bushwick A venue Congrega­ tional Church in Brooklyn, New York und in den letzten sechs J ahren seines Lebens ubte er, als "Visiting Professor" der Hartford Seminary Foundation, einen besonderen Einfluss auf einen grossen Kreis von Student en und Kollegen aus. (shrink)