Bargaining games have played a prominent role in modeling the evolution of social conventions. Previous models assumed that agents must choose from a predetermined set of strategies. I present a new model of two agents learning in bargaining games in which new strategies must be invented and reinforced. I study the efficiency and fairness of the model outcomes. The outcomes are somewhat efficient, but a significant part of the resource is wasted nonetheless. I implement two forms of forgetting, and restrictions (...) to the set of strategies that can be invented. (shrink)

General epistemic polarization arises when the beliefs of a population grow further apart, in particular when all agents update on the same evidence. Epistemic factionalization arises when the beliefs grow further apart, but different beliefs also become correlated across the population. I present a model of how factionalization can emerge in a population of ideally rational agents. This kind of factionalization is driven by probabilistic relations between beliefs, with background beliefs shaping how the agents’ beliefs evolve in the light of (...) new evidence. Moreover, I show that in such a model, the only possible outcomes from updating on identical evidence are general convergence or factionalization. Beliefs cannot spread out in all directions: if the beliefs overall polarize, then it must result in factionalization. (shrink)

The “sloppy models” program originated in systems biology, but has seen applications across a range of fields. Sloppy models are dependent on a large number of parameters, but highly insensitive to the vast majority of parameter combinations. Sloppy models proponents claim that the program may explain the success of science. I argue that the sloppy models program can at best provide a very partial explanation. Drawing a parallel with renormalization group realism, I argue that it would only give us grounds (...) for a minimal kind of scientific realism. Nonetheless, the program can offer certain epistemic virtues. (shrink)

Recent work on the evolution of social contracts and conventions has often used models of bargaining games, with reinforcement learning. A recent innovation is the requirement that every strategy must be invented either through through learning or reinforcement. However, agents frequently get stuck in highly-reinforced “traps” that prevent them from arriving at outcomes that are efficient or fair to the both players. Agents face a trade-off between exploration and exploitation, i.e. between continuing to invent new strategies and reinforcing strategies that (...) have already become highly reinforced by yielding high rewards. In this paper I systematically study the relationship between rates of invention and the efficiency and fairness of outcomes in two-player, repeated bargaining games. I use a basic reinforcement learning model with invention, and five variations of this model, designed introduce various forms of forgetting, to prioritize more recent reinforcement, or to maintain a higher rate of invention. I use computer simulations to investigate the outcomes of each model. Each models shows qualitative similarities in the relationship between the efficiency and fairness of outcomes, and the relative amount of exploration or exploitation that takes place. Surprisingly, there are often trade-offs between the efficiency and the fairness of the outcomes. (shrink)